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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. *Misuse of Official National Labor Relations Board Documents in
Certification Elections: C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB'
Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act")
provides that upon the stipulation of a union and an employer, or
upon the National Labor Relations Board's (the "NLRB" or
"Board") determination that there is a dispute regarding union
representation, a representation election shall be held. 2 A represen-
tative union elected by a majority of the appropriate employee
group becomes that group's exclusive collective bargaining agent.'
Under section 9 of the Act, the NLRB has extensive responsibility
for providing election procedures and has broad discretion in de-
termining when an employer's or union's actions have jeopardized
employees' freedom of choice. 4
In exercising its supervisory power over certification elections,
the Board has held that where a party has altered or embellished a
NLRB document so as to suggest that the NLRB favors one party,
the NLRB will overturn the election.' In 1954, the NLRB in Allied
Electric Products, Inc. stated that in the future, it would set aside the
results of any election where it found that the successful party had
distributed altered copies of the NLRB's official election ballot.° In
* By Heidi Schenk, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 844 17.2d 880, 128 L.R.R.M. 2203 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
2 National Labor Relations Act §§ 9(c)(1), (4), 29 U.S.C.
	
1511(c)(1), (4) (1959). This
note will use the terms "representation election" and "certification election" interchangeably
to refer to elections held to determine whether employees desire union representation.
3 National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1959).
4 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR Law 309-10 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) (citing NLRB v. Sanitary
Laundry, Inc., 441 1.2d 1368, 1369, 77 L.R.R.M. 2359, 2360 (10th Cir. 1970)).
5 THE DEVELOPING LABOR Law, supra note 4, at 322. See infra notes 6-11 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the NLRB's treatment of a party's misuse of an official Board
document during a certification election.
6 109 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1272, '39 L.R.R.M. 1538, 1539 (I 959). The NLRB decided that:
in the future [the NLRB) will not permit reproduction of any document pur-
porting to be a copy of the Board's official ballot, other than one completely
unaltered in form and content and clearly marked sample on its face, and upon
objection validly filed, will set aside the results of any election in- which the
successful party has violated this rule.
Id.
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Allied Electric, a union distributed copies of an election ballot that
had a large "YES" printed to the left of the yes box and an "X" in
the yes box. The union also added an additional line to the bottom
of the ballot that read, "Do not mark it any other way — Mark `Yes'
box only."' The NLRB concluded that, at a minimum, any copy of
an official NLRB election ballot that is altered for campaign pur-
poses tends to suggest that the NLRB approves of the ballot's con-
tents. Thus, the Board stated that in the future, it would find a
successful party's use of an altered NLRB ballot in an election to
be per se misleading, regardless of its actual effect on the voters,
and would set aside the election. 8 The NLRB subsequently ex-
panded the Allied Electric rule to include the alteration of other
official NLRB documents. 9
The NLRB generally adhered to the rule that alteration of an
official Board document was per se misleading until 1982, when it
asserted in Midland National Life Insurance Co. that employees are
able to recognize the truthfulness of campaign propaganda and to
discount that which is inaccurate. 19 In 1985, the Board expressly
overruled the Allied Electric per se approach in SDC Investments, Inc.
In SDC, the NLRB held that it would not invalidate an election
when an altered official NLRB ballot clearly identified the party
that had prepared the document. The NLRB reasoned that, where
it was clear that one of the parties prepared the altered ballot, it
was unlikely that employees would mistakenly believe that the
NLRB supported that party in the election. If, however, the altered
ballot did not clearly identify the responsible party, the NLRB held
that it would examine the nature and contents of the campaign
material on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the material
Id. at 1271, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
Id, at 1272, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1539.
9 See, e.g., Rebmar, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1434, 1434, 70 L.R.R.M. 1018, 1018 (1968). In
Rebmar, the NLRB set aside an election where a union passed out a handbill consisting of a
portion of the NLRB's election notice and of statements the union made. Id. The NLRB
stated that its "concern [was) not with the substance of the material added to the Board's
official notice of election, but with the possible impact such a partisan message added to an
official Board document, or copy thereof, might have on the freedom of choice of the voter."
Id. Thus the NLRB held that, regardless of whether the additions to the election notice were
innocuous, it would set aside the election results and direct that a new election be held. Id.
at 1434, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1019; see also GAF Corp., 234 N.L.R.B 1209, 1209-10, 97 L.R.R.M.
1417, 1418 (1978) (NLRB set aside election where union used NLRB letterhead, even though
union's name appeared at bottom of page).
LO 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 132, 110 L.R.R.M. 1489, 1493 (1978).
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was likely to mislead voters into believing that the NLRB supported
one party's position."
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB upheld the
NLRB's determination that a union's distribution of an administra-
tive law judge's decision, embellished with cartoons and campaign
slogans, did not mislead "reasonable employees" into believing that
the NLRB supported the union.' 2 The court expressed concern,
however, over the NLRB's use of the phrase "reasonable employee,"
because the phrase indicated that, even in a close election, the Board
would not consider the tendency of an altered NLRB document to
mislead less astute employees. Although the court did not reverse
the NLRB on this issue, the court noted that the Board should
explain its use of the "reasonable employee" standard, if that was
the Board's chosen standard.' 3 Consequently, after Krehbiel, the
NLRB will probably examine the closeness of an election in deter-
mining whether the altered Board document has the tendency to
make employees believe that the NLRB favored one party over
another.
In C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, the parties held the certification
election to determine whether the Graphic Communications Inter-
national Union (the "union") would represent C.J. Krehbiel's
("Krehbiel") employees. Krehbiel objected to the union's distribu-
tion of Byers prior to a certification election. 14 The union also rep-
resented employees of a nearby firm, Neilsen Lithographic Com-
pany ("Neilsen"), and its status at Neilsen, as well as its ability to
represent the Neilsen employees, became a crucial aspect of both
parties' campaigns in the Krehbiel election.' 5
Two days before the election at Krehbiel, the union distributed
a flyer containing the remedies section of an administrative law
judge's favorable decision regarding the union's charge that Neilsen
had engaged in unfair labor practices. The union embellished the
margins of the decision with cartoons and campaign slogans. Al-
though the union distributed the flyer in an envelope bearing its
name, the document itself was not identified as coming from, or
" 274 N.L.R.B. 556, 557, 118 L.R.R.M. 1410, 1412 (1985).
' 2 844 F.2d 881, 881, 885, 128 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2204 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 885, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
14 Id. at 882, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2204.
' 5 Id. at 881, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2204.
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having been embellished by, the union. The following day, the
union distributed a second campaign flyer, on union letterhead,
identifying the first flyer as "an actual copy of a recommended
notice issued by an N.L.R.B. Administrative Law Judge." The sec-
ond flyer was also covered with cartoons and partisan slogans. The
certification election was held the next day, and the union prevailed
by two votes.
Krehbiel subsequently filed objections with the NLRB's Re-
gional Director, alleging that the union's distribution of the first
campaign flyer misled Krehbiel employees into believing that the
NLRB favored the union. The Regional Director recommended
that the NLRB overrule Krehbiel's objections. ' 6 Applying the stan-
dard set forth in SDC, a three-member panel of the NLRB first
determined that the flyer did not on its face clearly identify its
source. The Board next evaluated whether the flyer tended to give
employees the mistaken impression that the NLRB supported the
union in the election. The Board found that a "reasonable em-
ployee" would not believe that the margins of a decision written by
an administrative law judge would be filled with partisan slogans, a
five-inch crowing rooster, and other cartoons. 17
 Moreover, the
NLRB reasoned that employees would recognize that the adminis-
trative law judge's decision applied to Neilsen, which was not a party
to the upcoming certification election. Finally, the NLRB noted that
the placement and sheer size of the cartoons and campaign slogans
lent weight to the conclusion that they were not a part of the
administrative law judge's decision, but instead were additions made
by some third party. The Board also concluded, over the objections
of a dissenting Board member, that the second flyer, distributed
one day before the election, clearly identified the first flyer as the
union's campaign propaganda.'s Consequently, the NLRB adopted
the recommendations and findings of the Regional Director by a
vote of two to one, and certified the union as the employees' exclu-
sive collective bargaining representative.' 9
In opposition to the Board's decision, Krehbiel declined to
recognize and bargain with the union, prompting the union to file
an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. In response to the
union's charge, the NLRB issued a complaint against Krehbiel,
Id. at 882, 128 L.R.R.M, at 2204.
17 Id. at 884, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2206.
18 Id. at 885, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
19 Id. at 882, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2204.
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alleging that the company violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act. Krehbiel in turn argued that the union was not properly cer-
tified. Krehbiel's arguments did not convince the Board, which
granted the union's motion for summary judgment, stating that
Krehbiel had not raised any special circumstances or previously
unavailable evidence that would require the Board to reconsider its
prior ruling. Thus, the NLRB ordered Krehbiel to recognize the
union as the employees' exclusive bargaining representative. 2" Kreh-
biel subsequently asked the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia to review and overturn the NLRB's order on
the grounds that the NLRB departed from established Board prec-
edent and that the NLRB's decision was not supported by substan-
tial evidence. 21
The court of appeals upheld the NLRB's decision that the
union flyers did not falsely lead employees to believe that the NLRB
supported the union's position in the certification election. 22 The
court first noted that because the NLRB has a great degree of
discretion in its decisions regarding representation elections, the
court could only overturn a Board decision when the party attempt-
ing to have the election set aside could show that the other party's
conduct interfered with the employees' freedom of choice "to such
an extent that it materially effected the election." Thus, the court
stated that if it found that the NLRB had followed established
precedent and that the Board's decision was backed by substantial
evidence, it would defer to the NLRB."
The court next addressed the issue of whether the NLRB's
decision conformed with Board precedent. 24 The court traced the
development of NLRB doctrine surrounding the use of official
NLRB documents in certification elections, and determined that the
NLRB had set forth the current legal standard in SDC Investment,
Inc. 25 In SDC, the NLRB rejected the Allied Electric rule that an
altered NLRB ballot is per se misleading. Instead, the Board in SDC
stated that it would examine the contents and nature of an altered
20 Id. at 882, 128 L.R.R.M, at 2205.
21 Id. at 882-83, 128 L.R.R.M, at 2205. Under sections 10(e) and (f) of the National
Labor Relations Act, the federal courts have limited review of NLRB decisions regarding
parties' conduct during certification elections, See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v.
NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 827, 73 L.R.R.M. 2323, 2330 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
C.J. Krehbiel CO. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 881, 128 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2204 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
25 Id. at 882, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2205.
24 Id. at 883-84, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2205-06.
25 Id. at 883, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2205-06.
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official NLRB document to determine whether it tended to mislead
employees only when the document did not clearly identify the
source of the propaganda. The court stated that Krehbiel did not
dispute SDC's application to its case, but instead argued that the
Board had not followed SDC correctly. According to the court,
Krehbiel asserted that the NLRB's error was evident when the facts
and the NLRB's ruling in the present case were compared with the
facts and rulings of pre-SDC cases that SDC did not overrule. 26
 The
court noted, however, that the earlier decisions of which the NLRB
expressly approved in SDC deviated from the NLRB's per se ap-
proach in Allied Electric. Consequently, the court reasoned that the
NLRB clearly had followed the analytical framework of SDC.27
The court next examined Krehbiel's claim that the NLRB's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 28 The court
initially noted that if one more employee had voted against the
union, the union would have failed to obtain the majority it needed
to become the employees' exclusive bargaining representative.
Thus, the court reasoned, the case merited the NLRB's careful
consideration because the flyers needed to mislead only one voter
to alter the election results.
In determining whether the Board's decision was supported by
substantial evidence, the court focused upon the Board's three con-
clusions with respect to the effect of the union's flyer. First, the
court examined the Board's conclusion that no "reasonable em-
26 Id. at 883, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2206.
27 Id. at 884, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2206. The court stated that:
[w]hile Krehbiel [was] correct in its assertion that the Board in SDC did nut
intend to disapprove all pre-SDC decisions, it fail[ed] to recognize that in the
older decisions specifically approved of in SDC, Associated Lerner Shops of America,
207 N.L.R.B. 348 (1973), and Stedman Wholesale Distributors, 203 N.L.R.B. 302
(1973), the Board panels had in practice disregarded the per se rule.
Id.
In Associated Lerner Shops, the union argued that the employer distributed a sample ballot
prior to the election that interfered with the election in violation of the Allied Electric rule.
207 N.L.R.B. 348, 349, 84 L.R.R.M. 1463, 1464 (1973). The Board held that the sample
ballot was unlikely to lead employees to believe that the NLRB endorsed the employer's
position. Id. Similarly, in Stedman, an employer distributed a sample ballot urging employees
to vote against the union. 203 N.L.R.B. 302, 302, 304, 83 L.R.R.M. 1055, 1056 (1973). The
Board found that the sample ballot distributed by the employer did not constitute a copy of
the official NLRB ballot. Id. The Board rioted that the sample ballot made no reference to
the NLRB and was smaller in size than an official ballot. Id. Thus, the Board held that "the
ballot did not give the appearance of an official ballot nor would it have misled employees
into believing that [the] Agency or the Government endorsed a particular choice." Id.
" C J, Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 881, 884-86, 128 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2206-07 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
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ployee" would believe that an administrative law judge would in-
clude partisan slogans, pictures of crowing roosters and other car-
toons in an opinion. Krehbiel argued that the Board could not
assume that the employees knew what a normal NLRB opinion
looked like, and asked the court to decide the question de novo. 29
The court noted that, because the NLRB's decision was based
solely on a written record, Krehbiel's argument had superficial ap-
peal." Nevertheless, the Krehbiel court refrained from reaching an
independent conclusion, reasoning that it must give the Board's
factual conclusions greater deference than the clearly erroneous
standard that a court of appeals affords a trial court. 3 ' The court
emphasized that Congress had charged the NLRB with the respon-
sibility of determining whether flaws in the election process had
interfered with the employees' free choice. Thus, the court reasoned
that its duty to defer to the NLRB was especially great.
The court expressed its concern, however, over the NLRB's
use of the phrase "reasonable employee" to determine whether the
flyers had a tendency to mislead employees. The court reasoned
that inherent in the adoption of the SDC case-by-case approach to
misleading tendencies was a need to consider the flyer within the
entire context of the election. According to the court, that context
included the possibility that the flyer would mislead less astute
employees, and thus affect the results of a close election. As a result,
the court expressed "puzzlement" over the NLRB's failure to ex-
amine whether, in a close election, the union's distribution of an
altered Board document might have led some of the less capable
employees to believe that the NLRB supported one party.
Noting that the NLRB used the term "reasonable employee"
only once, and that Krehbiel had failed to address directly this issue,
the court held that it would not reverse the NLRB's decision merely
because the Board used the phrase "reasonable employee." The
court suggested, however, that the "Board w[ould] doubtless wish
to explicate its decision to apply a 'reasonable employee' test in close
elections, if that indeed is the test to which the Board adheres."
The second of the Board's conclusions that the Krehbiel court
examined was that Krehbiel's employees would realize that the ad-
T9 Id. at 884, 128 1...R.R.M. at 2206.
3° Id. at 884, 128 L.R.R,M, at 2207.
31 Id. at 885, 128 L,R,R.M. at 2207. The court noted that "Congress has charged the
Board, a special and expert body, with the duty of judging the tendency of electoral flaws to
distort 'the employees' ability to make a free choice.'" Id. (quoting Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559,1556-64 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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ministrative law judge's opinion concerned the Neilsen dispute,
would know that Neilsen was not a party in the certification election,
and thus would recognize that the cartoons and slogans were not
part of the NLRB's opinion. The court, assuming arguendo that
Krehbiel's employees knew that the opinion was not related to the
upcoming election, was not convinced that all of the employees
would conclude that the union had added the cartoons to the opin-
ion. The court, however, could not say that the Board's conclusion
was unreasonable.
The third of the Board's findings that the Krehbiel court con-
sidered was that the physical size of the cartoons, and their place-
ment on the flyer, would be a further indication to Krehbiel's em-
ployees that the union added the cartoons and slogans. The court
agreed that, although it was possible that an administrative law
judge would embellish an opinion with a five-inch crowing rooster,
it was unlikely that an employee would conclude that the cartoons
were part of the decision itself. 52 Consequently, the Krehbiel court
deferred to the Board and upheld the Board's decision that the
flyers did not tend to mislead Krehbiel's employees into believing
that the NLRB favored the union's position in the upcoming cer-
tification election."
The Krehbiel court properly deferred to Board as Congress'
chosen means of safeguarding employees' rights in certification
elections. Its concern, however, that the Board's future use of a
"reasonable employee" standard could, in close elections, result in
diminished protection of employees' free choice is valid. Although
in SDC the NLRB moved away from the rigid, "per se misleading"
approach of Allied Electric, the Board did not intend to relax its
attempts to provide a fair, unbiased environment in which employ-
ees could freely accept or reject union representation. Instead of
resulting in a less stringent review of the parties' use of altered
official Board documents prior to a certification election, the SDC
rule served as an effective way to distinguish harmless uses of official
NLRB documents from uses that infringed on employees' ability to
exercise their right to make a free and unfettered choice. Thus, in
the future, the NLRB should address the Krehbiel court's concerns
by avoiding total reliance on a "reasonable employee" standard and,
instead, examining allegedly misleading campaign flyers in the con-
text of the entire election.
ss Krehbiel, 844 F.2d at 885, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
33 Id. at 885-86, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
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In C j. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, if one more employee had voted
against union representation, the union would have lost the election.
Consequently, if the union's flyers improperly swayed one em-
ployee, their distribution resulted in an impermissible outcome."
Although the NLRB applied the SDC test to the facts of Krehbiel, it
failed to acknowledge that the closeness of the Krehbiel certification
merited closer and more careful scrutiny. Instead, the NLRB used
a "reasonable employee" standard to determine whether a voter
would believe that an administrative law judge would include car-
toons and campaign slogans in a decision.
The Krehbiel court, however, recognized that, under the SDC
test, the NLRB must examine the altered Board document within
the context of the entire election. Most employers have employees
with varying intellectual capabilities. Less astute employees are cer-
tainly less likely to realize that a party to the election is responsible
for an altered board document, or that the document does not
reflect the NLRB's position or opinion in the election. In a close
election, the potential misconceptions of less astute employees be-
come much more significant. When, as in the Krehbiel election, the
outcome could have been altered by only one vote, it is critical that
the altered Board document not mislead even one employee.
The Krehbiel court recognized the possible objection that an
approximation of the pre-SDC rule might result if the Board con-
sidered the impressions of less astute employees when an election
was close." This, however, is an inadequate objection to the use of
such a standard. The Board has remained dedicated to ensuring
that the election atmosphere encourages employees to make an
independent, well-informed decision about union representation.
The SDC rule, which did away with Allied Electric's-
 per se misleading
approach, distinguishes between altered official Board documents
that are misleading and those that voters can clearly and easily
identify as propaganda.
In a close election, if an altered Board document misleads one
employee, the results of the election may be skewed. Thus, it may
be necessary for the Board to rule that an altered board document
is per se misleading if, in a close election, the responsible party is
not clearly identified on the document's face. Such a rule would
allow the Board to continue, in the majority of cases, to distinguish
between harmful and harmless uses of official Board documents.
34 Id, at 884, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2206.
" ld. at 885, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
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In cases where it is difficult to determine whether the altered doc-
ument improperly effected the election results, the rule would err
on the side of ensuring the employees' right to a fair election
process. If, in the future, the NLRB does not carefully consider the
perceptions of all employees in determining whether an altered
Board document could have skewed the results of a close election,
the Board will be unable to ensure that employees have an oppor-
tunity to make an informed choice about union representation.
In summary, the court in CI. Krehbiel v. NLRB upheld the
NLRB's ruling that flyers distributed by the union did not have the
tendency to mislead reasonable employees into believing that the
Board favored the union. 3° The court did, however, express "puz-
zlement" that the NLRB failed to consider the closeness of the
election under the case-by-case analysis mandated by the NLRB in
SDC Investments, Inc. The court's concern over the NLRB's reliance
on a "reasonable employee" test in such a close race reflects the
court's recognition of the continuing need to protect employees'
right to decide freely whether to elect a union as their exclusive
bargaining representative. Because the NLRB is Congress's chosen
means of protecting employees' rights in a certification election, the
Krehbiel court properly deferred to the Board. 37 In future cases,
however, the NLRB should ensure a fair and unbiased election
process by carefully examining all of the circumstances surrounding
a party's distribution of altered Board documents during a certifi-
cation election campaign.
B.*Changed Interpretation of Section 8(f) of the National Labor
Relations Act: Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern
California District Council of Laborers'
Section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or
"the Act") authorizes prehire contracts between employees and
unions in the building and construction industries. 2 Under section
36 Id. at 885-86, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
37 Id. at 885, 128 L.R,R.M. at 2207.
*By James M. Wilton, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 861 F.2d 1124, 129 L.R.R.M, 3073 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
7 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1982). Section 8(f) provides:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice ... for an employer engaged primarily
in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering em-
ployees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the
building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building
and construction employees are members ... because (1) the majority status of
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8(f), an employer may enter into a prehire agreement with a union
before a majority of employees has approved the union as its bar-
gaining representative.' Section 8(f )'s sanction of prehire contracts
is an exception to provisions of the NLRA that guarantee employees
the right to select their own bargaining representative. 4 For many
years, the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") construed
section 8(f) narrowly, holding that a prehire agreement was merely
a preliminary step to the creation of a full collective bargaining
agreement and, as such, was voidable-at-will once a workforce was
hired.' In 1978, the United States Supreme Court endorsed this
interpretation of section 8(0. 6 In 1987, the Board changed its in-
terpretation, holding that a prehire agreement is binding for its
term.' During the Survey year, in Mesa Verde Construction Co. v.
Northern California District Council of Laborers, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an en banc decision adopted the
Board's new interpretation of section 8(f ). 8
such labor organization has not been established . . prior to the making of
such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment,
membership in such labor organization .. or (3) such agreement requires the
employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment
with such employer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer
qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies min-
imum training or experience qualification for employment ... Provided further,
That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection,
shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) of this
title.
Id. (emphasis in original).
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(f)(1) (1982).
4 NLRB v. Iron Workers, Local 103, 434 U.S. 335, 344-45, 97 L.R.R.M. 2333, 2337
(1978) [hereinafter Higdon]; 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (providing that lehnployees shall have
the right ... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing"); see
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 757, 48 L.R.R.M. 2251,
2253 (1961) ($ 157 "assur[es] employees the right 'to bargain collectively through represen-
tatives of their own choosing.'"); NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 312, 105
L.R.R.M. 2059, 2075 (5th Cir. 1980), modified,  641 F.2d 351, 106 L.R.R.M. 2998 (1981) (right
of employees to select their own representatives is the "most sacrosanct" right guaranteed
under the NLRA).
5 Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702, 77 L.R.R.M. 1497, 1498 (1971); see R.J.
Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 695, 77 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1495-96 (1971), enforcement
denied sub nom., Local 150, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1191,
83 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6 Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2336; see Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S.
260, 266-67, 113 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2115 (1983).
7
 John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1377, 124 L.R.R.M. 1185, 1187 (1987),
enforced sub nom., Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 779-80, 128 L.R.R.M. 2020,
2028 (3d Cir. 1988).
861 F.2d 1124, 1134, 129 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3080 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
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Congress enacted section 8(1) in response to problems encoun-
tered in applying the NLRA to the construction industry's Prior to
the enactment of section 8(f), the Act prohibited companies from
bargaining with an uncertified union and, under the Act, a union
could not be certified as a bargaining representative until employees
were hired.' 9 .Despite the technical illegality of prehire agreements,
the construction industry continued to engage in the practice." The
congressional committees that reported on section 8(f) as a pro-
posed amendment to the NLRA recognized that the construction
industry, because it often hired on a project-by-project basis, re-
quired a supply of skilled workers for quick referral.' 2
 The com-
mittees also noted that the nature of the industry's bidding process
made it necessary for employers to know their labor costs before a
project began.' 5
 Based on these unique characteristics of the con-
struction industry, the committees concluded that Congress should
validate the industry practice of engaging in prehire contracts."
Section 8(1) does not grant prehire contracts the same statutory
protection that collective bargaining agreements enjoy under the
Act. Under a section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement a labor
union is protected by "contract bar" rules that guarantee that a
union's majority status as collective bargaining representative is free
from challenge for up to three years following a certification elec-
tion. 15
 Section 8(1), by contrast, contains a final proviso that permits
9 S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2318, 2344 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19,
reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2424, 2442 [hereinafter' HOUSE REPORT].
m SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2344; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2442; see
Chicago Freight Car & Parts Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1164-65, 24 L.R.R.M. 1190, 1192
(1949).
ii Note, Pre-hire Agreements and Section 8(f) of the NLBA: Striking a Proper Balance Between
Employee Freedom of Choice and Construction Industry Stability, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1014, 1017
(1982). Before the enactment of section 8(1'), the Board's General Counsel recognized the
need for prehire agreements in the construction industry and instituted a policy of not
issuing complaints against construction employers and unions. Id. When private parties
brought complaints, however, the Board continued to enforce the law by declaring prehire
agreements illegal. Id. at 1017 n.22.
•12 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2345; House REPORT, supra note 9, at 2442.
la
	 REPORT, supra note 9, at 2344-45; House REPORT, supra note 9, at 2442.
" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2442; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2344-45.
19 See, e.g., Westwood Import Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1216, app. A at 1222, 105 L.R.R.M.
1515, 1518 (1980) (decision of Board citing with approval decision of administrative law
judge reproduced in appendix A). The Board's "contract bar" rules protect challenges to a
union's continuing majority status for the first three years of an existing collective bargaining
agreement unless the challenge is made during an "open period" of sixty to ninety days prior
to the expiration of the agreement. Id.
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employer, union, or employees to challenge a prehire agreement at
any time by petitioning the Board to decertify the union.'
For many years, the NLRB has interpreted the final proviso of
section 8(1) broadly, holding that a prehire agreement was no more
than a preliminary step to developing a full collective bargaining
relationship." Accordingly, the Board held that Congress intended
that section 8(f) agreements should be voidable-at-will by either
party, without need for a certification election to determine if a
union possessed majority support.'s In order for a union to chal-
lenge the repudiation of an agreement, the Board required a dem-
onstration that it had achieved majority status during the life of the
agreement, thereby converting the agreement to a full collective
bargaining contract.'`' Under this "conversion doctrine," the Board
could convert an 8(f) prehire agreement into a 9(a) collective bar-
gaining agreement based on circumstantial evidence and without
holding an employee election. 20 In 1978, in NLRB v. Iron Woilters,
15 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1982); see Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, 345, 97 L.R.R.M. 2333, 2337
(1978).
17 Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702, 77 L.R.R.M. 1497, 1498 (1971); see R.J.
Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 695, 77 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1495-96 (1971), enforcement
denied sub nom, Local 150, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1191,
83 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2710 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In R.J. Smith, the Board found that the final proviso
of section 8(r) showed that Congress intended to exempt only contractual steps preliminary
to an employer's acquisition of a workforce. Id. at 694, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1495. The Board held
that the signatory union had no presumption of majority status; an employer could challenge
the union by repudiating the agreement at any time after employees had been hired. Id. at
695, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1495-96.
18 _John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1378, 124 L.R.R.M. 1185, 1188 (1987),
enforced sub nom., Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 779-80, 128 L.R.R.M. 2020,
2028 (3d Cir. 1988); Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 422, 97 L.R.R.M,
1072, 1073 (1977); see also D'Angelo & Kahn, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 396, 397, 103 L.R.R.M.
1470, 1471-72 (1980); G.M. Masonry Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 267, 267, 272, 102 L.R.R.M. 1542,
1542 (1979) (adopting decision of administrative law judge, appended to the opinion); R.I.
Smith, 191 N.L.R.B. at 695, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1496.
19 Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1378, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1188. Under the Board's "conversion
doctrine" an 8(f) agreement can "convert" into a 9(a) collective bargaining agreement by a
showing that a signatory union had majority support among employees at some time during
the effective term of the agreement. Id. For employers with a stable workforce, majority
support must be demonstrated in the workforce as a whole. Id. at 1379, 124 L.R.R.M. at
1188-89. if an employer hires on a project-by-project basis, majority support must be
demonstrated on each job site. Id. at 1379, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1189. See Higdon, 434 U.S. 335,
345, 97 L.R.R.M. 2333, 2337 (1978).
20 Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1378, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1188. Evidence that has been consid-
ered relevant in demonstrating a union's majority support includes: the presence of an
enforced union security clause, union membership by a majority of employees, the use of
referrals from an exclusive hiring hall and employee statements and actions indicating union
support. Id.
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Local 103 (commonly cited as Higdon) 21 and later in Jim McNeff, Inc.
v. Todd, 22
 the Supreme Court endorsed the Board's interpretation
of section 8(f). The Court stated that "the Board's construction of
the Act, although perhaps not the only tenable one, is an acceptable
reading of the statutory language."" Thus, until recently, section
8(f) prehire agreements were subject to an employer's right to
repudiate the agreement unless the contracting union could dem-
onstrate its majority status.
In 1987, the Board reversed its long standing policy of allowing
the repudiation of section 8(f) prehire contracts. In John Deklewa
and Sons, the Board held that a prehire agreement was binding
upon both parties and was enforceable under the refusal-to-bargain
provisions of the NLRA. 24 The Board further held that upon ex-
piration of the agreement's term, either party may repudiate it; the
signatory union would enjoy no presumption of majority status."
The Third Circuit has since upheld the Board's ruling in Deklewa. 26
During the Survey year, in Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern
California District Council of Laborers, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the Deklewa interpretation
of section 8(f), holding that an employer could not unilaterally .
repudiate a prehire contract. 27
 The court, over a strong dissent,
found that the Supreme Court had not definitively construed sec-
tion 8(1) when it endorsed the Board's pre-Deklewa interpretation."
The court, therefore, held itself not bound by stare decisis to uphold
the pre-Deklewa interpretation. 29
 Consequently, after Mesa Verde, the
21 Higdon at 335, 341, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2335-36.
" 461 U.S. 260, 266-67, 113 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2115 (1983).
23 Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2115.
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377-78, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1187.
23 Id. Although under this holding section 8(f) permits either party to terminate its
relationship upon expiration of the prehire agreement, the parties may still be bound to
renew the agreement by contractual obligation. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 20 v. Baylor
Heating and Air Conditioning, 688 F. Supp. 462, 473, 129 L.R.R.M. 2108, 2116 (S.D. Ind.
1988) (holding that an interest arbitration clause in the prehire contract bound the parties
to either negotiate a new contract or submit to arbitration); see McNeff, 461 U.S. at 267, 113
L.R.R.M. at 2115 ("[t]here is a critical distinction between an employer's obligation under
the [NLRA] to bargain with the representative of the majority of its employees and its duty
to satisfy lawful contractual obligations that accrued after it enters a prehire contract.")
2" Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 779, 128 L.R.R.M. 2020, 2028 (3d Cir.
1988). In upholding Deklewa, the Third Circuit found that the Supreme Court's endorsement
of the Board's earlier interpretation of section 8(f) was neither definitive nor binding. Id. at
776, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2025.
27
 861 F.2d 1124, 1134, 129 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3080 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
2" Id. at 1130, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3077.
"Id.
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Board's pre-Deklewa interpretation of section 8(f) is of questionable
precedential value despite its endorsement by the Supreme Court.
Additionally, Mesa Verde raises the larger issue of when courts
should defer to agencies in statutory interpretation."
Mesa Verde Construction Company ("the Company") signed a
prehire agreement with the Northern California District Council of
Laborers ("the Union") on June 26, 1980. 3 ' The contract established
wages, hours, and working conditions for company laborers and
provided for arbitration of disputes concerning interpretation and
application of the contract's terms. 32 By its terms the contract was
in effect until June 15, 1986. On May 15, 1984, the Company sent
a letter notifying the Union of its repudiation of the contract. At
that time, the Company was employing union members on a project
in Hercules, California. In late May or early June, following noti-
fication, the Company began a non-union project in Orland, Cali-
fornia. If the prehire contract was still in effect, this project violated
its provisions."
The Company brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment validating the Company's repudiation of the prehire agree-
ment. 34 The district court found in favor of the Company and a
panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed." This panel noted that Ninth
Circuit precedent permitted employers who hire on a project-by-
project basis to repudiate prehire agreements as they pertain to
future projects. 37 The panel acknowledged the shift in NLRB policy
under the Deklewa decision but asserted that an en bane hearing was
necessary to change circuit precedent."
" This chapter will address the narrow issue of whether in Higdon the Supreme Court
held that the Board has statutory authority to interpret section 8(f). The broader policy issue
of whether courts or administrative agencies should be the primary interpretive authority
for regulatory statutes is beyond the scope of this chapter.
31 Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1126, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3074. Also at issue in Mesa Verde was
the validity of the company's repudiation of a prehire agreement with a carpenter's union.
Id. Because both agreements were identical regarding the issues before the court, a descrip-
tion of the second agreement is omitted here for clarity.
52 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 598 F. Supp.
1092, 1094, 121 L.R.R.M. 3490, 3491 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
" Mesa Verde, 598 F. Supp. at 1101, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3497.
56 Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 820 F.2d 1006,
1013, 125 L.R.R.M. 2849, 2855 (9th Cir. i987),
37 Mesa Verde, 820 F.2d at 1012, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2854.
89 Id. at 1013, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2855.
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The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted an en Banc hearing in
which it adopted the Deklewa interpretation of section 8(0. 39 The
issues before the court were, first, whether the court had the power
to adopt the Deklewa ruling in light of existing Supreme Court
precedent and second, assuming the court had the necessary power,
whether it should adopt the ruling. 40
 The court reviewed the Su-
preme Court decisions in Higdon and McNeff and concluded that
language in those decisions showed that the Supreme Court had
not definitively construed section 8(f), but rather had deferred to
the Board's interpretation of the statute.'[ Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit court held that in accord with precedent it would defer to
the Board's Deklewa interpretation if that interpretation was a rea-
sonable construction of section 8(f). 42
In deciding whether the Deklewa interpretation was a reason-
able construction of the statute, the court first considered the pur-
pose of section 8(f). The court noted that section 8(f) validated
construction contracts with unions having minority status. 43 This
purpose, the court reasoned, was inconsistent with an interpretation
that permits the unilateral abrogation of contracts if a union does
not have majority status." The court concluded that the purpose
of section 8(f) was better fulfilled by Deklewa's non-repudiation
rule.45
The court next considered the Deklewa interpretation in light
of the purposes of the NLRA as a whole. The court noted that
Congress enacted the NLRA as a balance between two competing
interests, the guarantee of employee choice in union representation
and the promotion of industry stability."' Certain provisions of the
NLRA, the Court noted, guarantee employees the right to select
their bargaining representatives while other provisions such as the
"contract bar" provisions guarantee labor relations stability. 47
 The
court noted that a likely interpretation of the final proviso of section
39
 Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124,
1126, 129 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3074 (9th Cir. 1988) (en hanc).
4" Id. at 1129, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3076.
4' Id,
42 Id. at 1129-31, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3076-78.
" Id. at 1131, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3078 (quoting Local 150, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs
v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190, 83 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2709 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
44
 Id. (quoting Local 150, 1nel Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190,
83 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2709 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
45 Id,
Id. at 1131-32, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3078.
47 Id.
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8(f) was that Congress intended to promote employee choice by
allowing the company or the employees to petition for a certification
election to verify a section 8(f) union's majority status. 48 The court
noted, however, that under the pre-Deklewa interpretation, the final
proviso was interpreted to allow an employer to unilaterally repu-
diate a contract.`'`-' Unilateral repudiation, the court reasoned, hind-
ers employee choice because an employer's decision to repudiate is
likely to be based on economic considerations rather than on a
concern for employee free choice rights.'" Furthermore, the court
noted, under the pre-Deklewa "conversion doctrine" the Board can
certify a union as bargaining representative without an employee
election ever taking place.m The court reasoned that the "conversion
doctrine," instead of promoting the employees' right to choose a
union, may prevent them from ever voting for or against a union."
The court concluded that because the Board's Deklewa interpreta-
tion eliminates the repudiation rule and the "conversion doctrine,"
it is consistent with the NLRA's principle of employee free choice."
The court also concluded that the pre-Deklewa interpretation
did not further the NLRA's purpose of promoting industry stabil-
ity. 54 The complex nature of the "conversion doctrine," the court
noted, fosters litigation. As a result, the court observed, until the
litigation is settled, the parties to a prehire agreement are unsure
of their contractual rights and obligations. The Deklewa interpreta-
tion, the court asserted, avoids litigation and uncertainty by ensur-
ing that agreements will be binding. In summary, the court con-
cluded that the Deklewa ruling was consistent with the purpose of
section 8(1) and with the principles of employee choice and labor
relations stability. Accordingly, the court adopted the ruling as law
in the Ninth Circuit."
Judge Hug, writing in dissent, argued that the Supreme Court
had definitively construed section 8(f) and that under the doctrine
of stare decisis the Ninth Circuit was precluded from adopting a
different construction of the statute." Judge Hug asserted that
45 See id. at 1132-33, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3079.
4"Id. at 1132, 129 1...R,R.M. at 3079.
5"Id,
5 ' Id. at 1133, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
" Id. at 1133,1134,129 L.R.R.M. at 3079, 3080.
51 Id. at 1134, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
54 Id,
55 Id.
TA' Id. at 1138,129 L.R.R.M. at 3083 (Hug, j., dissenting). Mesa Verde was a 6-4 en hand
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precedent establishes two distinct standards for judicial deference
to agency decisions. 57
 In cases involving questions of pure statutory
construction, Judge Hug argued, courts are the final authority and
may not delegate this authority to an administrative agency.58 Judge
Hug stated that, although a court may defer to the expertise of
agency administrators in interpreting a statute, the court's decision
is binding regardless of the degree of deference accorded the
agency. 59
 In these cases, Judge Hug concluded, the court's decision
carries the full force of stare decisis."
A second type of deference, Judge Hug stated, is appropriate
in cases involving agency decisions within the scope of authority
that Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated to the agency. 6 '
Explicit delegation, Judge Hug explained, exists when Congress
authorizes an agency to promulgate regulations or to design pro-
cedures for the implementation of a statute. 62
 Implicit delegation,
Judge Hug stated, exists when Congress intends that a statutory
interpretation should be flexible, as when Congress intends that,
statutory terms should be defined through the process of adminis-
tering a statute." When Congress has explicitly or implicitly dele-
gated authority to an agency, Judge Hug argued, courts should
defer to agency decisions unless the agency's actions are inconsistent
with the statutory scheme." Judicial decisions employing this type
of deference, Judge Hug concluded, do not bind later courts by
stare decisis."
Turning to Higdon and McNeff, the Supreme Court cases con-
struing section 8(f), Judge Hug argued that these decisions involved
an issue of pure statutory construction. 66 As a result, Judge Hug
reasoned, the Supreme Court had no choice but to definitively
interpret section 8(0. 67
 Judge Hug concluded that any deference
decision. Id. at 1125, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3074. Judge Anderson, the eleventh judge, participated
in the argument of the case but died before the decision was rendered. Id.
57 Id. at 1139, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3084 (Hug, J., dissenting).




 Id. at 1140-41, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3085-86 (Hug, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 1141, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3086 (Hug, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 1141-42, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3086 (Hug, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 1141, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3086 (Hug, J., dissenting).
65 See id. at 1140, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3085 (Hug, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1142, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3087 (Hug, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1144, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3088 (Hug, J., dissenting).
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given to the Board's view in these decisions did not diminish the
stare decisis effect of the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation. 68
In a separate dissent, Judge Kozinski asserted that the majori-
ty's decision shifted the primary responsibility for statutory con-
struction from the judiciary to executive agencies.° 9 This shift is
problematic, he argued, because agencies lack the constraints im-
posed on judicial interpretations of statutes; agencies are free to
shift interpretations and to change policies with changes of lead-
ership in the executive branch." By authorizing agencies to defin-
itively interpret statutes, Judge Kozinski argued, courts in effect
hold that statutes have no fixed meaning but are intended by Con-
gress to have a variety of interpretations, each as good as the next. 7 '
In order to illustrate the scope of the problem created by the
majority's holding, Judge Kozinski cited a range of similar cases in
which courts had adopted agencies' interpretations of statutes. 72 He
concluded by expressing hope that the Supreme Court would re-
view the Mesa Verde decision. 73
The Mesa Verde decision to adopt the Board's Deklewa interpre-
tation of section 8(f) will have two effects. First, the decision will
affirm a significant change in the law concerning construction in-
dustry prehire contracts. In the short term, a degree of uncertainty
will follow this change in the law as parties to existing prehire
contracts discover that their legal relationship has been redefined.
In the long term, the Mesa Verde decision will advance a positive
change in the structure of prehire agreements. The second effect
of the Mesa Verde decision will be to affirm the primary role that
the Board plays in the statutory interpretation of section 8(f ).
The Deklewa interpretation adopted in Mesa Verde has had dra-
matic short term effects on the construction industry. In overturn-
ing a settled statutory interpretation, Deklewa has generated con-
fusion and uncertainty."' One attorney has characterized the
decision as a "business agent's nightmare and a lawyer's dream." 75
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1146, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3089-90 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
7° Id, at 1147, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3090 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
7, Id. at 1147, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1147-49, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3091-92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1149, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
74 Attorney's Debate on the Deklewa Ruling, 128 LAB. REL. REP. (DNA) 147, 148 (May 30,
1988).
79 Id.
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In particular, litigation has resulted from disputes over Deklewa's
retroactive application to contracts negotiated and entered into be-
fore the ruling. 76 The Deklewa Board recognized that change in the
law would result in a degree of confusion 77
 and acknowledged that
retroactive application of the ruling would place a burden upon
parties who agreed to terms in prehire agreements in reliance upon
their ability to repudiate the agreement at will. 78 The Mesa. Verde
decision will help to alleviate some of the short term confusion
generated by the Deklewa ruling. The Mesa Verde court's endorse-
ment of Deklewa sets precedent for Deklewa's acceptance in other
circuits and helps to settle expectations concerning the enforceabil-
ity of prehire contracts. Parties entering into or renewing prehire
contracts will be aware that the ruling is likely to be enforced in the
federal courts and will negotiate their contracts accordingly.
Although the Deklewa decision alters the nature of prehire
agreements it cannot alter the fundamental marketplace dynamic
that exists between labor and management in the construction in-
dustry. In the years since the passage of section 8(f), the construc-
tion industry labor force has shifted from being highly unionized
to being primarily open shop. 79 Because unions no longer hold as
strong a bargaining position in the industry, the increased liability
that employers incur by entering into prehire agreements is likely
to cause their increased use of "take it or leave it" bargaining tac-
tics." For this reason, one commentator has noted that with Deklewa,
unions have won the battle but lost the war. 8 '
76 Compare National Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension Fund v. American Automatic
Fire Protection, 680 F. Supp. 731, 734, 127 L.R.R.M. 2419, 2421 (D. Md. 1988) and Con-
struction Indus. Welfare Fund v. Jones, 672 F. Supp. 291, 293, 127 L.R.R.M. 2190, 2192
(N.D. III. 1987) (each denying the Deklewa ruling retroactive effect) with National Elevator
Indus. Welfare Plan v. Viola Indus., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (D. Kan. 1987) and R.W.
Granger & Sons, Inc. v. Eastern Massachusetts Carpenters and Carpenters Local 275, 686 F.
Supp. 22, 30 (I). Mass. 1988) (each giving Deklewa retroactive effect). Federal courts are not
strictly bound by the Deklewa Board's views and have discretion to refuse retroactive appli-
cation, particularly when "manifest injustice" would result. R.W. Granger, 686 F. Supp. at 30;
see NLRB v. W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d 7745, 748 n.2, 130 L.R.R.M. 3102, 3105 n.2 (8th Cir.
1989) (discussing standard of review for retroactive application of Board rulings).
77 John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1386 n.46, 124 L.R.R.M. 1185, 1195 n.46
(1987), enforced,
 ub norm, Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 779, 128 L.R.R.M.
2020, 2028 (3d Cir. 1987).
76 Id. at 1389, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
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In the long term, by adopting the Deklewa ruling, the Mesa Verde
decision will help to effect a positive change in the nature of prehire
agreements. In Deklewa, the Board based its decision to change the
law on three rationales. First, the Board asserted that the ruling
reflects Congress' intent in enacting section 8(f ). 82
 Second, the
Board maintained that the change in the law enhances industry
stability and employee free choice, the two primary purposes behind
the NLRA." Third, the Board asserted that Deklewa will solve prac-
tical problems in the administration of section 8(f ). 84
Over the years, commentators have argued that the pre-Deklewa
interpretation of section 8(1) did not further the purposes for which
the provision was enacted. 8 ' In Deklewa, the Board acknowledged
this defect in the law. 86 In particular, the Board noted that no
support for the unilateral repudiation of prehire agreements exists
in the express language of the statute. 87
 Section 8(f )'s final proviso,
the Board asserted, was intended as an "escape hatch," allowing
employees to challenge unwanted union representatives. 88 The
proviso was not intended to allow employers to void prehire agree-
ments. Thus, in Deklewa, the Board corrects the broad reading of
section 8(f)'s final proviso under which prehire agreements were
held to be voidable-at-will.
As both the Board" and the Mesa Verde court" asserted, the
Deklewa ruling will increase industry stability and employee free
choice. Deklewa will increase stability by preventing the repudiation
of prehire agreements. Employers and unions, as a result, can be
sure of their rights and obligations during the term of the agree-
ment. Under pre-Deklewa law, when agreements were repudiated
the validity of the repudiation depended upon whether the union
could effect a "conversion" of the agreement by establishing its de
facto majority status. During litigation to establish "conversion," nei-
42 Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 138(1, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1195.
Id.
" Id. at 1388-89, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1197-98.
85 King & La Vaute, Current Trends in Construction Industry Labor Relations — The Double-
Breasted Contractor and the Prehire Contract, 29 SYRACUSE L, REv. 901, 940 (1978); Note, supra
note II, at 1029-30; Note, Prehire Agreements in the Construction Industry: Empty Promises or
Enforceable Rights, 81 Cot.um. L. Rev. 1702, 1716-20 (1981).
60 Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1381, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1190-91.
137 Id. at 1381, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1191.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1386, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1195.
`-'(' Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124,
1134, 129 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3080 (9th Cir. 1988) (en hanc).
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ther party could be sure whether the obligations and rights con-
tained in the agreement were in force. As a result, labor relations
were destabilized.
Employee choice, as the Board" and the Mesa Verde court92
asserted, is enhanced by the elimination of the "conversion doc-
trine." Under Deklewa, section 8(f )'s final proviso gives employees
the right to petition for an election to decertify a union if they feel
that the union does not represent their interests. After Deklewa,
representatives may only be certified by direct elections, guarantee-
ing that employees have an option to choose their bargaining rep-
resentatives.
By adopting the Deklewa ruling, Mesa Verde will also have the
long term effect of helping to resolve practical problems in the
administration of section 8(1). As the Mesa Verde court noted, one
problem in particular is that the "conversion doctrine" encourages
litigation.° Administration of the doctrine is difficult, the Board
asserted, because administrators must determine from indirect ev-
idence, such as union membership rolls and contract referral pro-
visions, whether a union enjoyed majority status during the term
of an agreement." Such evidence, the Board reasoned, is frequently
incomplete and inferences are difficult to draw. 95
 The Board's con-
clusions in Deklewa concerning the practical difficulty in administer-
ing the doctrine are convincing. In addition, it is significant that all
of the parties and amici who argued Deklewa before the Board were
united in calling for changes in existing law. 96
In summary, the Mesa Verde court was correct in deferring to
the Board's decision in Deklewa. The Deklewa interpretation is a more
literal reading of congressional intent, conforms with the general
purposes of the NLRA, and eases practical problems in the admin-
istration of section 8(f). Therefore, Deklewa represents a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. If, as the Mesa Verde court asserted,
the Supreme Court in Higdon deferred to the Board and did not
91 Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1383, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1192.
92 Mesa Verde, at 1134, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
9' Mesa Verde, at 1134, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
94 Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1383, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1193.
95 Id.
" Id. at 1389, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1198. The employer, John Deklewa & Sons, and the
Council on Labor Law Equity and the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
argued that the Board should adhere to pre-Deklewa law but should adopt rules abandoning
the "conversion doctrine." Id. at 1377, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1187. The union, the AFL-C10, and
the Teamsters argued that the Board should overrule existing law and abandon the "con-
version doctrine." Id.
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definitively construe section 8(1), then lower courts should follow
precedent by deferring in similar fashion to the Deklewa interpre-
tation.
In deferring to the Board, the Mesa Verde court affirmed the
Board's authority to reinterpret section 8(f). Despite the general
policy arguments that the Mesa Verde dissent raised in favor of a
fixed judicial interpretation of section 8(f), it appears that the Mesa
Verde majority was following Supreme Court precedent. By the best
view, the Supreme Court in Higdon did not definitively construe
section 8(f ). The Higdon Court asserted that Congress had com-
mitted primary responsibility for effecting national labor policy to
the Board and that courts should have only limited review of Board
decisions.° In evaluating the legislative history of section 8(f), the
Court sought to determine if the Board's interpretation "repre-
sent[ed] a defensible construction of the statute." 98 In endorsing the
Board's interpretation, the Higdon Court concluded that section 8(f)
was an "acceptable" and "reasonable" interpretation of the Act,
although perhaps not the only reasonable one. 99 The best conclusion
that can be drawn from the opinion in Higdon is that the the Court
delegated interpretive authority to the Board, subject to judicial
review for reasonableness. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the Higdon Court never considered or rejected the alternative
interpretation of section 8(f) that was set forth in the opinion of
the appeals court in that case.'" If the Supreme Court had intended
to definitively construe the statute, it certainly would have consid-
ered all of the competing interpretations.
The dissents in Mesa Verde raised several arguments against
deference to the Board's Dektewa interpretation of section 8(1).
Judge Hug based his dissent on Supreme Court precedent subse-
quent to the Higdon Court's decision.m He argued that because
Congress in enacting section 8(f) did not intend to delegate in-
terpretive authority to the Board, interpretation of the statute pre-
"7 Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, 350, 97 L.R.R.M. 2333, 2339 (1978).
98 Id.
Id. at 341, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2336.
100 See ironworkers, Local 103 v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 87, 90, 91 L.R.R.M. 2986, 2989 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (citing Local 150, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 83
L.R.R.M. '2706 (D.C, Cir. 1973).
"'I See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v, Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1142, 129 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3086 19th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Hug, J., dissenting) (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S, 837 (1984) and INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
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sented an issue of pure statutory construction. 102
 From this premise,
he concluded that the Higdon Court necessarily made a definitive
interpretation of the statute.'"5 Judge Kozinski, in his dissent, made
a broader argument based on the adverse policy consequences that
he believed would result from granting interpretive authority to the
Board.'" Although these arguments may be valid in an assessment
of the wisdom of the Supreme Court's decision in Higdon, they
cannot overcome the stare decisis effect of the Higdon Court's defer-
ence to the Board. Because of this stare decisis effect, the Mesa Verde
majority was correct in deferring to the Board.
In conclusion, the decision in Mesa Verde incorporates the
Board's Deklewa interpretation of section 8(f) as law in the Ninth
Circuit. The Deklewa interpretation is a more literal reading of
section 8(f) and replaces a Hawed interpretation that the Board has
had difficulty in administering over the years. For these reasons,
Mesa Verde represents a positive change in the law of the Ninth
Circuit. The Mesa Verde decision will also help to settle the new
interpretation of section 8(f) by setting precedent for its acceptance
in other circuits. 1 °5 The Mesa Verde court based its decision upon a
reading of Supreme Court precedent under which the Board was
given primary authority to interpret section 8(f ). Although this
delegation of authority raises broad questions concerning the de-
gree of deference that the judiciary should give to administrative
agencies, the Mesa Verde court ruled correctly based on the narrower
rationale of following Supreme Court precedent.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. *Management Decision to Close Plant and Relocate Operations Not a
Mandatory Subject of Bargaining: Arrow Automotive Industries
v. NLRB.'
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act") de-
clares that an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with his or
102 Id. at 1142, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3087 (Hug, J., dissenting).
L°3 Id. at 1144, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3088 (Hug, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1146, 129 L.R.R.M. at 3090 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
1 " Since Mesa Verde, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
endorsed the new interpretation of section 8f, citing the Mesa Verde decision. NLRB v. W.L.
Miller Co., 871 F.2d 7745, 748, 130 L.R.R.M. 3102, 3104 (8th Cir. 1989).
*John Charles Hayes, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 853 F.2d 223, 128 L.R.R.M. 3137 (4th Cir. 1988).
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her employees' representatives constitutes an unfair labor practice. 2
In defining collective bargaining, section 8(d) imposes an obligation
on both the employer and the employees' representatives to nego-
tiate in good faith concerning "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment," but does not require that the parties
come to an agreement. 3
 In 1981, the United States Supreme Court
in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB considered whether the
Act required bargaining over management decisions that affected
or terminated employment relations but which primarily concerned
the direction and scope of the business, not merely the employment
conditions.4
 The Court held that the Act required mandatory bar-
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
3 Id. § 158(d). The Court divided bargaining proposals into three categories: mandatory
bargaining, which regulate wages, hours, and other conditions of the relationship between
employer and employees; permissive provisions, which the parties may lawfully incorporate
into the contract, but about which neither party must negotiate; and illegal provisions, which
the parties may not voluntarily incorporate into the contract. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349, 42 L.R.R.M. 2034, 2036 (1958); R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW 498 (1976). In discussing mandatory subjects of bargaining, the courts
broadly interpret wages to include any compensation for services performed or value accrued
from employment. See W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878, 24 L.R.R.M. 2068,
2071 (1st Cir. 1949). The courts interpret hours to include the number of hours, the particular
hours in a day, and the particular days in it week in which an employer requires its employees
to work. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 690-91, 59 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2381 (1965). The Board and the courts interpret terms and
conditions of employment to include safety rules, see NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822,
825, 66 L.R.R.M. 2501, 2503 (5th Cir. 1967), workload, see Beacons Piece Dyeing and Finishing
Co„ 121. N.L.R.B. 953, 956-57, 42 L.R.R.M. 1489, 1490 (1958), vacation plans, see NLRB v.
Sharon Hats, Inc., 289 F.2d 628, 631, 48 L.R.R.M. 2098, 2100 (5th Cir. 1961), sick time, see
NLRB v, Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 744, 50 L.R.R,M, 2177, 2181 (1962), conditions of initial hiring,
see NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 349 F.2d 449, 452, 59 L.R.R.M.
3013, 3015 (5th Cit.. 1965), and pensions and other conditions of discharges, see Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB. 170 F.2d 247, 252, 21 L.R.R.M. 1310, 1312 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960, 24 L.R.R.M. 2019 (1949).
According to the Court, management or the unions may propose permissive subjects of
bargaining, but neither may insist on the subject to the point. of impasse. Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. at 349, 42 L.R.R.M. at 2037. Permissive subjects, the courts and the Board have
held, include those which involve the relationship of the employer to a third party, and which
are therefore the prerogative of the employer, such as advertising, product design, financing,
and sales. See Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local No. 2265, 136 N.L.R.B. 769, 771, 49
L.R.R.M. 1842, 1843 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 269, 53 L.R.R.M. 2311 (6th Cir. 1963).
4
 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677, 107 L.R.R.M. 2705, 2709
(1981). The Court in First National considered the refusal of an employer to bargain with
the union representing its employees over the discharge of several employees. Id. at 670,
1(17 L.R.R.M. at 2707. The employer was it maintenance company, and had cancelled a
service contract with a nursing home due to a dispute over fees; as a result, the employer
discharged several employees that worked at the nursing home. Id. at 668-70, 107 L.R.R.M,
at 2706-07. The First National Court held that the Act did not require the employer to
negotiate about the cancellation of the service contract and the resultant discharge of the
employees. Id. at 668, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713.
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gaining over this type of management decision only if collective
bargaining could resolve the controversy. Furthermore, the Act
required mandatory bargaining, according to the Court, if the ben-
efit of bargaining outweighed the burden placed on the manage-
ment of the business. 5
Applying this balancing test between the benefit of bargaining
and the burden that bargaining would place on management, the
First National Court held that an employer's need to decide, without
hindrance, to shut down part of its business for economic reasons
outweighed any benefit that might accrue by collective bargaining
concerning the closing decision itself. 6 The First National Court
therefore held that the decision to partially close a business did not
fall within the scope of section 8 of the Act, and that such decisions
were not subject to mandatory bargaining.' The First National Court,
however, limited its holding to partial shutdowns, and stated that
the courts would have to consider other types of management de-
cisions, including plant relocations, on their particular facts. 8 The
Courts of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Board have
varied in their interpretations of the scope of First National's holding
concerning which management decisions are subject to mandatory
bargaining."
Id. at 678-79, 107 1...R.R.M. at 2709-10. The Court understood mandatory bargaining
as an attempt at instituting a process whereby management and labor can resolve subjects
amenable to resolution through bargaining in a manner in which each benefitted. Id. at 678,
107 L.R.R.M. at 2709-10. The Court also stated, however, that management must be free
from bargaining to the extent necessary for a profitable business's operation, and that
management must have some degree of certainty whether its decisions might later result in
penalties for unfair labor practices. Id. at 678-79, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2710.
6 Id. at 686, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713.
Id,
8 Id. at 686 n.22, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713 n.22. In limiting its holding, the Court noted
that First National did not intend to replace its discharged employees or move the terminated
part of the business elsewhere, and that the union did not have some control over the causes
of the business's economic losses that prompted the shutdown. Id. at 687-88, 107 L.R.R.M.
at 2713. See also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213-14, 57 L.R.R.M.
2609, 2613 (1964) (holding that employer's decision to subcontract out maintenance work
previously done by unionized employees required bargaining, because the economic reasons
for the subcontracting out — reduction of labor costs— were amenable to resolution through
collective bargaining). The Court also observed that section 8(a)(3) of the Act prohibited
partial closings arising from antiunion motivations. First National, 452 U.S. at 682, 107
L.R.R.M. at 2711.
9 The National Labor Relations Board in Otis Elevator Co. interpreted First National as
distinguishing between employer's decisions that turned primarily on the reduction of labor
costs and decisions that instead rested on an alteration of the scope or nature of the business.
269 N.L.R.B. 891, 891, 115 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1281 (1984) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Otis
The Board in Otis II reconsidered its earlier decision, in light of the Supreme Court's
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During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held in Arrow Automotive Industries v. NLRB that
holding in First National, that required Otis to bargain about the transfer of operations. Id.
at 891, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1281 (discussing Otis Elevator Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 235, 1(16 L.R.R.M.
1343 (1981)). The Board therefore held that the critical factor which determined if a man-
agement decision was subject to mandatory bargaining was whether the employer based its
decision on labor costs, not whether the decision affected employees or the union could offer
alternatives. Id. at 892, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1282-83.
The United States Courts of Appeals have interpreted First National with little consistency,
even within the circuits, and usually treat First National in a perfunctory manner. Some cases
have interpreted First National to limit severely the circumstances in which a decision to
partially close a business will be subject to mandatory bargaining. See, e.g., Railway Labor
Executives' Assoc. v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 845 F.2d 420, 429, 128 L.R.R.M. 2030,
2037 (3d Cir. 1988) (interpreted First National to hold that management not required to
bargain about decision to partially shut down its business even if decision leads to loss of
employee jobs), rev'd, 109 S. Ct, 2584, 131 L.R.R.M. 2611 (1989) (did not criticize Court of
Appeals's interpretation of First National); NLRB v. Master Slack and/or Master Trousers
Corp., 773 F.2d 77, 84, 120 L.R.R.M. 2514, 2519 (6th Cir. 1985) (management not required
to bargain about economically motivated decision to shut down plant); International Union,
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 181 n.23
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (interpreting First National to hold that employer had no duty to bargain
about decision to partially shut down business for purely economic reasons not involving
allegations of antiunion animus); Mason v. Continental Group, 763 F,2d 1219, 1224, 119
L.R.R.M. 3076, 3080 (11th Cir. 1985) (interpreting First National to hold that management
not required to bargain about decision to shut down plant), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087, 119
L.R.R.M. 3077 (1986); NLRB v. National Car Rental Sys., 672 F.2d 1182, 1188, 109 L.R.R.M.
2832, 2837 (3d Cir. 1982) (employer had no duty to bargain about decision to close facility);
NLRB v. Robin Am. Corp., 667 F.2d 1170, 1170, 109 L.R.R.M. 2844, 2845 (5th Cir. 1982)
(interpreting First National to not require bargaining over economically-motivated decision
to partially shut down business, leaving open question where decision motivated by antiunion
animus); NLRB v. Gibraltar Indus., 653 F.2d 1091, 1096, 107 L.R.R.M. 3307, 3311 (6th Cir.
1981) (distinguishes legitimate decision to close business for purely economic reasons from
decision motivated by antiunion animus).
The United States Supreme Court's discussion of First National in Pittsburgh & Lake
Eric Railroad Co. v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 109 S. Ct. 2584, 131 L.R.R.M.
2611 (1989), suggests that the Court would hold First National to not require management
to bargain about a decision to shut down part of its business, even if motivated by labor costs.
See id. at 2595 n.17, 131 L.R.R.M. at _n,17. The Court, however, did not refer to the specific
issue of partial closings motivated by costs within the ability of the union to effect, and so
the Court has yet to determine whether the Act subjects those partial closings to mandatory
bargaining. See id.
Other courts have adopted Otis Il's interpretation, or have otherwise limited First National
to its specific facts. See, e.g., NLRB v. 1199, Nat'l Union of Hosp. and Health Care Employees,
824 F.2d 318, 321-22, 126 L.R.R.M. 2204, 2207 (4th Cir. 1987) (management decision to lay
off workers reflected more a desire to reduce labor costs than an exercise of managerial
control over the scope and direction of the business, and was amenable to resolution through
collective bargaining; the decision therefore was mandatory subject of bargaining); Local
2179, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559, 578, 125 L.R.R.M. 3313, 3328 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that Otis Ws labor cost standard was "reasonably defensible interpretation" of
Act in light of First National); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. imple-
ment Workers v. NLRB, 802 F.2d 969, 972, 123 L.R.R.M. 2677, 2679 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that the Supreme Court in First National did not decide when and under what circumstances
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section 8(d) of the Act did not subject to mandatory bargaining
management decisions to partially close a business and hence ter-
minate employees because of labor costs.'° In Arrow, the court ruled
that the Act did not require Arrow to bargain with the union
representing its employees at a plant which Arrow decided to close,
and whose operations were to be moved to another plant," Con-
sequently, courts that adopt Arrow's reasoning as persuasive will not
require mandatory bargaining over decisions to partially close a
business to reduce labor costs. 12
Arrow Automotive Industries operated four plants in the
United States in 1981. 13 The Hudson, Massachusetts plant, which
served the Northeast, was the oldest, and the only plant that was
unionized.' 1
 Because of persistent financial problems at Hudson,
management must bargain over a decision to relocate operations, and also observing that the
Board and lower federal courts had held that management must bargain if the decision is
significantly motivated by labor costs); Road Sprinklers Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. NLRB,
789 F.2d 9, 16 n.22, 122 L.R.R.M. 2139, 2144 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding First National
inapposite by limiting its holding to circumstances involving an employer's decision to ter-
minate a contract for reasons unrelated to the work force); NLRB v. Island Typographers,
705 F.2d 44, 50 n.8, 113 L.R.R.M. 2207, 2211 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983) (interpreting First National
to apply balancing test to determine if bargaining required for management decisions that
involve change in the scope and direction of the business and that have substantial impact
on availability of employment (quoting First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666, 679, 107 L.R.R.M. 2705, 2710 (1981))); Jack Thompson Oldsmobile v. NLRB, 684 F.2d
458, 463, 110 L.R.R.M. 3368, 3372 (7th Cir. 1982) (interpreting First National to hold that
partial shut down of business for economic reasons was not necessarily subject to mandatory
bargaining).
For discussions of First National, see generally, George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A
New Chapter in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN L. REV. 667, 678-80 (1985); Gorman, The
Negligible Impact of the National Labor Relations Act on Managerial Decisions to Close or Relocate,
58 Tut.. L. Rm.'. 1354, 1361-64 (1984); Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bar-
gaining in Light of First National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 402 (1983); 1981-82 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 24 B.C.L. REV. 95 (1982).
'" Arrow Auto. Indus. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 228, 232, 128 L.R.R.M. 3137, 3142, 3145
(4th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Arrow 14
II Id. at 224-25, 232, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3138-39, 3145.
IS
 The union did not contend that antiunion animus motivated Arrow's decision. See id.
at 223, 225, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3137, 3139. The courts have held that management decisions
to partially shutdown or relocate operations because of antiunion animus are unfair labor
practices. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275, 58 L.R.R.M.
2657, 2661 (1965); see NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346, 350, 51 L.R.R.M. 2362,
2365-66 (4th Cir. 1962).
"Id. at 224, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3138. Each plant produced the same products, and served
their respective geographic areas. Id.
Arrow Auto. Indus., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57, at app. 3-4 ( June 25, 1987) [hereinafter
Arrow !). Note that the National Labor Relations Board Decisions slip opinion for Arrow! included
the administrative law judge's opinion in its appendix, but the Labor Relations Reference
Manual did not include the administrative law judge's opinion,
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due in part to higher labor costs than at the other plants, Arrow
had considered closing the plant beginning in 1978) 5
The union and Arrow had negotiated a series of collective
bargaining agreements, the most recent of which had expired on
November 30, 1980.' 6
 The union and Arrow opened contract re-
newal negotiations on October 22, 1980, and met nine times before
December 1, with the negotiations primarily concerning wage and
benefit increases and alterations in the employee health insurance
plan. 17
 These meetings produced little movement by either side,
and the employees struck on December 1, 1980. 18 The strike forced
Arrow to temporarily suspend operations at Hudson, with its Spar-
tanburg, South Carolina plant servicing Hudson's customers during
the strike.' 9
As the strike continued, Arrow carried out an analysis that
indicated that closing Hudson would increase Arrow's profits and
that the Spartanburg plant could service Hudson's customers more
efficiently. 2° On March 25, 1981, Arrow's Board of Directors de-
cided to close the Hudson plant and relocate its work permanently
to the Spartanburg plant. 21
 The minutes of the meeting indicated
that the Board of Directors made the decision because of losses at
the Hudson plant arising from declining sales in the Northeast and
increasing production costs, especially labor costs, at the Hudson
plant. 22
 Arrow informed the union on March 25 of its decision, and
requested a meeting to bargain about the closing's effects. 25 The
following day the union demanded that Arrow bargain about the
decision to close. 24
 Arrow refused to bargain about the decision to
close Hudson. 25
13
 Arrow 11, 853 F.2d at 224, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3138. The Hudson plant suffered a forty
percent drop in sales between 1976 and 1980, and operated at a loss in 1977, 1978, and
1980. Id,
1° Id.
17 Arrow 1, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57 at 2, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1189 ( June 25, 1987).
IR Id.
Id. at 2-3, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1189.
7°
 Arrow Auto. Indus. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 224, 128 L.R.R.M.•3138 (4th Cir, 1988).
71
 Arrow Auto. Indus., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57, slip op. at 4, 125 L.R.R.M. 1188, 1189
(June 25, 1987).
77 Id. at 4-5, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1189-90.
7.4
	 II, 853 F.2d at 225, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3139.
24 Arrow 1, 284 N.L.R.B. No, 57 at app. 7.
45 Id. Bargaining over the effects of a management decision differs from bargaining
about the decision itself, in that effects-bargaining concerns the consequences of the decision
— for instance, the effects on pensions and the amount of severance pay — but dues not
concern the decision itself. NLRB v, Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196, 60
L.R.R.M. 2033, 2036 (3d Cir. 1965).
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On April 6, 1981, the union filed an unfair labor practice
complaint with the National Labor Relations Board, charging that
Arrow's decision to close Hudson constituted a decision to transfer
work from Hudson to Spartanburg, and that Arrow violated the
Act by refusing to bargain in good faith about that decision. 2° An
administrative law judge held that Arrow's closing of the Hudson
plant was subject to mandatory bargaining, 27 but found that suffi-
cient bargaining had occurred, and dismissed the union's com-
plaint. 28 The judge reasoned that the First National Court limited
its holding to partial shutdowns arising from an employer's aban-
donment of a portion of its operations. 29 The judge found that
Arrow did not abandon the market served by Hudson, but rather
serviced that market through expanded operations at Spartan-
burg:3° The judge therefore held that Arrow's closing of the Hud-
son plant did not fall under First National's ruling and was subject
to mandatory bargaining. 3 '
In 1987, a three-member panel of the National Labor Relations
Board upheld the administrative judge's ruling that Arrow's deci-
sion to close the Hudson plant was subject to mandatory bargaining,
but held that Arrow did not meet that obligation, and thus ruled
Arrow had violated the Act. 32 The Board determined that Arrow's
decision to close the Hudson plant and transfer its work to Spar-
tanburg arose from frustration with the contract impasse," and that
the decision turned upon labor costs and not the direction of Ar-
row's business. 34 The Board held that the Act required Arrow to
bargain to impasse over the closing of Hudson," and found that an
26 Arrow 1, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57 at app. I. The union also alleged that Arrow refused to
furnish the union with requested information that was "necessary and relevant" to the union's
position as the representatives of the employees in collective bargaining. Id.
27 Id. at app. 14. After a regional director or the General Counsel of the Board investi-
gates and issues an unfair labor practice complaint, an administrative law judge hears the
complaint in a trial-type proceeding. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 7-8. If a party files exceptions
to the administrative law judge's decision, the Board formally reviews. Id. at 8.
2' Arrow I, 284 N.L.R.B, No. 57 at app. 19. The administrative law judge held that the
Act only required Arrow to give the union an opportunity to be heard, and did not require
that Arrow bargain to impasse. Id. at app. 17, 19.
29 Id. at app. 11.
3° Id. at app. 14.
31 Id. at app. 13, 14.
32 Id. at 1-2, 10, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1189, 1191.
33 Id. at 7, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1190.
74 Id. at 8, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1190.
25 Id. at 9, 125 L.R.R.M, at 1191. The Board observed no reason to distinguish Arrow's
obligation in closing Hudson with "the general obligation to bargain to impasse prior to
making unilateral changes." Id. at 8, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1191.
December 1989]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 135
impasse had yet to occur when Arrow refused to negotiate about
the Hudson closing. 36 Arrow appealed the Board's ruling. 37
in 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Arrow Automotive Industries v. NLRB, denied enforcement
of the Board's order, holding that the order contradicted the United
States Supreme Court decision in First National. 38 The Arrow court
interpreted First National as broadly concluding that decisions to
partially close a business were not subject to mandatory bargain-
ing." In discussing First National, the Arrow court acknowledged
that the Supreme Court emphasized the employer's need to make
unencumbered decisions. 4° The Arrow court also noted that the First
National Court held that the likely harm to an employer's need to
unfettered decisionmaking about partial closings for economic rea-
sons outweighed the likely benefits of the union's participation in
those decisions.`"
The Arrow court therefore held that decisions to partially close
a business based on economic reasons, even if those reasons in-
56 Id. at 9, 125 L.R.R. M. at 1191, The Board noted that the possibility of Arrow closing
the Hudson plant broke the apparent impasse in the contract negotiations, observed that
Arrow only met with the union once to discuss the Hudson closing, and also noted that
Arrow apparently did not consider the union's proposals after notifying the union of the
possibility of the Hudson closing. Id. at 9-10, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1191. The Board ordered
Arrow to negotiate with the union about the closing of the Hudson plant (five years alter
the closing had occurred) and to pay the discharged employees their wages for the period
from the Hudson plant closing until Arrow or the union satisfied certain conditions. Id. at
11, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1191-92.
" Arrow Auto. Indus. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 223, 128 L.R.R.M. 3137, 3138 (4th Cir.
1988).
' Id.
'" Id, at 226, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3140. The court interpreted this conclusion of First National
to be a general holding, independent of First National's facts. Id. The Arrow II court noted
that the Courts of Appeals and commentators had agreed that First National stated a per se
rule that decisions to partially close a business were not subject to mandatory bargaining. Id.
at 227, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3140-41. The Arrow II court reasoned that the First National Court's
apparent attempt to limit its holding did not affect this per se rule. See id. at 226-27, 128
L.R.R.M. at 3140.
1 Id. at 226, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3140. The Arrow II court further noted that the First
National Court reasoned that mandatory bargaining over decisions to partially close a business
was unlikely to increase communications between labor and management, that the Act
sufficiently protected employees by requiring bargaining over the effects of the closing, and
that the Act protected workers from partial closings caused by antiunion animus. Id. The
Arrow court also observed that the Court reasoned that, if management believed that collective
bargaining was likely to be useful in making the closing decision, management would likely
bargain voluntarily, but that mandatory bargaining would create the possibility of uncertainty
and union delay of the closing. Id,
4 ' Id. (quoting First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686, 107 L.R.R.M.
2705, 2713 (1981)).
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chided labor costs as an important factor, were not subject to man-
datory bargaining.42 The Arrow court reasoned that the First National
Court included labor costs in the category of "economic reasons"
for a partial closing that placed those decisions outside the scope of
mandatory bargaining . 4 3 The Arrow court interpreted First National
to distinguish business decisions based on "economic reasons" not
from decisions based on labor costs, but rather from decisions made
because of anti-union animus."
The Arrow court also reasoned that because the United States
Supreme Court in First National expressly limited its holding to
"partial closings" and not "relocations," the decision did not place
Arrow's transfer of work from Hudson to Spartanburg outside First
National's holding. 45 The Arrow court defined relocation to mean
when an employer replaced a plant with a new plant that would
perform the same work.° The Arrow court reasoned that the fact
that Arrow decided to close one plant and expand operations at
another already-existing plant constituted a decision to partially
close the business which, under First National, was not subject to
mandatory bargaining:47 According to the Arrow court, even if Ar-
row's decision constituted a relocation, the Act nonetheless did not
require that Arrow bargain about that decision, for Arrow's need
to make such entrepreneurial decisions without the hindrance of
collective bargaining outweighed any benefit likely to arise from
bargaining. 48
The Arrow court therefore held that the Hudson closing con-
stituted a management decision "at the core of entrepreneurial
control."49 The court consequently did not rely on the First National
balancing test for management decisions that affected the employ-
ment relation but which management made for other reasons in-
dependent of that relation. 50 The Arrow court, in the alternative,
" Id. at 228, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3142.
43 See id.
44 Id. The Arrow 11 court also criticized the Otis Il Board's labor cost standard for
determining whether a management decision affecting employment security is subject to
mandatory bargaining, because the standard, according to the Arrow Il court, provided little
guidance to companies faced with such decisions. Arrow II, 853 F.2d at 227, 128 L.R.R.M. at
3141. See supra note 9 for a discussion of Otis II.
42 Id. at 229, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3143. The court reasoned that partial closings often were
accompanied by expansions of work at other facilities. Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 229, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3143.
48 Id. at 230, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3143.
" Id. at 230, 232, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3143, 3145.
5° See id. at 230, 128 L.R.R.M. 3143.
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determined that the Act did not require mandatory bargaining even
if the First National balancing test applied. 51 The Arrow court rea-
soned that the burdens of mandatory bargaining outweighed any
benefit, and that management must be able to act with certainty
and without the fetters of mandatory bargaining; for these reasons
the court held that the Act did not require Arrow to engage in
mandatory bargaining about its decision to close its Hudson plant,
even under First National's balancing test. 52
Judge Winter, dissenting from the Arrow holding, argued that
the facts of the case, as found by the Board, required that the court
apply the First National balancing test." Under that test, Judge
Winter contended, Arrow's decision was subject to mandatory bar-
gaining. 54 Judge Winter reasoned that the labor dispute in Arrow
was amenable to resolution through collective bargaining and that
the potential burdens of bargaining did not outweigh the potential
benefits, thereby concluding that the Act required that Arrow bar-
gain to impasse and allow the union a fair opportunity to present
concessions to avoid the closing. 5'
51 See id.
" See id. at 230-32, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3143-45. In analysing the potential benefits of
bargaining over Arrow's decision, the court reasoned, among other things, that Arrow's
decision was not untenable to resolution through bargaining, and that the goal of labor peace
was achieved by effects-bargaining. Id. at 230, 231, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3143, 3144. The court
therefore distinguished the situation in Arrow front that in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2611 (1964) (replacement of unionized em-
ployees when management subcontracted out maintenance work subject to mandatory bar-
gaining) and NLRB v. Local 1199, Nat'l Union of Hosp. and Health Care Employees, 824
F.2d 318, 321, 126 L.R.R.M. 2204, 2207 (4th Cir. 1987) (layoff of portion of employees
subject to mandatory bargaining). Arrow II, 853 F.2d at 231, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3144.
53 Arrow II, 853 F.2d at 236-38, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3148-50 (Winter, j., dissenting). judge
Winter observed that the court should accept Board findings on judicial review if supported
by substantial evidence, argued that substantial evidence supported the Arrow Board's findings
that Arrow's decision to partially close turned on labor costs, and therefore accepted those
findings for the purpose of reviewing the Board's legal conclusions. Id. at 233, 236, 128
L.R.R.M. at 3145, 3148 (Winter, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 238, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3149-5(1 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter, in deter-
mining that mandatory bargaining should apply, ntade the following observations: that
Arrow's closing constituted a relocation of business, not a partial closing; that the Union's
rejection of the latest Arrow contract-proposal motivated the closing; that the escalating costs
at Hudson were within art area of Union control; that the Act required Arrow to consider
Union concessions; that Arrow terminated ongoing collective bargaining during a strike; and
finally that Arrow's relocation was not the same as entering a new business or terminating
its operations entirely. hi. at 238-39, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3150 (Winter, j., dissenting), Judge
Winter noted that these factors distinguished Arrow from First National's facts. Id. at 238, 128
L.R.R.M. at 3150 (Winter, J., dissenting).
55 See id. at 237-39, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3149-51 (Winter, J., dissenting). judge Winter
disputed whet her the courts of appeals cases cited by the majority supported the proposition
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The Arrow court restricted First National by interpreting the Act
not to require mandatory bargaining over partial closings not mo-
tivated by anti-union animus. 56 In so doing, the Arrow court re-
moved virtually all management decisions that resulted in partial
closings from the mandatory bargaining requirement, even if labor
could alter the conditions which caused management's decision to
close. The Arrow court placed a premium on the perceived require-
ment of unfettered managerial decisionmaking over whether to
close a plant, while denigrating labor's role in those decisions as
little more than an obstruction to managerial prerogative. 57
The Arrow court's holding and reasoning are factually and
legally suspect. The Board found that higher labor costs at Hudson
were the primary motivation for the Hudson closing, and the Board
also determined that Arrow acted out of frustration with the im-
passe in the contract negotiations. 58 The Fourth Circuit in Arrow,
however, did not heed these findings of fact, and instead reasoned
that labor costs played such a minor role in Arrow's decision that
concessions by the union could not affect Arrow's decision." As
Judge Winter observed in his dissent, substantial evidence existed
for the findings of the Board, and the court was not free to neglect
those findings. 60
More significantly, the Arrow court disregarded the First Na-
tional Court's effort to limit its holding to the specific facts of that
case. The First National Court reached its holding by comparing the
benefits and burdens of collective bargaining in the context of the
absence of union control over factors which motivated the shutdown
decision. 6 ' The First National Court excluded from its holding situ-
ations where labor had some control over a shutdown's causes. 62
The Arrow court instead interpreted First National to hold that
no matter what control labor might have over the causes of a shut-
that all economically motivated partial closing decisions were not subject to mandatory
bargaining, and reasoned that almost everything an employer did could be construed as
economically motivated. Id. at 240, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3151 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge
Winter also argued that the Board's ordered remedies were not unduly burdensome. Id at
241, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3152 (Winter,,., dissenting).
56 See id. at 228, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3142.
87 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58 Arrow Auto. Indus., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57 at 7-8, 125 L.R.R.M. 1188, 1190 (1987).
59 See Arrow Auto. Indus. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 230, 128 L.R.R.M. 3137, 3143 (4th
Cir. 1988).
60 See id, at 235, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3148 (Winter, J., dissenting).
61 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679, 687-88, 107 L.R.R.M.
2705, 2710, 2713 (1981).
62 See id. at 687, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713.
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down, the Act did not require mandatory bargaining." The Arrow
court dismissed the narrow fact pattern of First National, and the
explicit limitations on that holding, to remove labor's role from
management decisions which potentially may cause severe conse-
quences for employees. In so doing, the Arrow court treated collec-
tive bargaining as an impediment to managerial discretion. The
Arrow court also minimized collective bargaining's purpose, to keep
the labor peace by institutionalizing negotiations if an issue amen-
able to resolution might erupt into labor conflict without negotia-
tion." Mandatory bargaining insures that negotiations occur over
areas that concern the employment relation and that are amenable
to resolution. Arrow's reasoning allows management to make certain
decisions that fundamentally affect its employees without any re-
quired negotiations with labor, even if labor could influence those
decisions to the mutual benefit of management and labor.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Arrow held that the Act does not require mandatory bargaining over
a management decision to close a plant and relocate its operations
to another plant, even though labor costs motivated the decision.
By so holding, the Arrow court departed from the Supreme Court's
holding in First National, expanding First National beyond the ex-
plicit limits set by the Court. First National held that a partial closing
of a business motivated by reasons unrelated to labor costs or other
factors which the union could mitigate was not a mandatory subject
of bargaining. The Arrow court departs from First National by rea-
soning that the Supreme Court held that all management decisions
to partially close which were not motivated by antiunion animus
were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Arrow court's hold-
ing consequently removes labor's voice from an area of management
decisions amenable to resolution through collective bargaining, de-
cisions which substantially affect the employment relation.
B.*Nonpicketing Labor Publicity Not Within the Secondary-Boycott
Prohibition of Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act:
Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building & Construction Trades Council.'
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
"Act") governs the limits of a labor organization's ability to induce
63 See Arrow 1/, 853 F.2d at 228, 128 L.R.R.M. at 3142.
" See Fire National, 452 U.S. at 674, 107 L.R.R.M, at 2708.
* By Steven L. Brown, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 108 S. Ct. 1392, 128 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1988).
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a secondary boycott. 2 A secondary boycott is a boycott that involves
the exertion of pressure upon a person with whom the union has
no dispute in an attempt to persuade that person to cease doing
business with someone with whom the union does have a disputes
Section 8(b)(4) restricts secondary boycotts by prohibiting a union
from threatening, coercing, or restraining any person engaged in
commerce in order to force that person to cease doing business
with any other person.'
Although Congress attempted to insulate "neutral" employers
from secondary boycotts through section 8(b)(4), Congress also rec-
ognized unions' constitutional rights to free speech under the first
amendment.' A neutral employer is an employer whose employees
are not engaged in a labor dispute." In response to first amendment
concerns, Congress later added a publicity proviso to the prohibition
of secondary boycotts.' The Supreme Court in the 1964 case of
2
 National Labor Relations Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982). Congress
enacted this provision in 1959 to close a number of loopholes left by the Taft-Hartley Act.
For a history of the 1959 amendments, see NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Ware-
housemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 62-71, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961, 2963-67 (1964);
NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51-54, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2959-60 (1964).
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents to:
... threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is ..
forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any other
person . •
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982).
3 R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
240 (1976). Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), however, does not restrict labor activity aimed directly
against a primary employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(R) (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982).
5 See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 69-71, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2966. For a general discussion of the
first amendment issues related to section 8(b)(4), see Goldman, The First Amendment and
Nonpicketing Labor Publicity Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 36
VAND. L. REV. 1469 (1983); Case Comment, "It Takes More Than Money to Fly Delta, It Takes
Nerue.": Union Secondary Boycott Publicity and the First Amendment: Delta Air Lines, 67 MINN. L.
REv. 1235, 1238-54 (1983).
13 R. GORMAN, ,supra note 3, at 241.
See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 69, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2966. The publicity proviso provides in
relevant part:
That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such
paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members
of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by
another employer, as tong as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing
any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the
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NLRB v. Servette, Inc., interpreted the publicity proviso as to carve
out an exception for union communication. 8 As long as the com-
munication is truthful, does not cause a work stoppage, and is for
the purpose of informing the public that the primary party to the
dispute produces a product that is distributed by the secondary
employer, the publicity proviso keeps the union communication
outside the ambit of 8(b)(4). 9 •
Much of the litigation involving the application and interpre-
tation of the publicity proviso has focused on two of the elements
that the union must satisfy in order for the proviso to apply. These
two elements concern the relationship between the protesting party
and the primary disputant, and the nature of the publicity. 1 ° Courts
have held that a producer-distributer relationship must exist be-
tween the labor organization and the secondary employer or party."
Also, the union's publicity must relate solely to the primary dispute
or to the secondary employer that has a special relationship with
the primary employer. 12 Prior to Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation v.
course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods,
or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged
in such distribution .. .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
8 See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 57, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2961 (1964).
9 Id. Recent NLRB and judicial decisions have interpreted the scope of section 8(b)(4)
and the publicity proviso. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1404, 128 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2009 (1988); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 155-56, 113 L.R.R.M. 2955, 2956-57 (1983);
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safety), 447 U.S. 607, 614-15, 104
L.R.R.M. 2567, 2570 (1980) (picketing at a secondary site is an unfair labor practice under
section 158(b)(4) if' such picketing can be expected to cause the secondary employer substan-
tial economic loss); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 72, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961, 2967 (1964); Servette, 377 U.S. at 56-57, 55
L.R.R.M. at 2961 (handbilling in front of secondary employer's supermarket protected by
publicity proviso because "producer" under section 158(b)(4) includes processors and man-
ufacturers); United Steelworkers of Am, & Pet, Inc. (Pei, Inc.), 249 N.I..,R,B. 96, 101, 102
L.R.R.M. 1046, 1050 (1979) (a union's total consumer boycott of a diversified holding com-
pany was within the publicity proviso's exemption even when the union's dispute was with
one subsidiary who did not sell any of its products to any other subsidiary of the corporation),
rev'd and remanded sub nom, Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 691 17.2d 545, 529-50, 106 L.R.R.M. 2977,
2480 (8th Cir. 1981).
i° See supra note 8 for the relevant text of the publicity proviso.
" See DeBartolo v. NLRB, 463 U.S. at 152-54, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2955-57; Servette, 377
U.S. at 55-56, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2960-61.
IS See Hospital & Serv. Employees Union, Serv. Employees Intl Union, and Delta Air
Lines, Inc. (Delta Air), 263 N,L.R.B. 996, 998-99, 11 l L.R.R.M. 1159, 1162 (1982) (board
prohibited handbills and advertisements because they contained information unrelated to
the primary dispute that pertained solely to the secondary employer's business), rev'd and
remanded sub nom., Hospital & Serv. Employees Union, Local 399, Serv. Employees Intl
142	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:103
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, neither the
courts nor the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"Board") had directly considered how section 8(b)(4) and the pub-
licity proviso apply to a situation involving nonpicketing union pub-
licity. 13
Before 1988, decisions construing section 8(b)(4) involved pick-
eting, or a combination of picketing and handbilling." In the 1964
decision of NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local
760 ("Tree Fruits"), for instance, the United States Supreme Court
held that peaceful picketing and handbilling intended to persuade
supermarket customers to cease buying the product of the primary
employer was not coercive within the meaning of section 8(b)(4),
even though the union's activity caused the secondary employer
economic loss. 15 The Tree Fruits Court, however, indicated that pick-
eting aimed at preventing customers from dealing with a grocery
store's employees was unlawful under section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) which
restricts appeals to employees of a secondary employer. 16 Almost
two decades later, in the 1980 decision of NLRB v. Retail Stores
Employees Union, Local 1001 ("Safeco"), the United States Supreme
Court held that section 8(b)(4) prohibits the picketing and hand-
billing of a secondary employer if a union can reasonably expect
such activity to cause substantial economic loss to the secondary
employer. 17 Neither Tree Fruits nor Safeco, however, dealt directly
with the issue of whether the secondary boycott prohibition of
section 8(b)(4) prohibits pure handbilling and, if so, whether the
first amendment protects such handbilling.
During the 1988 Survey year, the United States Supreme Court
finally addressed the issue of whether section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) applies
to the distribution of handbills.' 8 In Edward f. DeBartolo Corporation
v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, a unani-
mous Supreme Court held that the union's peaceful handbilling
did not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).' 9 In reaching its conclusion that
Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRI3, 743 F.2d 1417, 1428-29, 117 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2726-27 (9th Cir.
1984).
' 3 108 S. Ct. at 1404, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2009; Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463
U.S. 155-56, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956-57.
 -
14
 See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 610, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2568 (picketing); Tree Fruits, 377
U.S. at 60, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2962 (picketing and handbilling).
15 377 U.S. at 72-73, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2967.
L6 See id.
17 447 U.S. at 614-15, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2569-70.
See Edward]. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
108 S. Ct. 1392, 1394, 1395, 128 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2002, 2003 (1988).
19 Id. at 1396, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2003-04.
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section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) did not cover all handbilling, the Court held
that proof of a violation of section 8(b)(4) requires an affirmative
showing that the union's activity constituted threats, coercion or
restraint. 2°
The DeBartolo decision involved a labor dispute between High
Construction Company ("High"), a construction contractor that was
building a store for a mall tenant, and the Florida Gulf Coast
Building and Construction Trades Council ("union"). 2 ' The shop-
ping mall owner and operator, the DeBartolo Corporation, had
entered into a lease with a retail department store owner, the H.J.
Wilson Company ("Wilson"). 22 Claiming that High paid substandard
wages and fringe benefits, the union distributed handbills at the
DeBartolo mall asking customers not to shop at any store on the
premises until the mall's owner promised that all its construction
would be done by contractors who provided fair wages and benefits
to their employees. 2s The handbills clearly stated that the union
sought only a consumer boycott against the mall tenants, not a
secondary strike by their employees. For three weeks in December
of 1979, the union peacefully distributed the handbills at all four
entrances of the mall. There was no picketing or patrolling. 24
The DeBartolo Corporation attempted to convince the union
to restrict both the language and the distribution of the handbill. 26
Specifically, DeBartolo requested that the language of the handbills
be narrowed to a statement that the dispute involved only Wilson.
DeBartolo also asked the union to limit the handbill's distribution
to the immediate area surrounding the construction site. After these
attempts failed, DeBartolo filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the union. The complaint alleged that the union had vio-
lated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by making an illegal secondary
appeal. 26 The Board, without deciding whether the union's hand-
billing constituted the type of "threats, coercion, or restraint" pros-
cribed by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), dismissed the complaint, concluding
that the handbilling came within the publicity proviso. 27
Affirming, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the Board's decision was consistent with both the
20 Id, at 1399, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005-06.
21 Id. at 1394, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1394•95, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2002-03. For the full text of the handbill see id, at
1395 n.1, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2002
24 Id. at 1395, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2003
25 Id.
20
27 Id. at 1395-96, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
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publicity proviso's legislative history and with prior court decisions. 23
After granting a writ for certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court ruled in 1983 that the handbilling in question did not fall
within the scope of the publicity proviso. 29 The Court reasoned that
DeBartolo and the mall tenants did not "distribute" products of
High or Wilson because the "producer-distributer" requirement was
not fulfilled. 30 The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the
Board for a determination of whether the union's handbilling con-
stituted threats, coercion or restraint, within the prohibition of sec-
tion 8(b)(4). The Court instructed that if the Board found the
handbilling within the scope of section 8(b)(4), the NRLB would
then have to decide whether the first amendment protected the
activity.
On remand, the Board held that the handbilling, because it
urged a complete consumer boycott of the mall, was coercive and
therefore violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 3 ' The Board sidestepped
the issue of whether the first amendment protected handbilling by
relying on the presumption of the Act's constitutionality. 32 The
Board bolstered its finding by noting that the secondary employers,
the tenants of the mall, had suffered economic harm, and that this
constituted a form of coercion under 8(b)(4). 33
Denying enforcement of the Board's order, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the traditional
rule of statutory interpretation that, if possible, a statute should be
interpreted so as to avoid conflict with the constitution." The Elev-
enth Circuit in DeBartolo observed that the legislative history and
statutory language of section 8(b)(4) revealed no intent to prohibit
nonpicketing labor publicity. 35 In addressing the constitutional is-
sues raised by the union, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
first amendment generally protects peaceful distribution of hand-
bills. 36 The court noted that the first amendment protects the
28 Edward/ DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 272, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729, 2734 (4th
Cir. 1981).
29 DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1396, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2003. See also 1984-85 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 26 B.C.L. REV. 230, 233-36 (1984).
" DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1396, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
91 Id.
" See WI. at 1396, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
33 Id.
" See id. at 1396, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2004. DeBartolo brought suit to enforce the Board's
order in the Eleventh Circuit, although the original appeal was brought in the Fourth Circuit.
35 Id.
36 Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1332,
123 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004 (11th Cir. 1986).
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union's act of distributing handbills even when they are designed
to pressure others to act. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that
section 8(b)(4) did not prohibit the union's handbilling. 37 In 1987,
the United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari in the
DeBartolo case to resolve the important issue of whether section
8(b)(4) prohibits consumer nonpicketing publicity. 38
In a unanimous decision, the DeBartolo Court held that the
union's handbilling was not prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) be-
cause the handbilling did not threaten, restrain or coerce within the
meaning of the Act." The Court explained that although the words
of section 8(b)(4) are vague and non-specific, they should be inter-
preted with "caution," and not given a "broad sweep." The Court
also added that section 8(b)(4) required DeBartolo to make an af-
firmative showing of threats, coercion, or restraints to establish a
violation. 40 Thus, the Court held that the section did not reach the
handbilling in the present case because there was no violence, no
picketing, and no patrolling.4 ' Instead, noted the Court, the union
merely attempted to influence customers to shop elsewhere. More-
over, after examining the legislative history of section 8(b)(4), the
Court concluded that there was no clear indication that Congress
intended to proscribe handbilling, unaccompanied by picketing,
that urged a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. 42 The Su-
preme Court held therefore, that the language and legislative his-
tory of section 8(b)(4) allowed a finding that the union's handbilling
did not violate the secondary boycott provisions of the Act.
By deciding that section 8(b)(4) did not encompass the union's
handbilling, the DeBartolo Court avoided subjecting section 8(b)(4)
to first amendment scrutiny. 43 The Court noted that the union's
handbilling was peaceful, and did not involve any picketing or
37 Id. at 1346, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2015.
" See DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1396, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
3" See id, at 1399, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005-06.
40 Id. at 1399, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
Id. at 1399, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2006. 	 rejecting the Board's determination that the
handbilling coerced mall tenants, despite the union's peaceful distribution, the Supreme
Court held that its decision in Tree Fruits made the Board's decision untenable. Id. In Tree
Fruits, the Court held that union picketing of a secondary employer, a retailer, that asked
the public not to purchase products produced by the primary employer was not coercive
within the meaning of section 8(b)(4). 377 U.S. 58, 72-73, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961, 2967 (1964).
The Court came to this conclusion despite its acknowledgment of the possibility that the
retailer might lose revenue. Id. The DeBartolo Court reasoned, therefore, that the possibility
of economic loss to the mall did not render the union's handbilling coercive. Id.
42 Id. at 1402-04, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2008-09.
43 Id. at 1404, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2009.
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patrolling." The Court also noted that the handbills revealed the
existence of a labor dispute in a truthful manner and urged con-
sumers to take a wholly legal course of action. In other words, stated
the Court, by arguing that consumers should oppose substandard
wages by not shopping in the mall, the union's handbilling consti-
tuted an expressive activity. Had the union simply leafleted the
general public about the issue of substandard pay, noted the Court,
it is likely that such union publicity would be protected by the first
amendment. 45 The Court reasoned that DeBartolo presented an
analogous factual situation even though the handbills called atten-
tion to a specific situation and were not part of a general educational
effort.46 Thus, the Supreme Court implied that the first amendment
would protect the union's activities. 47
The United States Supreme Court's failure in DeBartolo to ad-
dress directly the constitutionality of restrictions on nonpicketing
labor publicity leaves the state of the law in doubt except for section
8(b)(4) constitutional questions. Unions, in particular, lack guidance
in determining what course of action to take against a secondary
employer. The 1988 Supreme Court decision in DeBartolo does
clarify that the secondary boycott prohibition of section 8(b)(4) does
not cover "non-coercive" handbilling, however, it does not clearly
define what conduct is coercive. 48 Questions remain, therefore,
about what conduct unions can lawfully undertake under section
8(b)(4).
The DeBartolo decision suggests that section 8(b)(4) permits
alternative forms of nonpicketing publicity, as long as they are
peaceful and are not directed at the employees of a secondary
employer. Under this interpretation of section 8(b)(4), such union
publicity as newspaper, radio, or television appeals urging the public
not to patronize a shopping mall would also be permissible and
would not be coercive under section 8(b)(4). Thus, the DeBartolo
decision indicates that modes of communication other than hand-
billing may be outside the scope of section 8(b)(4), but does not
' Id. at 1397, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
" Id. at 1397, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2004-05.
46 Id. at 1398, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
47 See id. at 1397-98, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2004-05. The DeBartolo Court noted that although
some communications by labor unions may be "commercial speech" and may therefore be
subject to a lesser degree of constitutional protection, the handbilling in this case did not
appear to be typical commercial speech. Id. at 1398, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005. See Goldman,
supra note 5, at 1487-97, for a discussion of commercial speech issues arising from nonpick-
eting labor publicity.
48 DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1399, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005-06.
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specify these modes. This leaves uncertainty for both unions and
employers.
The Supreme Court in DeBartolo distinguished between pure
handbilling and picketing by noting that the picketing is qualita-
tively more intimidating to customers than that of other modes of
communication.49 According to the Court, the truthful presentation
of information in handbills does no more than inform consumers
of what they would honestly want to do themselves. 50 The Court's
distinction between handbilling and picketing fails, however, to ad-
dress the physical aspects of handbilling — specifically, the physical
presence of the union members distributing leafiets. 5 ' It could be
argued that although peaceful, the union's distribution of handbills,
which includes union members walking around the entrance of the
mall, approaching customers, and at times having brief conversa-
tions with them, constitutes picketing. 52 Because the DeBartolo Court
failed to address the issue of what constitutes picketing under sec-
tion 8(b)(4) head on, the NLRB, employers, unions and the courts
are left with little guidance in this area.
Another issue recognized by the DeBartolo Court's interpreta-
tion of section 8(b)(4), but not squarely faced, is whether handbilling
constitutes commercial speech." In DeBartolo, the NLRB argued
that the union's conduct should be treated like commercial speech,
and therefore accorded less than full first amendment protection. 54
The Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested that the handbilling at the
Florida mall did not appear to be commercial speech because it
differed greatly from an advertisement of the price or merits of a
49 Id. at 1400, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2006. The Court noted that picketing, in contrast to




5I Cf. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 315-16, 68 L.R.R.M. 2209, 2212 (1968) ("Handbilling, like picketing, involves
conduct other than speech, namely, the physical presence of the person distributing leaflets
52 At the very least, such acts bear the potential of being every bit as physically intrusive
and intimidating as picketing. Cf. NLRB v. United Furniture Workers of Am., AFL-CIO,
337 F.2d 936, 940, 57 L.R.R.M. 2347, 2351 (2d Cir. 1964) (reasoning that the extent of
"confrontation" between the union members and employees, customers or suppliers is critical
in determining whether the union's activities constitute "picketing" under section 158(b));
NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 58, 52 L.R.R.M. 2354, 2356 (2c1 Cir. 1963)
(union signs planted in a snowbank abutting the entrance to the employer's premises while
the union members waited in their cars parked on an adjacent roadway was held by the court
to be picketing even though the union chose to bisect the activity).
" See DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1398, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
" Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NRLB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1335
n.7, 123 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2006 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986).
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product." The Court added, however, that even if the handbilling
were commercial speech, it would still be protected by the first
amendment." The Court did not resolve the commercial speech
issues raised by the union's activities, however, the Court found that
the union's handbilling was non-coercive under section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)." The issue of whether the definition of "commercial
speech" is broad enough to encompass handbilling, as well as other
forms of nonpicketing publicity, is a question that needs to be
addressed and resolved by the Supreme Court in order to provide
guidance to lower courts, NLRB, and unions.
Although ten years of DeBartolo litigation that began in 1979
with the distribution of handbills at a Florida shopping mall have
come to an end, there are still many questions left unanswered. The
Supreme Court's unanimous decision in DeBartolo does not provide
very much guidance for lower courts or the NLRB faced with
challenges to a union's nonpicketing publicity in the future, or for
a union in deciding what tactics to employ against a secondary
employer. The DeBartolo decision does, however, make clear that
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not forbid peaceful handbilling designed
to gain public support during a labor dispute." The questions left
unanswered after DeBartolo concerning the precise definition of
picketing and the constitutional protection of nonpicketing labor
publicity will, no doubt, be the subject of future litigation when a
union's nonpicketing activity is determined by the NLRB or court
to be "coercive" under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
M. ARBITRATION
A. *The Eighth Circuit Moves Toward Establishing That Only Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Regulations Constitute Public Policy: Daniel
Construction Co. v. Local 257, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers'
In the National Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
("Act"), Congress declared formal and binding arbitration to be the
" DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1398, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005; see also Goldman, supra note 5, at
1490 (author suggests that nonpicketing labor publicity is not commercial speech because it
satisfies the values underlying the first amendment).
5" DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1398, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
" See id. at 1404, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2009.
5' See id. at 1399, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2005-06.
* By Mark 0. Hoe/Trier, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 856 F.2d 1174, 129 L.R.R.M. 2429 (8th Cir. 1988).
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preferred method for resolving employer-employee disputes. 2 Un-
der the provisions of Section 301(a) of the Act, the victor in an
arbitration proceeding may seek enforcement of the arbitrator's
decision in a United States district court. 3 The United States district
court, however, plays a very limited role in the review of an arbi-
trator's decision.4 In the 1987 case of United Paperworkers Interna-
tional. Union v. Misco, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held
that courts must abide by the arbitrator's view of both the facts and
the meaning of the contract, because parties who included an ar-
bitration clause in their collective bargaining agreement have bar-
gained to have their disputes resolved by an arbitrator rather than
a judge.' Thus, according to the Misco Court, a reviewing court
should enforce an arbitrator's award, even in the presence of serious
error, as long as the arbitrator construed or applied the collective
bargaining agreement in reaching the decision. 6
According to the Misco Court, however, a court may refuse to
enforce an arbitrator's award if enforcement results in the violation
of some explicit public policy.' In Misco, the employer sought to
overturn an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee who pos-
sessed marijuana on company property. 8 The Misco Court noted
that a court must ascertain public policy from laws and legal prec-
2 29 U.S.C. § I73(d) (1982). In the relevant section, the Act provides:
(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to he the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services
available in the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort in
exceptional cases.
Id.; .see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 46
L.R.R.M. 2416, 2417-18 (1960).
' 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). In the relevant section, the Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined by this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy, or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.; see Santos v. District Council of New York and Vicinity of United Brotherhood of
Carpenters, 547 F.2d 197, 201, 94 L.R.R.M. 2244, 2247 (2d Cir. 1977) (the court stated that
"it is well established that the victor in an arbitration proceeding may seek court enforcement
of his award under LMRA § 301(a)").
4 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 108 S. Ct. 364, 370, 126 L.R.R.M. 3113,
3116 (1987).
Id. at 370, 126 L.R.R.M, at 3117.
" Id. at 371, 126 L.R.R.M, at 3117.
7 Id. at 373, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
8 Id. at 369, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
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edents rather than from general considerations of the public inter-
est.9 Additionally, the Court stated that the party seeking to over-
turn the award must show a clear violation of the explicit public
policy.'° The Misco Court thereby established that implementing an
arbitrator's award must clearly violate an explicit public policy in
order for a court to vacate the award."
In the 1987 case of Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union
204, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Misco to nuclear safety issues by rec-
ognizing strict adherence to nuclear safety rules as a national public
policy.' 2 The Iowa Electric court overturned an arbitrator's decision
which reinstated a nuclear power plant employee who had com-
mitted a serious violation of the safety rules promulgated by the
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company.'s The Iowa Electric court
concluded that the passage of the federally mandated nuclear 'reg-
ulatory system demonstrates the public's concern for the safe op-
eration of nuclear power plants." The Iowa Electric court observed
that the employee violated a power plant safety rule required by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), which also approved
of the employee's dismissal. E 5 The Iowa Electric court did not specify
whether it meant an NRC regulation or a rule promulgated by an
individual nuclear power plant when it used the term "safety rule." 16
9 Id. at 373, 127 L.R.R.M. at 3119 (quoting W.R. Grace v. Local 759, Intl Union of
Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2647 (1983)).
10 See id. at 373-74, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119. In /Witco, the Court held that the company
demonstrated no clear violation of the public policy against using dangerous machinery while
under the influence of drugs because the company could not establish the employee's actual
use of drugs while operating dangerous machinery. Id, at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
" See generally United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 108 S. Ct. 364, 126 L.R.R.M.
3113 (1987).
12 Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. Local Union 204, Int'l 8hd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d
1424, 1427, 127 L.R.R.M. 2049, 2051 (8th Cir. 1987).
" Id:
 at 1429-30, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2052-53. in Iowa Electric, the employee worked in the
nuclear power plant's secondary containment area, a zone designed to contain any radiation
that escapes from the primary containment area at the core of the reactor. Id, at 1425, 127
L.R.R.M. at 2049. To prevent leakage, the secondary containment area is pressurized. Id. In
order to maintain the pressure, an interlock system connects all the doors leading from the
secondary containment area that only allows the employees to open one door at a time. Id,
at 1425-26, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2049. In order to get an early start on lunch, the employee
requested that a foreman remove a fuse from the interlock system that allowed the employee
to open a second door leading out of the secondary containment area. Id. at 1426, 127
L.R.R.M. at 2049-50.
14 Id. at 1428, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2051.
" Id.
Id. at 1428-29, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2051-52.
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Therefore, the Iowa Electric court's holding left open the question
of which specific nuclear safety rules constitute public policy.
During the Survey year, in Daniel Construction Co. v. Local 257,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that enforcing an arbitra-
tor's award of back pay to employees discharged by a nuclear power
plant for failing a psychological evaluation did not violate the public
policy of nuclear plant safety)? The Daniel court stated that the
employer advanced no valid public policy) 8 Additionally, the Daniel
court noted that the arbitrator only awarded the employees back
pay and therefore returned no potentially dangerous employees to
the nuclear power plant)" Moreover, although the court did not
take this factor into account in its reasoning, the Daniel court ob-
served that the arbitrator's award actually advanced the public pol-
icy requiring enforcement of nuclear safety rules. 2°
The Daniel case involved a situation where the court had to
analyze three levels of regulation, including both public and private
regulation. 2 ' The first level consisted of the statutory regulation of
the nuclear power plant by the NRC. 22 The second level concerned
the contractual agreements between the nuclear power plant and
one of its subcontractors, Daniel Construction Cornpany. 23 The
third level of regulation was the collective bargaining agreements
between the subcontractor and eighteen different unions."
First, the NRC regulated the licensing and operation of Union
Electric Company's nuclear power plant in Callaway County, Mis-
souri. 25 Before granting the Union Electric nuclear power plant a
license, the NRC required that the plant submit a site security plan. 2"
As part of the security plan, the NRC recommended that Union
Electric establish a screening program to test the trustworthiness of
17 Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 856 F.2d 1174, 1183, 129
L.R.R.M. 2429, 2436 (8th Cir. 1988). In Daniel, the arbitrator only granted back pay and did
not order the reinstatement of the employees because by the time of the arbitration, con-
struction on the Callaway nuclear plant was winding down and the Daniel Construction
Company had already begun to lay off even those employees who had passed the psycho-
logical exam. Id. at 1179 n.10, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2433 n.10.
15 Id. at 1182, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2435.
'" Id.
2L1
21 Id. at 1176, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
22 Id. at 1176-77, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2430-31.
73 Id. at 1178. 129 L.R.R.M. at 2432,
21 Id.
" Id. at 1176-77, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2430-31.
26 Id. at 1176, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
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both employees and potential employees in order to establish
whether Union Electric should grant these people unescorted access
to sensitive areas of the plant. 27 Union Electric submitted its security
plan to the NRC without detailing a specific screening program,
and the plan received NRC approval,"
After receiving the approval, Union Electric hired the Institute
for Personality and Ability Testing ("IPAT") to develop a screening
program.29 The testing program developed by IPAT included three
personality tests. The IPAT testing program also contained an in-
terview with a clinical psychologist as an appeal for employees who
failed the written tests. For its own employees, Union Electric
adopted the IPAT program which included both the test battery
and the appeal process. 3°
The second level of obligations involved the contract between
Union Electric and a subcontractor, Daniel Construction Company
("Daniel"). 3 ' Union Electric provided its subcontractors with the
option of either developing their own screening test or using a test
provided by Union Electric. 32 For testing the employees of contrac-
tors, Union Electric only supplied a shorter version of the IPAT
written test battery which, in addition to containing fewer questions,
had no provisions for an appeal if the subcontractor's employee
failed the written portion."
The third and final level of obligations involved Daniel's col-
lective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with eighteen unions. Daniel
entered into a CBA with eighteen labor unions regarding the con-
struction of the Callaway plant. 34 The terms of the CBA permitted
Daniel to enact appropriate security, safety, and job rules. 35 Addi-
tionally, under the CBA, Daniel could only discharge employees for
cause. 36
When Union Electric introduced nuclear fuel into the Callaway
plant, it implemented its security plan." As a result, Daniel dis-
27 Id. at 1176-77, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2431.
26 Id. at 1177, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2431.
" Id.
'0 Id.
31 Id. at 1178, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2432.
32 Id.
" Id. at 1177-78, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2431-32.
34 Id. at 1178, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2432. In this case, the CBA is called the Project Agreement.
Id. at 1175, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
" Id. at 1178, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2432.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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missed 157 of its employees who had failed the shortened screening
test provided to Daniel by Union Electric under the second level of
contractual obligations." Responding to the dismissals, six of the
eighteen unions party to the CBA filed grievances which resulted
in arbitration."
The arbitrator ruled that the provision of the CBA permitting
Daniel to establish appropriate safety rules only empowered Daniel
to implement screening procedures which were not "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or unreasonable."° After hearing extensive expert testi-
mony, the arbitrator held that the shortened version of the psycho-
logical test administered to Daniel's employees lacked validity, and,
in addition, needed an appeals procedure for those who failed the
written test.'' The arbitrator concluded that because Daniel dis-
missed the 157 employees as a result of an invalid test, the dismissals
lacked cause, as required by the CBA. 42 As a remedy, the arbitrator
awarded the dismissed employees back pay without interest." Dan-
iel instituted a suit in the district court requesting that the court
overturn the arbitrator's award as a violation of the public policy
regarding nuclear safety. 44 The district court rejected Daniel's ar-
guments and Daniel appealed, again advancing the same public
policy argument."
In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that implementing the arbitrator's award of back pay
to the employees discharged because of the screening test did not
violate the public policy of ensuring safety in nuclear power plants."
As an initial matter, the Daniel court held that it must accept the
arbitrator's findings regarding the validity of the screening test.' 17
The court reached this decision because it determined that the issue
of the screening test was arbitrable." In reaching this conclusion,
38 Id.
59 Id. at 1178-79, 129 L,R.R.M. at 2432.
49 Id. at 1178, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2432.
" Id. at 1179, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2432-33. The arbitrator based his decision on statistical
evidence which demonstrated that random selection of employees had the same value in
locating mentally unstable employees as the shortened version of the screening test. M. at
1179 n.9, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2433 n.9.
42 Id. at 1179. 129 L.R.R.M. at 2433.
43 Id, See supra note 17 for a discussion of the arbitrator's rationale for giving this
particular award.
44 Id.
"Id. at 1179-80, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2433-34,
16 Id. at 1183, 129 L.R.R.M, at 2436.
" Id, at 1181, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2434.
"Id. at 1181, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2434.
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the Daniel court stated that whenever an arbitration clause grants
an arbitrator broad authority, only the most forceful evidence can
demonstrate that an arbitrator had no authority to hear any one
particular dispute. 49 Also, the court noted that the CBA between
Daniel and the unions granted the arbitrator broad authority. 50
Therefore, the appeals court determined. that the arbitrator's find-
ings of fact regarding the screening test's lack of validity controlled
their decision.
Despite having to accept the arbitrator's findings of fact in cases
such as this, the Daniel court stated that a court retains the power
to refuse enforcement of an arbitrator's award on public policy
grounds. 5 ' The eighth circuit, however, then rejected the public
policy argument advanced by Daniel Construction Company. 52 The
Daniel Construction Company asserted that the arbitrator violated
public policy when he, rather than the NRC, decided that the se-
curity plan failed to conform to NRC standards." In rejecting this
argument, the appellate court emphasized that the Daniel Construc-
tion Company offered no proof that the NRC actually ever evalu-
ated, approved, or decided in any way that the screening plan
complied with NRC regulations regarding screening procedures.
Additionally, the Daniel court noted that the only evaluation of
Union Electric's screening plan occurred in the adversary process
before the arbitrator. As a result, the court rejected the Daniel
Construction Company's public policy argument. 54
The eighth circuit also contrasted its holding with its prior
decision in Iowa Electric, where it had overturned an arbitrator's
decision because enforcement of the decision required reinstating
an employee at a nuclear power plant and therefore violated the
public policy of nuclear safety." The Daniel court reasoned that the
award of back pay implicated no public safety concerns, unlike the
decision in Iowa Electric which returned a dangerous employee to
the workplace. Therefore, even if Daniel Construction Company
stated a valid public policy, the Daniel court would enforce the
"Id. (quoting AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1419,
121 L.R.R.M. 3329, 3332 (1986)).
50 Id. at 1181, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2434,
51 Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Intl Union or Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2645 (1983)).
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arbitrator's award because the award of back pay does not clearly
violate public policy.
After the Daniel court concluded that the arbitrator's award did
not violatd public policy, it went on to state that public policy actually
required enforcement of the arbitrator's award. 56 According to the
arbitrator's finding, Daniel Construction Company used an invalid
screening test. The Daniel court pointed out that the NRC required
that each nuclear power plant have a valid screening test, and
therefore the test used by the Daniel Construction Company ac-
tually violated NRC standards. As a result, the Daniel court noted
that enforcement of the arbitrator's award not only failed to violate
public policy, but enforcement actually promoted public policy by
exposing the invalid test. 57
In Daniel Construction Co. v. Local 257, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit properly upheld the arbitrator's award of back pay
to employees dismissed pursuant to an invalid psychological screen-
ing test." The Daniel court's holding follows the guidelines set out
by the United States Supreme Court in Misco for evaluating whether
a court should overturn an arbitrator's award because enforcement
of the award would result in a violation of public policy.59
Despite complying with the Misco standards, the Daniel court's
decision failed to establish a general rule regarding which nuclear
power safety rules constitute public policy. Like its previous decision
in Iowa Electric, the eighth circuit in Daniel failed to identify whether
NRC regulations or individual nuclear plant safety rules constitute
public policy. The Daniel court's decision implies, however, that a
court can only overturn arbitrators' awards on public policy grounds
if enforcement of the award results in a violation of an actual NRC
rule.
The Daniel court's holding closely follows the public policy
doctrine as set out by the United States Supreme Court in Misco."6
According to the Misco Court, reviewing courts must ascertain pub-
lic policy through laws and legal precedents."' The Daniel court held
56 Id.
57 Id.
56 Id. at 1183, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2436.
See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of a court's power to
review an arbitrator's decision.
w Daniel, 856 F.2d at 1181, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2434.
61 United l'aperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, 108 S. Ct. 364, 373, 126 L.R.R.M. 3113,
3119 (1987) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Intl Union or Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757, 766, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2645 (1983)).
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that the NRC regulations established that denying untrustworthy
employees unescorted access to sensitive areas of a nuclear power
plant constituted a public policy. 62 Therefore, the Daniel court fol-
lowed the Misco Court's standard, requiring a specific enunciation
of a public policy before a court can use the policy to overturn an
arbitrator's award.
The Misco Court also held that enforcing the arbitrator's award
must result in a clear violation of the explicit public policy in order
for a court to overturn the award. 63 The arbitrator's decision at
issue in Daniel did not result in a clear violation. Because the arbi-
trator only awarded back pay, his decision returned no potentially
unstable employees to work at the power plant." Therefore, the
Daniel court's decision fully complies with the Misco Court's criteria
for overturning an arbitrator's decision as a public policy violation.
Despite reaching the proper decision, the Daniel court estab-
lished no standard for evaluating when enforcement of an arbitra-
tor's award results in a violation of the public policy of nuclear
power plant safety. The lack of a definition for the public policy
constituted by nuclear safety also marked the eighth circuit's pre-
vious holding in Iowa Electric. The Daniel court's opinion only re-
jected the public policy argument offered by the Daniel Construc-
tion Company without stating the instances in which an individual
nuclear power plant's safety rules constitute public policy, if at all.°
Thus, the Daniel court established no specific criteria for identifying
public policy among nuclear safety rules.
Even though the Daniel court established no standard for public
policy in the arena of nuclear power plant safety, one can infer
from the decision that only actual NRC regulations represent public
policy. The Daniel court accepted without question the NRC rec-
ommendations regarding denying unstable employees access to sen-
sitive areas of a reactor." The Daniel court also placed great em-
phasis on the fact that the NRC never approved of the screening
test or decided that the test complied with NRC regulations. More-
over, the Daniel court permitted an arbitrator to decide the validity
of an individual nuclear power plant's safety test. As a result, it
appears that the Daniel court intended that only actual NRC regu-
62 Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 856 F.2d 1174, 1176, 129
L.R.R.M, 2429, 2430-31 (8th Cir. 1988).
63 Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 373-74, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
fia DanW, 856 F.2(1 at 1182, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2435.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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lations, rather than the safety rules of an individual nuclear power
plant, constitute an explicit public policy.
Therefore, the Daniel court's decision offers no specific defi-
nition of which nuclear plant safety rules constitute public policy.
One can infer from the decision, however, that only actual NRC
regulations constitute public policy in the nuclear safety arena. As
a result of this inference, a court could overturn an arbitrator's
decision which, if enforced, placed a nuclear power plant in viola-
tion of an NRC regulation. As long as the plant is clearly in violation
of the NRC regulation, then overturning the arbitrator's award
complies with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Misty.
I V. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. *The Ineligibility of Striking Workers to Participate in the Food Stamp
Program — Lyng v. International Union'
The Food Stamp Act was designed to alleviate hunger and
malnutrition and to promote the general health and well-being of
the Nation's populace by increasing the food purchasing power of
all eligible households through the issuance of food stamps. The
Act was also intended to promote food distribution and strengthen
the agricultural economy. 3 In 1981, as part of its plan to reduce
federal spending, Congress included various amendments to the
Food Stamp Act in its Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA). 4 Among the more than one dozen changes to the Food
Stamp Act contained in OBRA '81 was section 109. Section 109
precludes a household containing a worker on strike from either
collecting food stamps or increasing its allotment because of the
decreased income of the striking worker. 5 Section 109 provides,
• By Michele Lukban, Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE: LAW REVIEW.
' 108 S. Ct. 1184, 127 L.R.R.M. 2977 (1988).
2 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988).
Id.
1 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 109, 95 Stat. 361
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1988)).
Id. Section 2015(d)(3) states as follows:
(d) Refusal to register for or accept employment
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a household shall not
participate in the food stamp program at any time that any member of such
household, not exempt from the work registration requirements of paragraph
(1) of this subsection, is on strike as defined in section 142(2) of title 29, because
of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) as defined in section 152(9) of title 29:
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however, that a household which satisfies eligibility requirements
before the strike will not lose its eligibility because of the strike, and
a household will not become ineligible if one of its members refuses
employment at a plant because of a strike or lockout.°
In 1984, two unions and individual union members filed suit
against the Secretary of Agriculture, alleging that section 109 un-
constitutionally violated their first amendment rights of association
and their fifth amendment rights to equal protection.' In Interna-
tional Union v. Lyng, the individual plaintiffs were various striking
workers and members of their households who were denied food
stamps because they were on strike. 8 In its undisputed findings of
fact, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
found that state agencies informed some workers that their house-
hold could avoid disqualification and receive food stamps if the
worker left their household." In addition, the court found other
workers voted to ratify or accept collective bargaining agreements
that were not entirely favorable, while one plaintiff quit his strike
and abandoned his union in order to receive food stamps.'" Thus,
to avoid the adverse effect of section 109 upon the household,
striking workers were advised or compelled to alter their actions in
a manner not necessarily consistent with their needs or desires.
The district court determined that the applicable standard of
review was the "rational basis test" — whether section 109 was
rationally related to one or more legitimate government interests.
Applying the rational basis test, the district court concluded that
the Food Stamp Act amendment violated the plaintiffs' first and
fifth amendment rights." Specifically, the court held that the
amendment interfered or threatened to interfere with the plaintiffs'
Provided, That a household shall hot lose its eligibility to participate in the food
stamp program as a result clone of its members going on strike if the household
was eligible for food stamps immediately prior to such strike, however, such
household shall not receive an increased allotment as the result of a decrease
in the income of the striking member or members of the household: Provided
further, That such ineligibility shall not apply to any household that does not
contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment
at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout.
Id.
6 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1988).
i nternational Union v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1235, 1'24 L.R.R.M. 2406, 2407 (D.D.C.
1986).
Id.
9 Id. at 1237, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2408.
1 ° Id.
" /d. at 1238-39, 1241, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2410, 2412.
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freedom of association with their families, union, and fellow union
members. 12
 The court also held that the amendment violated the
plaintiffs' freedom of expression and freedom from government
coercion." Finally, the court held that the amendment impermissi-
bly attacks the worker through his or her family by denying the
entire household food stamps rather than adjusting the allotment
to exclude the striking worker." The court also noted the vast
differences in the treatment of striking workers and voluntary quit-
ters." Among these differences are the fact that a voluntary quitter's
household is disqualified from receiving food stamps for only ninety
days, while a striking worker's household is ineligible for the du-
ration of the strike. Moreover, voluntary quitters are not disqualified
if they can show "good cause" for leaving work, such as employer
discrimination or unreasonable work conditions, while striking
workers have no similar opportunity to show "good cause" for the
strike.'S
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court in
Lyng u. International Union reversed the district court's decision and
held that section 109 does not violate a worker's first amendment
rights of association with his or her family, union, or other union
members." The Court also held that the statute is not coercive's
and that the Constitution does not require the government to pro-
vide funds to subsidize the exercise of a Constitutional right. 1 • Ap-
plying the rational basis test, the Court further concluded that the
amendment was rationally related to the government objective of
maintaining neutrality in labor disputes. 20
In determining that section 109 did not infringe upon the
workers' first amendment rights of freedom of association and ex-
pression, the Supreme Court relied upon the rationale used in their
earlier decision, Lyng v. Castillo. 21
 The Castillo Court considered
E2 Id. at 1239, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2410.
13 Id.
1 4 Id. at 1240-41, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2411.
15 Id. at 1240, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2411. Appendix A to the 1985 Memorandum accom-
panying the opinion discusses the undisputed differences in the treatment accorded striking
workers as opposed to voluntary quitters. See id. at 1253-55.
iu Id. at 1237, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2409.
17
 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1188-89, 127 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2979 (1988).
IS Id, at 1191, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2980.
19 Id. at 1190, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2980.
2° Id. at 1192, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
21 Id. at 1189, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2978 (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986)). As
noted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), the right of association includes
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whether the definition of a "household" as used in the Food Stamp
Act was contrary to plaintiffs' fifth amendment equal protection
rights." Under the Food Stamp Act, benefits are determined on a
household rather than an individual basis. 23 The definition of
"household" used to determine the food stamp allotment classifies
parents, children, and siblings who live together as a single house-
hold. 24 More distant relatives or groups of unrelated individuals are
not presumed to be a single household unless they customarily
purchase food and prepare meals together. 25 Thus, the Act's defi-
nition may be contrary to an individual family unit's definition of a
household and may cause families to alter their living arrangements
in order to be eligible for food stamps. 26
The Castillo Court determined the rational basis test was appli-
cable because the definition of "household" did not burden a fun-
damental right. 27 The Court concluded that the definition did not
burden any fundamental rights because it did not interfere with
family living arrangements, nor did it prevent any group of indi-
viduals from dining or sharing meals together." Finally, the Court
concluded the statutory definition had little if any effect upon the
households' formation or activities. 29
Although Castillo involved fifth amendment equal protection
claims and not the first amendment, the International Union Court
concluded that the Castillo Court's determination of the appropriate
standard of review was applicable. 30 Directly applying Castillo, the
International Union Court asserted that although some striking work-
ers might leave their homes to enable their households to obtain
food stamps, in the majority of cases the amendment would have
no effect:3 ' Thus, the Court ruled that the statute did not prevent
any group of persons from dining together nor did it "directly and
substantially" interfere with family living arrangements and, there-
fore, their rights of association."
the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group. Such associ-
ation, concluded the Court, is a form of expression of opinion and its existence is necessary
in making the express guarantees of the first amendment meaningful. Id.
22 Castillo, 477 U.S. at 636.
23 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1988).
21 7 U,S.C. § 2012(i)(3).
25 See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(1)(2).
26 See Castillo, 477 U.S. at 645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27 477 U.S. at 638.
28 Id.
29 Id.
3° 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1189, 127 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2978 (1988).
" Id. at 1189, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2979.
52 Id.
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Applying the Castillo rationale to the workers' freedom of as-
sociation with other workers, the International Union Court con-
cluded that the statute did not order or prevent workers from
associating together, nor did it burden their ability to associate in
any significant manner." Although the Court acknowledged that
striking workers have voted to ratify or accept less than favorable
collective bargaining agreements as a result of the denial of such
benefits, the Court held that the amendment did not "directly and
substantially" interfere with the workers' abilities to associate in
furtherance of their common goals and interests.M The Court noted
that any impact on the workers' rights of association was merely a
result of the government refusal to extend food stamp benefits to
striking workers. 35 The Court, applying reasoning used in previous
decisions, stated that a legislative decision not to subsidize the ex-
ercise of a right does not constitute an infringement of that right. 36
In a footnote, the Supreme Court noted previous decisions
which held that the right of association is protected from both
frontal attacks and more subtle forms of government interference."
The Court cited cases such as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
which involved disclosure of an organization's membership list,"
and NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., which involved state impo-
sition of individual liability based on an association with another
individual.3" The Court distinguished International Union from these
earlier cases, asserting that section 109 did not "significantly" inter-
fere with plaintiffs' rights of association to the extent of exposing
members to physical and economic reprisals or civil liability because
of membership.° Rather, the Court concluded that section 109 was
merely a withdrawal of a government benefit for the duration of
an activity and not a reprisal based on membership in an associa-
tion.'"
" Id. at 1189-90, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2979.
3' Id. at 1189 and n.9, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2979 and n.4.
35 Id, at 1190, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2980.
3 '1 Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549
(1983)).
" Id. at 1190 11.5, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2979 n.5.
38
 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
39
 458 U.S. 886, 919-20 (1982).
40 108 S. CI. at 1190 n,5, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2979 n.5.
-" Id. In the body of the opinion, the Supreme Court categorizes section 109 as a
legislative decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right. See International
Union, 108 S. Ct. at 1190, 1191, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2979, 2980. The Court, however, in its
discussion in footnote 5 acknowledges that section 109 is in fact a withdrawal of a government
benefit. Id, at 1190 n.5, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2979 n.5.
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In asserting that section 109 violated the workers' freedom of
expression absent government coercion, appellee unions and union
members relied upon Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 42 In Abood
the Supreme Court ruled that the state law requiring teachers to
pay a Fee to their union, which used the funds for political and
ideological purposes, violated the first amendment rights of those
members who disagreed and objected to such use of their funds.43
The Court concluded that an individual's freedom to believe should
be shaped by his or her mind and conscience rather than coerced
by the state."
Distinguishing Abood, the International Union Court concluded
that section 109 requires no exaction, does not "coerce" a belief,
and does not require political participation regardless of an individ-
ual's agreement or disagreements. 45 Section 109, the Court noted,
merely declines to extend additional assistance to striking workers.46
The Court also noted that although the Constitution prohibits coer-
cive governmental interference with specific rights, it does not con-
fer any monetary entitlement to aid in the fulfillment of those rights
or freedoms.47
After determining that the Food Stamp Act amendment had
no substantial impact on any fundamental interest and did not affect
a protected class, the International Union Court applied a rational
basis test to determine the outcome of appellees' fifth amendment
equal protection claim. 48 In keeping with this standard of review,
the Court assumed that legislative classifications or distinctions be-
tween groups of individuals or things are valid.° As the Court
noted, the Secretary of Agriculture offered three justifications for
the Food Stamp Act amendment. 5° The first government objective
was to cut federal spending. The second objective was to use the
available limited resources where the need was greatest. The third
objective was concerned with avoiding one-sided support in labor
strikes. 5 '
" Id. at 1191, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2980 (citing 431 U.S. 209, 95 L.R.R.M. 2411 (1977)).
43 431 U.S. at 235-36, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2421.
" Id. at 235, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2421•
15 108 S. Ct. at 1191, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2980.
16 Id.
47 Id.
" „See id. at 1191-93, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2980-82.
49 Id. at 1192, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
5° Id.
5 ' Id.
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The International Union Court focused on the third governmen-
tal objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side in a private
labor dispute. 52 The Court based its decision on a Senate Report
which cited public policy reasons for ending food stamp subsidiza-
tion of striking workers. 53
 The report stated that granting benefits
to striking workers can be viewed as encouraging workers to "wait
out" management rather than compromise. 54 The report also de-
clared that union strike funds, and not the food stamp program,
should support striking workers during labor-management dis-
putes.55
The Court also noted the Senate's concern with preserving the
integrity of the Act and its purposes and goals of alleviating hunger
and malnutrition and strengthening the agricultural economy of
the country.m Although acknowledging that the statute has some
discriminatory effect upon striking workers, the Court refused to
reject a congressional determination of "what constitutes wise eco-
nomic or social policy." 57
 The Court then considered the two excep-
tions to section 109: the provision allowing striking workers to
continue to receive food stamps if they were eligible before the
strike, and the provision not disqualifying a household if a member
refuses work at a striking plant or site. The Court viewed these two
exceptions as evidence of Congress's effort to avoid favoritism in
labor disputes." The Court therefore concluded that the amend-
ment precluding striking workers from collecting food stamps was
rationally related to the state objective of maintaining neutrality in
private labor disputes. 39
Having determined a rational basis between government neu-
trality and section 109, the Court eschewed the issue of whether
" Id.
55
 S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
News 396, 452.
" Id.
55 Id. By concentrating on the Senate report, the Supreme Court ignored the House
Agriculture Committee report cited by the district court in its undisputed findings of fact.
The House Agriculture Committee report contained a history of previous proposals to
preclude striking workers from collecting fbod stamps. The report cited an earlier House
Committee finding which declared that automatic exclusion of striking workers would be
unfair and inequitable and would result in non•nentral government pressuring of workers
to abandon a strike. H.R. Rap. No. 106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1981). See International
Union v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp, 1234, 1236 (D.D.C. 1986).
56
 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1192, 127 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2981 (1988).
57 Id. at 1193, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
55 Id. at 1193, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2981-82.
59 Id. at 1193, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2982.
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either of the Secretary's remaining two justifications — to cut federal
spending and to best allocate resources — would alone justify sec-
tion 109.6" The Court commented, however, upon the Secretary's
first justification concerning the reduction of federal spending. Al-
though the Court stated that Congress cannot save money by using
discriminatory practices, the Court deferred to the congressional
determination of how best to allocate resources."'
The Court dismissed appellees' argument that the Food Stamp
Act amendment impermissibly interfered with the workers' first
amendment rights by disqualifying his or her family because of a
strike."' The Court stated that the amendment's application merely
conformed with the general operation of' the food stamp program
by having an individual's actions affect household eligibility. The
Court could find no difference between this argument and the
dispute in Lyng v. Castillo over the Act's definition of a household."'
The Court therefore applied its decision in Castillo, that the Act's
definition of household was valid regardless of the fact that benefits
were determined by household and not on an individual basis, and
concluded there was no impermissible interference with a consti-
tutional right. 64
The dissent in International Union, written by Justice Marshall
and joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, criticized the ma-
jority for the "brevity" of its fifth amendment analysis and con-
cluded that section 109 failed even under "the most deferential
scrutiny."" 5
 Applying a rational basis test to the Secretary of Agri-
culture's three arguments supporting the amendment, the dissent
stated that it was difficult to discern a rational relation between
legitimate government interests and the Food Stamp Act amend-
ment." Justice Marshall noted previous Court rulings that the lack
of a rational relationship between a legislative classification and
purported goals suggests an illegitimate legislative purpose."' The




63 Id.; see supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Castillo Court's
review of the Aces definition of household.
64 108 S. Ct. at 1193-94, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2982. See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,
636 (1986),
65 108 S. Ct. at 1194, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2982. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 1195, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2983 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1194-95, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2983 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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such an illegitimate legislative purpose, namely public animus
against striking workers."8
The dissent concluded that the Secretary of Agriculture's first
argument, that the amendment would save money, was unpersu-
asive because exclusion of any gi-oup from a benefit program would
result in a decrease in spending and would thus survive rational
basis scrutiny. 69
 In a footnote, the dissent noted certain statistics
indicating that striking workers rarely participate in the food stamp
program. One study indicated households containing striking work-
ers accounted for only .2 to .3 percent of non public-assistance
households participating in the program." The dissent stated that
more than concern for financial resources was necessary to justify
the selection of striking workers to bear the burden of cost cutting
legislation.'
In regard to the Secretary's second argument, that limited re-
sources should be allocated where the need is greatest, the dissent
found no logical relation between the purpose of the Act to alleviate
hunger and a striking worker's actions."' The Secretary had also
argued that "need" was related to "willingness to work" and strikers
were "unwilling to work." 73 In response, justice Marshall noted that
striking workers often do not have the option to return to work
because the business has been shut down or because the worker has
been permanently replaced. 74
Justice Marshall also focused on the different treatment ac-
corded "voluntary quitters" and striking workers. Justice Marshall
noted that "voluntary quitters" are given the opportunity to prove
"good cause" for leaving, such as employer discrimination or un-
reasonable' work conditions. 75 If good cause is shown, the worker
and his or her household are not disqualified from receiving food
stamps. 76
 Striking workers, however, are not given this opportunity
despite the fact that strikes are frequently alleged to be the result
ea Id. at 1198, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2986 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1195, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2983 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7U Id. at 1195 n.2, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2983 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1195, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2985 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 227 (1982); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Shapiro v. 'Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633 (1968)).
72 Id. at 1196, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2984 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1196 n.5, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2984 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.7(n)(3)(i), (ii) (1988)).
75 Id. at 1196, 127 LRAM. at 2984 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of unfair labor practices by employers." Voluntary quitters and
their households are also disqualified for only 90 days in the absence
of "good cause," while the striking worker and his or her household
are disqualified for the duration of the strike. 78
The dissent argued that the Secretary of Agriculture's "neu-
trality" argument upon which the Court focused was deceptive and
deeply flawed." The dissent based its assertion on the fact that
businesses can claim a net operating loss as a result of a strike and
receive tax subsidies and are also eligible for special tax credits for
hiring replacement workers during a strike." In addition, the dis-
sent noted that management employees are not precluded from
collecting food stamps, thus decreasing management's burden dur-
ing a strike. 8 ' The dissent concluded that in view of the network of
governmental support of both labor and management, the with-
drawal of even a single support on the side of labor does not
constitute a "neutral" act, but rather constitutes a penalty. 82
The dissent reviewed earlier proposals of the Food Stamp Act
amendment, beginning in 1968, which likened striking workers to
"hippies" and "commune residents." This group of individuals was
considered voluntarily poor. The dissent also reviewed a 1973 Su-
preme Court opinion that held exclusion of communal households
from the food stamp program was irrational and unconstitutional. 83
In particular, the dissent noted that the Government's argument
before the Supreme Court, that exclusion of communal households
would reduce fraud, differed from the Government's earlier ar-
guments. The Government, at the district court level had initially
asserted that the exclusion of communal households was necessary
to foster "morality." 84 Thus, by implication, exclusion of striking
workers might be viewed as necessary to foster "morality."
Based on legislative history and the failure of the Secretary's
purported rationales for the Food Stamp Act amendment, the In-
ternational Union dissent concluded that the amendment may have
77 Id. at 1197, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2984 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 1196-97, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2984 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.7(n)(1)(v)).
79 Id, at 1198,127 L.R.R.M. at 2985 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8° Id. at 1198, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2985-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 1198, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2985 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1198, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2986 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 Id, at 1199, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2986 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States Dept
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)).
84 United States Dept of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 n.7 (1973).
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been enacted based on public animus against striking workers."
Although the dissent agreed with the majority that the Food Stamp
Act was not established to be used as a weapon in labor disputes,
the dissent argued that in fact the Food Stamp Act amendment was
such a weapon. The dissent therefore concluded that the amend-
ment was irreconcilable with the Act's goals of aiding the needy."
In sum, the International Union Court, applying the Court's
decision in Lyng v. Castillo, concluded that the Food Stamp Act
amendment does not infringe upon a worker's first amendment
right of association. 87 Applying a rational basis test, the Court de-
termined the Food Stamp Act amendment was rationally related to
the government's interest in remaining neutral in private labor
disputes." The International Union Court affirmed the congressional
determination of what constitutes wise social and economic policy."
The dissent, however, attacked the neutrality argument." In light
of the treatment accorded voluntary quitters and the various tax
subsidies available to businesses experiencing a strike, the dissent
concluded that the Food Stamp Act amendment was not neutral
and in fact was a weapon against striking workers.`''
The International Union decision is narrowly focused, distin-
guishing the freedoms to believe, express and associate from the
freedom to act. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that
some forms of association constitute a form of expression, the Court
has historically distinguished between speech and conduct. 92 In
holding that section 109 does not "directly and substantially" inter-
fere with a striking worker's first amendment rights, the Court
disregarded any indirect effect this amendment might have upon a
R5 108 S. Ct., at 1198,1199,127 L.R.R.M. at 2986 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In its decision,
the District Court for the District of Columbia noted that striking workers have historically
been subjected to discrimination and have been considered an unpopular political minority.
International Union v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234,1240,124 L.R.R.M. 2406,2410-11 (D.D.C.
1986).
108 S. Ct. at 1199-200,127 L.R.R.M. at 2987 (Marshall, j„ dissenting).
" 7 Sec supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lyng v. Castillo.
" See ,supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for a discussion or the government
objective of neutrality in private labor disputes.
RR See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
au See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's criticism
of the neutrality argument.
See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissenting opinion.
92 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965); see supra note 21 for a discussion
of Griswold. See also L. TRIBE, ANIERICnN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 825-26 (2nd ed, 1988),
for a discussion of the historical use of the speech-conduct distinction and its origins in the
labor picketing cases.
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worker. The Court distinguished between the physical and eco-
nomic reprisals suffered by individuals due to their membership in
an association and an action by the group to which an individual
belongs." This distinction clearly indicates that the Court upheld
an individual's right to hold his own beliefs and to associate in
furtherance of common goals and interests. By precluding striking
workers from participating in the Food Stamp program because of
the union's act of striking, Congress and the Court are constraining
workers to belief without action.
Although withdrawal of a benefit is not necessarily an affir-
mative impediment, it is a passive impediment with a very clear
message. Such removal indicates that if a worker chooses to act on
a belief, he or she must do so independent of social aid. Therefore,
this policy represents a type of social sanction. Even if, as statistics
indicate, only a small percentage of workers will be affected and
the coercive powers of the government would therefore be minimal,
this does not alleviate the perceived hostility toward labor. This
perception is even greater in light of the fact that section 109 will
only marginally aid in reducing federal spending." Although it may
be less harmful overall to cut such a small program rather than a
larger one that would affect a greater number, this amendment has
a profound effect upon those households that would have been
eligible for food stamps prior to the amendment.
As noted by the dissent, the network of government support
of management has not been affected by the withdrawal of aid to
striking workers. Although a striking worker may be willing to work
but unable to do so because the business is closed, the business can
claim a net operating loss. 95 The business, therefore, has more
economic resources because of government regulations than does
the worker. Moreover, because management employees are not pre-
cluded from collecting food stamps, management's burden is less. 96
Management workers, unlike faithful union members, need not
worry that their families will go hungry during a strike or shut-
down. if Congress truly sought government neutrality in private
labor disputes, it would either eliminate all forms of economic as-
95 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of this distinction.
94 See supra note 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of disburse-
ments to striking workers on the Food stamp program.
95 See supra note 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tax benefits available
to businesses.
% See supra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion of management employees
eligibility for food stamps during a strike.
December 1989]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 169
sistance available to labor and management or seek to balance gov-
ernment assistance. Section 109, however, has removed economic
assistance only from workers, and the legislative history is devoid
of any reference to labor being unfairly advantaged. The legislative
history does, however, contain suggestions of public animus towards
striking workers. 97
The Supreme Court's decision in Lyng v. International Union
sanctions congressional withdrawal of food stamps from striking
workers. The Court, however, only uses the term "withdrawal" once
in a footnote, and focuses primarily on the fact that the Constitution
does not require the government to extend entitlements or subsidies
to individuals in fulfillment of a constitutional right. The dissent
focuses primarily on the impact of the amendment upon striking
workers and their households. The dissent also recognizes the dis-
parate treatment. between voluntary quitters and striking workers.
As noted by the dissent, striking workers are unable to prove a
strike is for "good cause" even though some strikes may be in
response to situations which, for a voluntary quitter, constitute
"good cause." Despite the Food Stamp Act amendment's acknowl-
edged discriminatory effect on striking workers, the Court in Inter-
national Union concluded that the government objective of main-
taining neutrality in private labor disputes is rationally related to
this amendment and therefore does not violate a worker's fifth
amendment rights. The Court further concluded that the Food
Stamp Act amendment does not directly and substantially interfere
with a worker's right or ability to believe or express an idea or to
associate with family, other workers or the union.
V. PREEMPTION
A. *Section 301 Preemption and State Court Actions for Retaliatory
Discharge: Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.'
Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act confers subject
matter jurisdiction to federal courts in suits alleging a contract
"7 Sec supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of early hostility toward
striking workers.
* By Deborah C. Segal, Staff Member, BosToN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 108 S. Ct. 1877, 46 FEP Cases 1553 (1988).
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violation between an employer and a labor organization. 2
 In 1957,
the United States Supreme Court in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills
construed section 301 as authorizing federal courts to develop a
uniform body of substantive federal labor law to apply to labor
contract disputes that involve a collective bargaining agreement. 3
In 1962, in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the preemptive scope of section 301, holding that federal
labor law preempts the application of state law to enforce collective
bargaining agreements. 4 Gradually, the Court broadened the
preemptive scope of section 301 to include a state tort whose reso-
lution depends upon an interpretation of the labor contract agree-
men t. 5
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers v.
Lueck held that an employee's tort claim alleging a bad faith han-
dling of an insurance claims was "inextricably intertwined" with the
2 See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the "Act"), § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982). Section 301 of the Act states in pertinent part:
(a) suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as 'defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51, 40 L.R.R.M . 2113, 2116
(1957). In a grievance dispute between an employer and a labor organization, the union sued
in federal court to compel arbitration of the grievance. Id. at 449, 40 L.R.R.M. at 2113. The
district court ordered the employer to comply with arbitration. Id. The appeals court reversed,
holding that the court did not have the authority, based either in state or federal law, to
grant relief. Id. The United States Supreme Court, reversing the appeals court, held that
federal labor law is the appropriate substantive law to apply in section 301 disputes. Id. at
456, 40 L.R.R.M. at 2116.
See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717,
2720-21 (1962). An employer who had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
a union sued the union in state court for damages arising after the union called an eight day
strike. Id. at 97, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2718. The state court applied state contract law and held
that the strike violated the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 97-98, 49 L.R.R.M. at
2718. The Supreme Court, although affirming the judgment, held that the state court should
have applied federal labor law, not state contract law, in section 301 disputes involving
collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 102-03, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2720-21. The Court
emphasized the importance of a single body of federal labor law in order to achieve the
policy of uniformity underlying the federal labor legislation. See id. at 103-04, 49 L.R.R.M.
at 2721.
5 See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3352-53
(1985).
Wisconsin courts have recognized the had faith handling of an insurance claim as a
tort under state law. Id. at 203, 118 L.R.R.M. at '3345. Wisconsin courts distinguish the tort
of bad faith from a bad faith breach of contract claim, although the tort duty is also created
by the creation of the contract. Id. at 207, 118.L.R.R.M. at 3347.
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terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore section
301 preempted the state tort claim.' The Lueck Court analyzed
whether the state tort conferred non-negotiable state law rights to
an employee or employer independent of the rights established by
the labor union contract.' Although recognizing that some state-
conferred rights and obligations may exist independently of the
labor union contract, the Court held that the tort of bad faith
derived from the contractual duties and rights stipulated by the
collective bargaining agreement and thus fell within the preemptive
scope of section 301. 9
Furthermore, the Court noted that in order to achieve the
policies underlying section 301, the preemptive scope of section 301
must extend to include any disputes that involve collective bargain-
ing agreements, regardless of whether the claim is labeled as a
breach of contract, or as a tort claim."' If section 301 precluded
preemption of tort claims, the Court reasoned, a party could evade
the procedures stipulated by the collective bargaining agreement
by artfully pleading a contract claim under the guise of a tort."
Thus, the Court stated, to hold that section 301 did not preempt
this tort claim would undermine the primary importance and ef-
fectiveness of the arbitration procedure and would frustrate the
federal labor goal of national uniformity. 12
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lueck, circuit courts have
disagreed as to whether section 301 preemption applies to the state
tort claim of retaliatory discharge.' 3 A number of circuit decisions
have held that section 301 does not preempt the tort of retaliatory
discharge and thus union employees may pursue such a claim in
7
 Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213, 219, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349-50, 3352. See generally 1986-87
Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 28 B.C.L. REV. 101
(1987) For a discussion of Lueck and its impact upon section 301 preemption of state law.
471 U.S. at 213, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349-50.
9 Id, at 212, 217, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349, 3351.
'" Id. at 210-11, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349.
" Id. at 211, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349.
12 See id. at 219-20, 118 L.R.R.M, at 3352.
Compare Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814
F.2d 102, 107, 125 L.R.R.M. 3363, 3367 (2d Cir. 1987) (section 301 does not preempt
retaliatory discharge tort) and Herring v. Prilice Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120,
124 n.2, 123 L.R.R.M. 2165, 2167 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); with Johnson v. Hussman Corp.,
805 F.2d 795, 797, 123 L.R.R.M. 3074, 3076 (8th Cir. 1986) (section 301 preempts retaliatory
discharge tort) and Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511, 517, 119 L.R.R.M. 2465,
2469 (7th Cir. 1985) (tort of retaliatory discharge is breach of collective bargaining agreement
to which section 301, and not Indiana Worker's Compensation statute, applie.$),
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state court. 14 Applying the "independent tort" analysis of Lueck,
these courts have concluded that a claim of retaliatory discharge is
independent of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
because resolution of the claim does not depend upon interpreta-
tion of the labor union contract. 15
In contrast, other circuits have upheld section 301 preemption
of a retaliatory discharge tort.' 6 For example, the Eighth Circuit, in
Johnson v. Hussman Corp., applying the Lueck standard, held that an
employee's claim of retaliatory discharge was substantially depen-
dent upon the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.'?
The Johnson court reasoned that, although the employee brought
his complaint in tort, the employee was in fact suing for wrongful
discharge in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and
thus the claim fell within section 301 preemption.' 8
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court, in
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., resolved this conflict.' 9
In Lingle, the Supreme Court, reversing a decision by the Seventh
Circuit, held that section 301 preemption does not apply to the tort
of retaliatory discharge. 2° The Court affirmed the Lueck principle
that section 301 preempts a state law claim if the claim depends
upon an interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. 21 The Lingle Court ruled, however, that the tort of
retaliatory discharge is independent of the collective bargaining
agreement because resolution of the claim does not require a state
court to interpret the labor union contract. 22 Thus, after Lingle, a
union employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement may
maintain a separate action in state court for retaliatory discharge."
In Lingle, petitioner Lingle, a union employee covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, was injured while working in the
Norge Division of Magic Chef's manufacturing plant in Illinois. 24
14 See, e.g., Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 107, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3367; Herring, 799 F.2d at 124
n.2, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2167 n.2.	 •
15 See, e.g., Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 105, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3365.
l° See, e.g., Johnson, 805 F.2d at 797, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3076; Vantine, 762 F.2d at 517, 119
L.R.R.M. at 2469.
17 Johnson, 805 F.2d at 797, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3076.
18 Id.
19 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1879-80, 46 FEP Cases 1553, 1554 (1988).
2° Id. at 1879, 46 FEP Cases at 1553.
21 See id. at 1885, 46 FEP Cases at 1558.
22 Id. at 1882, 46 FEP Cases at 1556.
23 See id. at 1879, 46 FEP Cases at 1553.
24 Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879, 46 FEP Cases at 1553.
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Shortly after Lingle filed for worker's compensation under the Il-
linois Worker's Compensation Act, Norge discharged Lingle for
allegedly Falsifying her compensation claims. 25 Upon Lingle's dis-
charge, the union representing Lingle filed a grievance on her
behalf. 26 The collective bargaining agreement protected Lingle
from discharge except for "just" or "proper" cause, and provided
for a grievance arbitration procedure. 27 An arbitrator ruled in Lin-
gle's favor and ordered her reinstated with back pay. 28
During this period, Lingle filed a retaliatory discharge com-
plaint in state court, alleging that Norge fired her in retaliation for
exercising her rights under the state's compensation laws." Norge
then removed the case to federal district court on the basis of
diversity." The district court dismissed the case, holding that the
tort claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the terms of the labor
union contract, and to allow the state action to proceed would
undermine the arbitration procedure set forth in the parties' con-
tract. 3 '
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court's holding that section 301 preempts the state law claim
for retaliatory discharge." The appeals court, relying on the Lueck
holding, reasoned that the retaliatory discharge tort necessarily im-
plicated the "just cause" provision of the labor union contract and
therefore the tort claim was substantially dependent upon the col-
lective bargaining agreement." Furthermore, the court of appeals
in Lingle concluded that the retaliatory discharge tort was inextric-
ably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement because
both the state action and the arbitration procedure implicated the
same analysis of the facts. 34 Finally, the court noted that if common
law protected workers from unjust discharges, workers would de-
pend less upon the union's established arbitration procedures,




29 Id. at 1879, 46 FEE' Cases at 1554.
29 Id. The Illinois Supreme Court labeled the retaliatory discharge claim as a tort. See
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill, 2d 172, 185, 384 N.E.2d 353, 358 (1978).
5° Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879, 46 FEP Cases at 1554.
21 Id.
92 Id.
53 Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1041, 1046, 125 L.R.R.M.
2855, 2863, 2867 (7th Cir. 1087).
34 Id. at 1046, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2867.
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points — the protection of union workers from arbitrary dis-
charge.35
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
in Lingle and held that section 301 does not preempt a state tort of
retaliatory discharge. 36 The Court first noted that the Illinois Su-
preme Court, the state's highest court, recognized the tort of retal-
iatory discharge and had extended the availability of the tort to
union employees." The United States Supreme Court then stated
that the plaintiff must prove two elements in order to prove a charge
of retaliatory discharge. 38 First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
he or she was either discharged or threatened with discharge."
Second, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's motive was to
deter the plaintiff from exercising, or to interfere with the plaintiff's
exercising his or her rights under the Illinois Worker's Compensa-
tion Act. 4° The Court stated that these two elements of proof pre-
sented purely factual questions and neither required an interpre-
tation of the collective bargaining agreement's terms. 4 ' Thus, the
Court held that the tort of retaliatory discharge existed indepen-
dently of the labor union contract for section 301 preemption pur-
poses. 42
The Supreme Court rejected the appeals court's reasoning that
because both the arbitration procedure and the state action impli-
cated the same factual analysis, the state claim necessarily depended
upon the collective bargaining agreement. 4" Although the Supreme
Court agreed that resolution of the state law claim might require
the same factual considerations as an arbitrator's inquiry into the
"just cause" provision of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Court observed that section 301 preempted only those areas involv-
ing an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement itself."
35 Id. at 1047, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2868.
'6 Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879, 46 FEP Cases at 1553.
37 Id. at 1881-82, 46 FEP Cases at 1555-56, citing Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 III. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Midget( v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 III. 2d 143, 117 L.R.R.M.
2807 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985). See generally Comment, Retaliatory Discharge—
Illinois' Extension of Retaliatory Discharge Tort Actions to Employment Relationships Governed - by
Collective Bargaining Agreements: New Obstacles Imposed by Federal Labor Law Preemption, 1985 S.
ILL. L. REV. 707 (1985).





43 Id. at 1883, 46 FEP Cases at 1556-57.
44 See id. at 1882-83, 46 FEY Cases at 1556-57.
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The Court further stated that section 301 does not infringe upon
a state's ability to provide substantive rights to employees when
adjudication of those rights does not depend upon an analysis of
the collective bargaining agreement.45 The Court held, therefore,
that section 301 preemption does not apply. 46
The Lingle Court's decision is consistent with the reasoning
underlying the Court's earlier decision in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck.
The Lueck Court held that the tort alleging breach of good faith
required an analysis of the duties established by the collective bar-
gaining agreement in order to determine whether a deviation from
the contractual obligations occurred. 47 Therefore, the Lueck Court
concluded that section 301 necessarily preempted the state claim
for bad faith." The Lueck Court implied, however, that an indepen-
dent, non-negotiable state law right, whose existence did not depend
upon a collective bargaining agreement, might fall outside the
preemptive scope of section 301. 49
The Lingle Court, applying the Lueck analysis, determined that
the tort of retaliatory discharge conferred substantive state law
rights independent of the collective bargaining agreement. 5° The
Lingle Court reasoned that substantive state rights in the labor area
can exist without implicating collective bargaining agreements."
Because adjudication of these rights did not substantially depend
upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court
held that section 301 does not preempt the tort. 52
At the same time, the Lingle Court failed to address whether a
union may waive its members' individual non-preempted state law
rights within the collective bargaining agreement. 53 The Court
noted that under Illinois law, neither party to a labor union contract
may waive the tort of retaliatory discharge or curtail an employee's
rights under the state worker's compensation scheme." The Lingle
Court did not resolve, however, whether a state prohibition against
the waiver, such as the Illinois law, falls within the scope of section
45 14. at 1883, 46 FEP Cases at 1556-57.
4" Id. at 1879, 46 FEP Cases at 1553.
47 See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 217-18, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3351
(1985).
45 Id. at 219, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
49 Id, at 217 n.11, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351 n.11.
5° Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1883, 1884, 46 FEP Cases at 1556-57, 1557.
51 Id. at 1884, 46 FEP Cases at 1557.
52 See id, at 1883, 46 FEP Cases at 1:7.56.
53 Id. at 1883 n.9, 46 FEP Cases at 1557 n.9.
54Id.
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301 requiring preemption by federal labor law. 55 The Court merely
stated that before deciding whether a state prohibition against a
waiver could be preempted under federal law by the parties to the
agreement, the court would require "clear and unmistakable evi-
dence" that the parties intended such a waiver."
The Lingle decision allows union employees to pursue an action
for retaliatory discharge in state court before resolution of the
grievance arbitration procedure. The Lingle Court explained, how-
ever, that its decision should not be construed as an attempt to
undermine federal labor law policy encouraging arbitration. 57 Dis-
putes involving interpretations of collective bargaining agreements
still remain within the arbitrator's discretion," and parties therefore
must submit to the arbitration procedure stipulated by the labor
union contract. The Lingle Court merely affirmed a state's ability to
provide substantive rights to workers without necessarily implicating
the broad preemptive scope of section 301 governing collective
bargaining agreements. 59 Simply because the goals of the Worker's
Compensation Act are also protected under a "just cause" provision
of a collective bargaining agreement, a claim of retaliatory discharge
is not rendered substantially dependent on the collective bargaining
agreement.
Given that many jurisdictions award punitive damages for a
violation of public policy, whereas arbitration remedies include only
reinstatement and back pay for wrongful discharge,6° the Lingle
decision undoubtedly will encourage union employees to pursue
state actions for retaliatory discharge. Separate state actions for
retaliatory discharge, however, should not present a serious threat
to a union's organizing strength; a union still serves as protection
against arbitrary and wrongful discharge. Rather, increased resort
to state claims of retaliatory discharge will serve to strengthen the
goal underlying punitive damages — that of deterring employers
from retaliatory firings when workers exercise their rights under a
state worker's compensation scheme. Furthermore, Lingle empha-
sizes that interpretations of collective bargaining agreements remain
within the realm of arbitration.6 '
55 See id.
56 Id. (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983)).
57 See Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884, 46 FEP Cases at 1557.
56 Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884, 46 FEP Cases at 1557.
59 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of a state's ability to
provide substantive labor rights without preemption by section 301.
60 See Comment, supra note 37, at 712-13, 731.
61 Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884, 46 FEP Cases at 1557.
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The Lingle decision may also give rise to an increased number
of contract claims involving collective bargaining agreements dis-
guised as state tort claims, a fear that the Court in Lueck expressed. 02
Because of the availability of punitive damages under the tort claim,
employees may seek to file breach of contract claims in 'state court
as a tortious breach of contract. The "independent tort" analysis,
however, developed in Lueck and now affirmed in Lingle, is an
effective tool to distinguish between contract claims and tort claims.
Courts must examine on a case-by-case basis whether the tort claim
derives its rights from the collective bargaining agreement, and
whether resolution of the state law claim substantially depends upon
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lingle resolved the conflict
among circuit courts over the scope of section 301 preemption
regarding the tort of retaliatory discharge. As such, the Court's
holding that section 301 does not preempt a state tort claim of
retaliatory discharge is not a departure from prior existing law. The
Lingle decision merely affirmed the section 301 preemption prin-
ciple developed in Lueck: section 301 only preempts a state law claim
that is inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
B* NLRB Preemption of an Action Under ERISA To Recover
Delinquent Contributions: Laborers Health & Welfare Trust
Fund For Northern California v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co.'
An , employer who has a contractual duty to contribute to a
pension fund has, in addition, a statutory duty to contribute during
the period beginning after contract expiration and ending when
negotiations for a new contract have come to an impasse, pursuant
to section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 2 In
1980, Congress amended the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA) sections 515 and 502(g)(2) to provide trustees of
multi-employer benefit plans a remedy in federal court to collect
62 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons why the
preemptive scope of section 301 should include tort claims whose resolution depends upon
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
* By Brenda keel Sharton, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 108 S. Ct. 830, 127 L.R.R.M. 22657 (1988).
2 Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund For Northern California v. Advanced Light-
weight Concrete Co., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 830, 832, 127 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2657 (1988).
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delinquent contributions. 3
 These amendments provide an exception
to the well-established rule that federal courts must defer to the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on matters which arise
under section 7 or 8 of the NLRA. 4
The 1980 amendments to ERISA apply to "[e]very employer
who is obligated to make contributions to a multi-employer plan
under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively
bargained agreement . . . "5 The amendments have been found by
the First Circuit to provide a federal remedy for contributions
delinquent under a contractual obligation. 6 The statute raises the
issue of whether they also provide a federal judicial remedy for
delinquent contributions which are due for the period beginning
after contract expiration and ending prior to impasse pursuant to
the statutory duty which arises under the NLRA, or whether the
NLRB retains sole jurisdiction.'
Four circuit courts, the First, Third, Fifth and Ninth, have
ruled on whether the NLRB's jurisdiction preempts a federal court
action under ERISA to recover delinquent contributions pursuant
to the statutory duty to contribute even after contract expiration. 8
All four circuits have agreed that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over such claims and that the 1980 ERISA amendments pro-
vided a federal remedy only to collect unpaid contributions which
accrued before contract expiration.9 Thus, according to the circuit
courts, the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to decide this unfair
bargaining issue which arises under section 8 of the NLRA, and the
ERISA § 505(g)(2) as amended 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (1982).
' San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838,
2842 (1959). The Court stated "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act,
the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with the national policy is to be
averted." Id.
5 Advanced Lightweight, 108 S. Ct. at 834, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2659.
6 New Bedford Fisherman's Welfare Fund v. Baltic Enter., Inc., 813 F.2d 503, 504, 125
L.R.R.M. 2319, 2320 (1st Cir. 1987).
7 Id.
8 Id.; Moldovan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 790 F.2d 894, 900-01, 122 L.R.R.M.
2762, 2768 (3rd Cir. 1986); U.S. 198 Health & Welfare v. Rester Refrig. Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d
423, 424, 122 L.R.R.M. 2457, 2458 (5th Cir. 1986); Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund
v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 779 F.2d 497, 505, 121 L.R.R.M. 2276, 2282
(9th Cir. 1985).
See New Bedford Fishermen's Welfare Fund, 813 F.2d at 504, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2320;
Moldovan, 790 F.2d at 900-01, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2768; Rester Refrig. Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d at
424, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2458; Advanced Lightweight, 779 F.2d at 505, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2282.
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1980 ERISA amendments only apply to actions arising while the
contract is still in effect."'
During the Survey year, The Supreme Court affirmed the rule
set forth by the circuit courts, holding, in Laborers Health and Welfare
Trust Fund for Northern California v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co.,
that the remedy provided by ERISA . for collection of delinquent
contributions is limited to contributions owed pursuant to an agree-
ment, and does not give jurisdiction to federal courts to determine
whether an employer's decision to discontinue contributions post-
contract expiration was an unfair labor practice in violation of sec-
tion 8 of the NLRA." The Court ruled that federal courts must
defer to the expertise of the NLRB to determine whether an em-
ployer's unilateral decision to discontinue contributing after the
contract has expired is unfair bargaining under the NLRA.' 2 Thus,
the Supreme Court's holding was consistent with the decisions of
all the circuits that had ruled on the issue." After Advanced Light-
weight, it is clear that the NLRB will be the only forum open to
pension plan trustees who wish to complain that an employer has
breached its statutory duty to contribute post-contract expiration
and prior to impasse, in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
In Advanced Lightweight, the defendant was a member of the
Associated General Contractors of California and was involved in
two multi-employer collective bargaining agreements negotiated on
its behalf by the association." The agreements required Advanced
Lightweight to make contributions to eight employee benefit plans
on a monthly basis." The agreements were set to expire on June
15, 1983. On April I, 1983, Advanced Lightweight notified the
unions that the association no longer had authority to bargain for
them and that it would not contribute past June 15, 1983 and
thereafter would negotiate with the unions independently. In De-
cember of 1983, the plaintiffs, the trustees of the eight employee
benefit plans, sued Advanced Lightweight in the Federal District
I" New Bedford Fishermen's Welfare Fund, 813 F.2d at 504, 125 L.R.R.M, at 2320; Moldovan,
790 F.2d at 900-01, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2768 U.S. Health & Welfare v. Rester Refrig. Serv.,
Inc., 790 F.2d at 424, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2458; Advanced Lightweight, 779 F.2d at 505, 121
L.R.R.M. at 2282.
11 Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 830, 836, 127 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2660 (1985).
12 Id. at 833-34, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2658-59.
13 Id.
14
 Id. at 832, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
15 Id.
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Court for the Northern District of California in order to collect
contributions to the funds after the June 15, 1983 expiration date.
The trustees alleged that the federal court had proper jurisdiction
based on the federal remedy provided in section 502(g)(2) and
section 515 of ERISA.'°
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia granted Advanced Lightweight's motion for summary judg-
ment, reasoning that section 515 of ERISA did not apply to an
employer's obligations under the NLRA, and the NLRB had exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the claim.' 7 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that in examining the text and
the legislative history of section 515 of ERISA, there was no per-
suasive evidence that Congress intended that section to apply to the
category of suits claiming recovery of delinquent contributions ac-
cruing between contract expiration and impasse.'s The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and affirmed the decision and reasoning
of the court of appeals. 19
In affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
examined both the plain text and the legislative history surrounding
the 1980 ERISA amendments and reasoned that Congress enacted
these amendments to force employers to fulfill their contractual
duties to contribute to pension plans and to provide a speedy and
efficient remedy against delinquent contributors. 20 Accordingly, the
Court held that the amendments did not provide a judicial remedy
for delinquent contributions owed under the statutory duty to con-
tribute after expiration and prior to impasse. 2 ' According to the
Court, Congress responded to two concerns with its 1980 amend-
ments to ERISA.22 First and foremost, the Court noted, Congress
was concerned about the burden on remaining contributors to a
multi-employer fund when other contributors withdrew. 23 The
16 Id.
' 7 Id. at 833, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
LB Id., at 833-34, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2658-59. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded: "[w]e 6nd no persuasive evidence in either the plain words or legislative history
of ERISA or the MPPAA [Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980] that
Congress intended section 515 to be an exception to the general rule of NLRB pre-emption
for that narrow category of suits seeking recovery of unpaid contributions accrued during
the period between contract expiration and impasse." Id.(quoting Laborers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 779 F.2d 497, 505 (9th Cir. 1985).
i" Advanced Lightweight, 108 S. Ct. at 834, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2659.
21' Id. at 835-36, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
21 Id.
22
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Court stated that Congress, in response to this problem, enacted
the "withdrawal liability" provision, which arises when an employer
no longer is obligated to contribute to the plan. In this provision,
"obligation" is defined as including both contractual obligations as
well as the statutory obligation imposed by the NLRA. The Court
reasoned that this demonstrated that Congress was well aware of
the two distinct sources under which an employer may be obligated
to contribute: contractual and statutory. Secondly, in making the
amendments, the Court noted that Congress was also concerned
about the problem of employers failing to make "promised contri-
butions" on a regular and timely basis. 24 Thus, the Court reasoned
that the plain language of section 515 and section 502(g)(2) of
ERISA indicated that Congress enacted those provisions in response
to this concern and did not even mention an employer's noncon-
tractual obligation imposed by the NLRA. 25
The Court maintained that, in addition to the plain text of the
ERISA provisions the legislative history also supported the propo-
sition that Congress added the remedies contained in the 1980
amendments to further ensure that employers honor their contrac-
tual duties and to provide quick and efficient collection of any
delinquent payment. 26 The Court noted that the legislative history
did not mention an employer's statutory duty to make post-contract
contributions to the funds while negotiating for a new contract. 27
Given this legislative history, and the plain language of the text of
sections 515 and 502(g)(2), the Court concluded that the remedy
under these sections is restricted to the collection of "promised
contributions" and district courts do not have jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether an employer's refusal to make the required post-
contract contribution violates the NLRA. 28
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected two policy argu-
ments which the petitioners set forth as reasons to interpret section
515 broadly enough to encompass post-contract contribution delin-
quencies. 29 First, the trustees argued that the refusal to recognize
14 Id .
25 Id. at 834-35, 127 L.R.R.M. at '2659. ERISA section 515 provides that "[e]very em-
ployer who is obligated to make contributions to a multi-employer plan under the terms of
the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement .shall, to the extent not
inconsistent with the law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and condi-
tions of such plan or such agreement." [Emphasis added]. 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1982).
" Advanced Lightweight, 108 S. Ct. at 835, 127 L.R.R.M, at 2660.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 836, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
Id. at 837, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2661
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jurisdiction for post-contract contributions would cause a "gap" in
the enforcement Scheme." Second, the plaintiffs argued that the
NLRB remedies were inadequate. 31
The Supreme Court rejected both of these policy arguments
mainly because the congressional intent was so plain that policy
arguments should have been addressed to Congress, which has the
authority to amend the legislation, rather than to the Court, which
could only interpret such legislation. 32 In addition to this main
principle, the Court went on to set out countervailing arguments
which it concluded made it more likely that Congress had limited
the statute by choice rather than inadvertently as petitioners had
alleged. As to the asserted gap in the enforcement scheme, the
Court made three observations. First, because post-contractual de-
linquency appears not even to have been mentioned to Congress,
the Court reasoned that it probably is not a serious problem. Sec-
ond, the Court noted that the issues. presented in a dispute over
post-contract delinquency are far more complex than the issues
involved in a "simple collection action," because the question of
whether an impasse has occurred requires a judgment based on
such factors as the parties' bargaining history. Third, with regard
to the increased complexity, the Court observed that the NLRB has
expertise in deciding whether an employer's unilateral decision to
cease contributing to a pension plan is a violation of the NLRA.
The Court also noted that in cases such as the one before it that
involve an "arguable" violation of section 8 of the NLRA, federal
courts usually defer to the NLRB."
In response to petitioner's second policy argument that the
remedies available under the NLRB are less effective than those
available judicially, the Court simply noted that any defects in the
NLRB remedies are not unique to this claim and are shared by all
unfair labor practice proceedings brought before the NLRB. 34 The
Court pointed out that if the labor legislation were repealed, peti-
tioners would have no basis to claim that the employer had a duty
to contribute to the fund after the contractual duty had expired,
and the duty that does exist was created solely to protect the collec-





Id. at 838, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2662.
95
 Id.
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In summing up, the Court pointed out that the the duties imposed
on employers by the 1980 amendments provided a substantial ben-
efit to ER1SA plan trustees by providing a federal remedy for
delinquency to contribute while under a contractual duty, but did
not give such trustees a federal remedy for an employer's violation
of its duty to bargain in good faith under the NLRA. 36
The Supreme Court's opinion in Advanced Lightweight does not
depart from previous law and simply reinforces the viewpoint of
past. lower court cases." After Advanced Lightweight, there can be no
question that the NLRA preempts an,ERISA action in federal court
for the collection of delinquent contributions owed after contract
expiration and prior to negotiating impasse pursuant to section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The Supreme Court's decision was correct
because it was consistent with the plain meaning of the text of the
ERISA amendments and the legislative history behind it, and also
consistent with the policies and intent of both ERISA and the
NLRA.
The Court held that no cause of action existed under ERISA
sections 515 and 502(g)(2) to collect contributions owed after con-
tract expiration, 38 a finding which was correct given the plain lan-
guage and legislative history of these sections. As the Court noted,
the plain language of section 515 itself shows that it was meant to
apply to contributions owed pursuant to an "agreement" and it does
not even mention contributions owed under NLRA section 8(1)(5). 3 •
The text of section 515 states that: "[e]very employer who is obli-
gated to make contributions to a multi-employer plan under the
terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained
agreement shall . . . ."40 Given the plain meaning of the words, this
section can only be interpreted to mean that only contributions
delinquent under an agreement, in other words a contract, give rise
to a federal remedy. The legislative history of the section also bols-
ters the Supreme Court's decision.'"
In addition, the Court's holding is consistent with the general
policies of ERISA and the NLRA. Given the general rule that the
NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, 42 the
311 Id.
" Id. at 836, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
a' Id.
Id. at 834, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2659.
40 Id .
41 Id. at 835, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2666.
" San Diego Building Trades Council v. Carman, 359 U,S. 236, 245, 43 L.R.R,M. 2838,
2842 (1959).
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Court was correct in determining that the federal court did not
have jurisdiction to determine whether impasse had been reached
and thus contributions no longer due. Courts should defer to the
NLRB, as that body has the expertise to determine when an unfair
labor practice has occurred.* As the Ninth Circuit stated, impasse
is "an imprecise term of art."'" It requires judgment based on such
factors as the parties' bargaining history.* The NLRB deals with
this issue on a frequent basis, and is quicker and more efficient in
determining when impasse has occurred:* The Court's decision is
consistent with the major policy of the NLRA, which is to promote
good faith bargaining47 and allow the NLRB, which is comprised
of experts on the subject, to decide good faith bargaining disputes:*
Employers have a statutory duty to contribute to the pension funds
while negotiating a new contract° in order to prevent employers
from holding out and forcing unions to grant a contract on unfa-
vorable terms simply out of necessity to get the contributions started
again, i.e., to prevent unfair bargaining. The statutory duty that
does exist was created to protect the collective bargaining process
and carry out the purposes of the NLRA. 5°
ERISA, on the other hand, protects contract actions. 5 ' Section
515 provides an exception to the general policy of the NLRA and
gives a privilege to the pension plan trustees in that they are given
a federal judicial remedy for the two reasons stated in the Supreme
Court's opinion: first, to relieve the burden placed on other con-
tributors when one withdraws, and second, to prevent employers
from failing to make their "promised contributions" on time." Con-
gress enacted the ERISA sections to meet these two concerns and
intended to limit them to contract actions." Had Congress meant
for the district court to be able to give a remedy as to unfair labor
practices, they surely would have stated this explicitly. 54
" U.S. 198 Health & Welfare, Educ. & Pensiori Funds v. Rester Refrig. Serv., Inc., 790
F.2d 423, 426, 122 L.R.R.M. 2457, 2460 (5th Cir. 1986).
44 Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Advanced Lightweight, 108 S. Ct. 830, 833 n.5,
127 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2658 n.5 (1988).
45 Id, at 837, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
46 Id,
47 Id. at 831, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
Rester Refrig. Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d at 426, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2460.
" Advanced Lightweight, 108 S. Ct. at 838, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2662.
511 Id.
Id. at 836, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
52 Id. at 834, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2659,
53 Id. at 834-35, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2659.
54 Id, at 836 n.16, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2660 n.16.
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In Advanced Lightweight, the Supreme Court held that the 1980
ERISA amendments, sections 515 and 502(g)(2), do not provide a
federal judicial remedy for delinquent pension fund contributions
owed for the period beginning after contract expiration and ending
prior to impasse under the statutory duty imposed by section 8 of
the NLRA. The decision accorded with all circuit court decisions
on the issue. Thus, after' Advanced Lightweight, it is clear that the
NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints that an employer
has breached the statutory duty to continue to contribute to em-
ployee pension funds after contract expiration and prior to impasse,
in violation of section 8 of the NLRA. The decision was consistent
with past decisions, and in accordance with the plain meaning and
legislative history of the statute involved. In addition, the decision
was consistent with the policies of the NLRA and ERISA: to protect
against unfair labor practices and to protect contract actions re-
spectively.
VI. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A.*The Supreme Court Rejects the Jiffy June Willfulness Standard in
Favor of the Thurston Standard for Determining FLSA Violations:
McGlaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.'
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regulates mini-
mum wages, maximum hours and other aspects of employment for
most workers in the United States.' Actions for violations of the
FLSA must be brought within two years of the violation unless the
violation is "willful," in which case the limitation period is extended
to three years. 3 This extension has particular importance in FLSA
cases because many violations of the Act are continuing ones, with
backpay damages limited only by . the length of the statute of limi-
tations. 4 The FLSA itself provideS no guidance as to what is meant
• By Hugh F. Murray, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
108 S. Ct. 1677 (1988).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (1982).
29 U.S.C. §§ 255(a) (1982). That provision, which provides the statute of limitations
for both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1982)), and the FLSA states that an action under the FLSA "may be commenced within
two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred
unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of
action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause
of action accrued." Id.
See, e.g., Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2(1 80, 84 n.6 Ord Cir. 1986).
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by the word "willful," 5 and consequently there was a dispute re-
garding the proper interpretation of the term. 6
Before the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
in 1988, two conflicting definitions of "willful" prevailed in the
federal circuit courts of appeals.' In the 1972 decision of Coleman
v. Jiffy June Farms Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a willful violation was one in which the
employer "knew or suspected that his actions might violate the
FLSA."8
 The Jiffy June standard, widely followed by other circuit
courts, 9 did not require that the employer knew that its actions
violated the provisions of the FLSA, but only that the employer
realized that the Act could have been "in the picture." 10 The alter-
native definition of a "willful" violation of the FLSA is based on a
United States Supreme Court decision that interpreted the same
term in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)." In
the 1985 case of Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, the Supreme Court
held that an employer willfully violates the ADEA only if "the
employer knew or showed reckless disregard as to whether its con-
duct was prohibited." 12 Many circuit courts borrowed the reasoning
and result of Thurston for use in cases involving FLSA violations : "
During the 1988 Survey year, the United States Supreme Court,
in McGlaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. resolved this conflict by holding
that a violation of the FLSA is willful if the employer knew or
5
 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 255(a) (1982).
6
 McGlaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 108 S. Ct. at 1679-80.
Compare Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that an employer's conduct is "willful" for purposes of the FLSA if the employer knew that
the FLSA was "in the picture") with Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that an employer's conduct is "willful" for purposes of the FLSA if the
employer knows or shows reckless disregard as to whether its conduct is prohibited).
8 458 F.2d at 1142.
See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Daylight Dairy Prod., Inc., 779 F.2d 784, 789 (1st Cir.
1985); Donovan v. Bel-Loc Diner Inc., 780 F.2d 1113, 1117 (4th Cir. 1985); Marshall v.
Union Pacific Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1981); Donovan v. M &
M Wrecker Serv. Inc., 733 F.2d 83, 85-86 (10th Cir. 1984); Brock v. Georgia Southwestern
College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (11th Cir. 1985).
I° 458 F.2d at 1142. ("Stated most simply, we think the test should he: Did the employer
know the FLSA was in the picture?").
" 29 U.S.C. §1 626(b) (1982). This provision states in relevant part that " ... liquidated
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. 626(b)
(1982).
12
 469 U.S. 111, 119, 36 FEP Cases 977, 985 (1985) (quotations and citations omitted).
' 5 See, e.g., Russo v. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, inc., 837 F.2d 40, 45, 45 FEP Cases
1145, 1149 (2nd Cir. 1988); Peters v. Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1167-68, 43 FEP Cases
1822, 1837 (5th Cir. 1987); Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 311 (7th
Cir. 1986).
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showed reckless disregard as to whether it was violating the statute."
In Richland Shoe, the Supreme Court upheld a Third Circuit deci-
sion that had applied the Thurston standard to determine the will-
fullness of an employer's conduct.' 5 The likely result of this clari-
fication in the law is that, in those circuits that had not already
adopted Thurston, violators of FLSA provisions could be subject to
smaller backpay fines because of the increased difficulty of showing
that a particular violation was willful. Thus, those employers who
negligently violate or disregard the FLSA will not be subject to the
third year of backpay liability.
In 1984, the Secretary of Labor filed an action against Richland
Shoe Company ("Richland") for alleged violations of the FLSA.'°
Upon motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that
Richland had violated the Act. 17 The evidence also revealed that
the employer had been aware that the FLSA potentially governed
its actions.' 8 Applying the Jiffy June "in the picture" standard to
these facts, the district court determined that Richland had willfully
violated the Act and therefore was subject to the extended statute
of limitations period.' 9 In calculating the cumulative backpay dam-
age award, the district court used the three-year period as opposed
to the two-year period." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court, rejecting
the Jiffy June standard and holding that a willful violation must be
intentional or reckless. 2 ' To resolve a growing conflict among the
circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 22
The United States Supreme Court held that the word "willful"
in the FLSA statute of limitations requires more than the employer's
awareness that the FLSA governs its actions. 23 The Court faced
alternative definitions of the term. 24 The Third Circuit had anal-
ogized to Thurston and adopted a recklessness standard, 25 In addi-
14 108 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 (1988).
15 1d. at 1680-81.
Ifi Id. at 1679.
17 Donovan v. Richland Shoe Co., 213 F.Supp. 667, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
IR Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that "Richland's
vice-president and general manager stated in his deposition that he knew that the FLSA
applied to overtime pay schemes such as that used . . .'').
1'7
	 v. Richland Shoe Co., 623 F. Supp. 667, 670-71 (D.C. Pa. 1985),
20 Brock, 799 F.2d at 84 n.6.
21 1d. at 83-84.
22
 108 S, Ct. 63 (1987).
McGlaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 108 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 (1988).
24 See id. at 1681-82.
25 Id. at 1680.
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tion, although neither side urged a strict Jiffy June standard on the
Court, the Secretary of Labor advocated a modified Jiffy June stan-
dard that would find a willful violation if the employer both rec-
ognized that the FLSA was "in the picture" and failed to take steps
reasonably calculated to resolve any doubts about the law. 26
The majority chose to address Jiffy June directly. 27 The Court
reasoned that defining a willful violator as any employer who knew
that its actions were governed by the FLSA would result in nearly
every employer being subject to the three-year period. The two-
tiered nature of the statute of limitations put forth by Congress,
the Court reasoned, indicated that a meaningful distinction should
exist between ordinary and willful violations. The Court held that
the Jiffy  June standard failed to make that distinction. 28 The majority
also rejected the Secretary of Labor's modified standard that would
permit a finding of willfullness based on nothing more than negli-
gence or good faith error. 29 Given the fact that many jurisdictions
were already turning away from the Jiffy June standard, the Court
held that its continued application was not necessary for judicial
continuity." The Court also noted that the Secretary of Labor her-
self had rejected the "in the picture" standard espoused by Jiffy
June. 3 '
After rejecting these possible standards, the Court briefly artic-
ulated its reasons for applying the Thurston standard. The Court
cited "voluntary," "deliberate," and "intentional" as synonyms for
"willful," and wrote that the term generally refers to something
more than negligent conduct. The Court therefore held that a
willful violation of the FLSA for purposes of the statute of limita-
tions provision must entail either actual knowledge of violation or
reckless disregard as to whether the statute prohibited its conduct."
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
dissented from the majority's holding. 33 Although Justice Marshall
agreed that the Jiffy June standard swept too broadly, 34 he argued
26 Id. at 1680-82. The Secretary "would deem an FLSA violation willful if the employer,
recognizing it might he covered by the FLSA, acted without a reasonable basis for believing
that it was complying with the statute." Id. at 1682.
27 Id. at 1681-82.
29 Id, at 1681.
29 M. at 1682.
30 Id. at 1681-82.
' 1 Id. at 1682.
92 Id. at 1681.
Id, at 1682-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1683 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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for the adoption of the intermediate standard proposed by the
Secretary of Labor." Justice Marshall argued that if an employer,
knowing that the FLSA might regulate its actions, fails to take
reasonable steps to determine the law and consequently violates the
Act, the employer should be subject to the longer statute of limi-
tations period."
Justice Marshall noted that in the past the Court had inter-
preted the term "willful" in more than one way if the context of
the words warranted such a distinction." Justice Marshall argued
that such a contextual difference exists between the use of the word
"willful" in the ADEA and its use in the FLSA." Justice Marshall
reasoned that an important distinction exists between the conse-
quences of a finding of a willful violation under the two statutes
that militates towards a different definition." He noted that a willful
violation of the ADEA results in punitive damages being imposed
on the employer, whereas a willful violation of the FLSA entails
only an increased period of time during which plaintiffs can recover
purely compensatory relief. 40 Noting that concerns of unfair puni-
tive damage awards had led the Court in Thurston to restrict the
definition of willful for purposes of the ADEA, Justice Marshall
reasoned that a broader definition of the term was appropriate
under the FLSA, which, he observed, provided only compensatory
relief.'" Therefore, Justice Marshall argued that the Court should
have adopted the modified Jiffy June standard urged by the Secre-
tary of Labor. 42
For those circuits that operated under the Jiffy June standard,
defining willful conduct as occuring when the employer reasonably
knew the FLSA was "in the picture," the Richland Shoe case repre-
sents a significant shift in the way FLSA violators are treated.'" As
a result of this decision, employers who negligently disregard or
violate the act will face smaller damage awards due to the increased
difficulty of proving a willful violation.
The Court's result in Richland Shoe is correct in light of the
Court's recent interpretation of the term "willful" in the context of
55 Id. at 1683-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56 See id.
" Id. at 1683 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1683-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 1684 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 Id.
11 Id. at 1684 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1683-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45 See Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126, 36 FEY Cases 977, 984.
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the ADEA.44 By rejecting the Jiffy June standard, the Court gave a
more proper interpretation of the two-tiered statute of limitations
Congress established."' Congress decided that willful violators
should be treated differently from inadvertent violators; this pur-
pose is not furthered by making the definition of willful so broad
as to encompass all violators. Also, because the Court defined "will-
ful" in Thurston, unless there is a compelling reason to distinguish
the two situations, the definition should be consistent across statutes.
This is especially true where, as here, one statute (FLSA) served as
a model for significant portions of the other (ADEA). 46
Justice Marshall's distinction between the effects of a finding
of a willful violatibn of the ADEA and the effects of such a finding
under the FLSA on the basis of the punitive versus remedial nature
of the damages incurred is largely illusory. Many cases brought
under the FLSA are, as in Richland Shoe, continuing violations. 47
The result of the extended statute of limitations period is to increase
the amount of monetary damages that the willful FLSA violator will
have to pay. Unlike most common law actions, an FLSA violation is
often a continuous violation, in many cases extending farther back
than the statute of limitations. The backpay awards, therefore, are
limited only by the length of the statute of limitations. If a willful
violation is found, the employer is liable for three years worth of
backpay, whereas an inadvertant violator incurs only two years of
liability. Assuming that the violations were consistent over the years,
the extra year is, in effect, a fifty percent increase in the damages
paid by the employer.
The reason for extending the period cannot be, as Justice
Marshall asserts, compensation 'of the victim, for victims of inad-
vertent violations are harmed as much as victims of deliberate vio-
lations. Rather, the purpose of extending the statute of limitations
must be to punish willful violators. Adding time to the limitation
period of continuous offenses is roughly analogous to imposing
double or treble damages in cases that are essentially one-time
" See supra note 3 for the relevant text of the FLSA.
45 See supra note 3.
46 See, e.g., Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1986).
17 As the Third Circuit noted, "[ilndeed, the increased risk of liability cannot be explained
as anything but a punitive measure. The harm to the workers on account of willful violations
is neither more difficult to detect nor more severe than it would be were the violations not
willful. Thus, the extension of liability is clearly based on Congress' perception that willful
violations are more culpable than negligent ones. The extension is therefore a punitive
measure, and no different in this regard from the double damages provision considered in
Thurston." Brock, 799 F.2d at 84.
December 1989]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 191
violations. Although strictly speaking the award is compensatory in
that it remedies actual damages incurred by the plaintiff, the pur-
pose of treating willful violators differently from non-willful viola-
tors can only be to punish the former.48 Any distinction between
the two types of awards is slight and is not sufficient to justify
defining "willful" in a different way for the two statutes. The Rich-
land Shoe Court's adoption of the definition of "willful" used under
the ADEA is valid. The Court is correct to interpret the same word
the same way in what is essentially the same context.
The Supreme Court in Richland Shoe resolved a dispute among
the circuit courts regarding the definition of "willful" in the statute
of limitations provision of the FLSA. The Court held that for the
violation to be deemed "willful" and thus trigger the punitive statute
of limitations, the employer must either know that its conduct is
violative of the Act or show reckless disregard as to whether its
conduct is prohibited. Given the congressional decision to punish
willful violators, the plain meaning of the word and the precedent
set by Thurston, this was the proper interpretation for the Court to
make.
" Richland Shoe, 108 S. Ct. at 1681.
192	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:103
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Filing Timely Federal Charges of Employment Discrimination: Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial Office
Products Co.'
Sections 706(c) & (e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 establish the time limits for filing charges of employment
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). 2 Under section 706(e), a complainant must file an
employment discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days
after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice."
If the complainant initially institutes proceedings with an authorized
state or local agency, however, the time limit for filing the charge
with the EEOC is extended to 300 clays after the occurrence of the
alleged discrimination. 4 When the complainant initially files such a
charge with an authorized state or local agency, the EEOC must
grant that agency exclusive jurisdiction over that charge for sixty
days, unless the state agency's proceedings have been terminated
earlier.5
* By Robert C. Troyer, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LASS' REVIEW.
I 108 S. Ct. 1666, 46 FEP Cases 1265 (1988).
2
 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c), (e) (1964).
3 42 U.S.C. 12000e-5(e) (1964). This section provides that.
[a] charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty
days after the . alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... except that
in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person
aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge
shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty
days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the




 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c) (1964). This section provides that
[1]n the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting
the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute
criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no
December 1989]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 193
Thus, because the EEOC must defer to the state or local agency
for sixty days, the complainant must file the charge with the appro-
priate state or local agency within 240 days of the occurrence of the
alleged illegality in order to ensure filing with the EEOC within the
300-day limit. 6 Even if the complainant does not file the charge with
the state or local agency within 240 days, however, the charge still
may be timely filed with the EEOC if the state or local agency
terminates its proceedings before 300 days have elapsed.' Conse-
quently, whether a state or local agency terminates its proceedings
may determine whether a complainant has 240 or 300 days to file
a timely charge with the EEOC. 5
In 1985 in Isaac v. Harvard University, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether a state agency's
temporary waiver of its right to process a charge constituted a
termination of that agency's proceedings for the purposes of section
706(c) of Title VII. 9 In Isaac, Harvard University denied tenure to
appellant Ephraim Isaac, and 251 days later the EEOC referred
Isaac's discrimination charge to the authorized state agency.'° On
the 263rd day after the alleged illegality, the state agency tempo-
rarily waived its jurisdiction over the charge, but retained the right
to consider Isaac's case later." Even though the state agency waived
only its right to initiate proceedings, and did not completely abandon
its interest in the charge, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held
charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved
before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier termi-
nated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred
and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or
local law.
Id.
A complainant need riot file his or her charge directly with a state or local agency; he
or she may file first with the EEOC, arid the F.E0C may then refer that charge to the state
or local agency. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525, 4 FEP Cases 150, 151
(1972)(state agency's proceedings considered initiated when EEOC referred complaint to
state agency). The EEOC's referral properly institutes the agency's proceedings. Id. Once
that referral is made, the EEOC may hold the charge in "suspended animation" during the
state or local agency's 60-day exclusive jurisdiction period. Id.
6 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Products Co., 108 S.
Ct. 1666, 1669, 46 FE! ' Cases 1265, 1266 (1988).
7 Id,
" See id.; see also Isaac v. Harvard Univ., 769 F.2d 817, 819, 38 HT Cases 764, 765 (Ist
Cir. 1985).
769 F.2d 817, 827-28, 38 FEP Cases 764, 772 (1st Cir. 1985).
'I' Id, at 819, 38 FEP Cases at 765. Isaac filed his charge with the EF.00 on the 241st
day after the occurrence of the alleged illegality. Id.
" See id. at 819-20, 38 FEP Cases at 765-66.
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that such a waiver "terminated" state proceedings under section
706(c) of Title VII.L 2
 Therefore, because the state agency termi-
nated its proceedings before 300 days elapsed, Isaac's charge was
timely filed with the EEOC.' 3
In 1986 in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial .
Office Products Co. (COPC I), however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the First Circuit Court
of Appeals' conclusion in Isaac." In COPC I, a state agency waived
its section 706(c) 60-day deferral period, allowing the EEOC to
initiate proceedings on a sex discrimination charge.'-"' Although the
agency waived the deferral period, it retained the right to conduct
its own proceedings in the future. 16
 The court of appeals held that
this temporary waiver was not a "termination" of the agency's pro-
ceedings under section 706(c)." Until 1988 this conflict between the
Courts of Appeals for the First and Tenth Circuits remained:
whether these temporary waivers were or were not "terminations"
of state agencies' proceedings for the purposes of section 706(c),
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on COPC I to resolve this conflict.' 8 In Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial Office Products Co.
(COPC II), the Court followed the First Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Issac, holding that the state agency which waived the 60-
day deferral period, but not the right to process the charge in the
future, had "terminated" its proceedings.' 9 This ruling clarified the
definition of "terminates" under section 706(c) of Title VII. 20 In
doing so, the holding also confirmed that complainants who file
employment discrimination charges with state agencies between 240
and 300 days after the occurrence of the alleged discrimination may
file with the EEOC within the limitation period, even though the
state agency's waiver of its proceedings is only temporary.
" Id. at 827-28, 38 FE? Cases at 772.
19 Id.
74
 803 F.2d 581, 587, 42 FEP Cases 50, 53 (10th Cir. 1986) (explicitly disagreeing with
the Isaac court's definition of "terminate").
15 Id. at 584, 42 FEP Cases at 51.
'" Id.
17
 Id. at 590, 42 FEP Cases at 56. The dissenting judge, following the reasoning of the
Isaac court, argued that such a waiver constituted termination of a state agency's proceedings.
Id. at 591, 42 FEP Cases at 57 (McKay, J., dissenting).
'" Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Products Co., 108 S.
Ct. 1666, 1671, 46 FEY Cases 1265, 1267 (1988).
19 Id. at 1676, 46 FEP Cases at 1271.
70 Id.
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The dispute in COPC II arose on March 26, 1984, when Suanne
Leersen filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 2 ' In her
complaint, she alleged that 290 days earlier the Commercial Office
Products Company (the Company) had discharged her because of
her gender, in violation of Title V11. 22 On March 30, the EEOC
sent a copy of Leersen's charge and a transmittal form to the Col-
orado Civil Rights Division (CCRD), the state agency authorized to
process employment discrimination charges. 23 The form stated that
the EEOC would initially process the charge pursuant to a work-
sharing agreement that already existed between the EEOC and the
CCRD.24 The CCRD returned the form to the EEOC, indicating
that it waived its right to initial processing of the charge. 23 On April
4, the CCRD informed Leersen that it had waived its right initially
to process her charge but had retained jurisdiction to act on the
charge after the EEOC concluded its proceedings.'" Thus, if the
CCRD's waiver "terminated" its proceedings, then Leersen's charge
was filed with the EEOC just under the 300-clay limit. If the waiver
was not a "termination," the charge was not timely filed with the
EEOC.
When the EEOC subpoenaed the Company for information
relevant to Leersen's charge, the Company refused to comply, main-
taining that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction over the charge because
it was not timely filed with the EEOC." The United States District
Court for the District of Colorado agreed with the Company, and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court of
appeals found that the statute required a state agency to surrender
completely its jurisdiction over a charge in order for the agency's
proceedings to be "terminated." Because the CCRD reserved the
right to act after the conclusion of the EEOC's proceedings, the
court of appeals reasoned, it did not finally and completely termi-
nate its own proceedings. 28
21 Id. at 1670, 46 FEP Cases at 1266.
22 Id.
23 Id.
2 '1 Id. This worksharing agreement allowed the CCRD and the EEOC each to process
certain charges. Id. at 1669-70, 46 FEP Cases at 1266. When the EEOC processed a charge,
the CCRD would waive the 60-day deferral period. Id. No matter which party reviewed the
charge initially, the other party reserved the right to review the first party's resolution of the
case and to investigate the case after the first party had concluded its proceedings. Id. at
1670, 46 FEP Cases at 1266.
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In COPC II, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluding that a state agency's
temporary waiver of its proceedings constituted a termination of
those proceedings. 29 In reaching its decision, the Court noted that
the word "terminate" was ambiguous because in common and dic-
tionary usage it may mean "to end finally or to cease temporarily.""
The Court then stated that the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous
language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. 3 '
Next, the COPC II Court determined that the EEOC's interpretation
of "terminate" was reasonable because it was supported by the two
basic goals of the deferral provisions: to allow states an opportunity
to process discrimination claims, and to encourage efficient pro-
cessing of those claims." In addition, the Court reasoned that the
cooperative spirit of related sections of the statute indicated that
the EEOC's interpretation of the ambiguous word "terminate" was
reasonable.33 Therefore, the Court concluded that it must defer to
the EEOC's construction of section 706(c). 34
After finding that "terminate" was ambiguous, the Court ex-
amined the deferral provisions' legislative history to determine the
reasonableness of the EEOC's interpretation of "terminate."' The
Court found that the first purpose of these provisions was to give
states a reasonable opportunity to address employment discrimi-
nation charges without federal intervention. 36 Reviewing the legis-
lative history, the Court noted that the deferral provisions were a
result of a conflict between the House and the Senate." The House
bill, the Court determined, proposed that the EEOC defer to state
enforcement efforts only in certain circumstances and retain the
power to monitor those efforts." The COPC 11 Court then found
that the Senate objected to this degree of federal intervention and
therefore proposed that the EEOC defer to the states for sixty days
before starting its own proceedings.39 The Court further noted that
the proponents of the deferral provisions identified deference to
" Id. at 1676, 46 FEP Cases at 1271.
" Id. at 1671, 46 FEP Cases at 1267.
" Id. at 1671, 46 FEP Cases at 1268.
52 Id. at 1671-73, 46 FEP Cases at 1268-69.
" Id. at 1671, 46 FEP Cases at 1268.
" Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1672, 46 FEP Cases at 1268.
" Id. at 1671, 46 FEP Cases at 1268.
38 Id. at 1671-72, 46 FE? Cases at 1268.
"Id. at 1672, 46 FE.? Cases at 1268.
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the states as one of the provisions' goals." The Court also found
that Congress intended deferral to work as "a carrot, not a stick,"
allowing the states the option of processing employment discrimi-
nation charges first, but not penalizing them for failing to do so.'"
Therefore, the Court concluded that one purpose of the deferral
provisions was to give states an opportunity to respond to employ-
ment discrimination charges before the EEOC intervened. 42
Next, the COPC II Court determined that the EEOC's position
that states may, if they choose, waive the deferral period but retain
jurisdiction over a charge supported the statute's goal of state de-
ference. 4 ' The Court found that the waiver provisions of workshar-
ing agreements in no way denied states the provisions' 60-day pro-
tection from federal intervention.'" The waiver provisions of the
worksharing agreement between the CCRD and the EEOC, the
Court stated, allowed the states to make a voluntary choice to forego
their exclusive period for processing discrimination charges. Be-
cause the waiver was voluntary, the Court reasoned, the Federal
government was not imposing on the states' opportunity to address
employment discrimination claims. Thus, the Court concluded that
allowing the states temporarily to waive their proceedings upheld
Congress's goal of deferral to the states for processing.
The second goal of the deferral provisions, the COPC II Court
determined from the legislative history, was to promote efficient
handling of discrimination claims." The Court asserted that the
EEOC's interpretation of section 706(c) was reasonable because it
was consistent with the goal of efficiency." The Court supported
this conclusion by outlining several grossly inefficieht consequences
of the Company's construction of section 706(c). 4' First, the EEOC
would be required to wait sixty days before processing a claim even
when a state agency chooses not to act during the deferral period."'
41)1d. at 1673, 46 FEP Cases, at 1269. The COurt also asserted that the Company presented
an argument antithetical to the voluntary spirit of state deference. Id. at 1672-73, 46 FEP
Cases at 1269. The Company argued that Congress intended to show a preference for state
as opposed to federal enforcement. Id. Therefore, the Company claimed, the states should
not be allowed to waive the 60-day deferral period at ail. Id.
41 id .
42 Id .
43 Id. at 1672, 46 FEY Cases at 1268.
44 Id.
43 Id. at 1673, 46 FEP Cases at 1269.
46 Id. at 1671, 1673, 46 FEP Cases at 1268, 1269.
47 Id. at 1673, 46 FEP Cases at 1269.
491d.
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Second, if states tried to avoid this needless delay by attempting
initially to process all charges received, they would create an enor-
mous backlog of cases. Third, the Court noted that states could
avoid the delay by rewriting their worksharing agreements so that
the waiver provisions required the states to relinquish their juris-
diction completely. The Court concluded that requiring a state to
abandon jurisdiction was contrary to both Congressional goals of
efficiency and state deference. 49
Finally, the Court reasoned that the Company's interpretation
of the deferral provisions would generally confound the goals of
efficiency and deference to states because it would preclude a whole
class of discrimination claims: those filed with the EEOC more than
240 days but fewer than 300 days after the alleged illegality oc-
curred. 5° The result would be contrary to the goals of efficiency
and state deference because the deferral period would render un-
timely many claims filed within the 300-day federal limit, despite
the state agency's and the EEOC's efforts to process the charges."
The Court stated that no such problems of inefficiency existed with
the EEOC's construction of section 706(c) and, therefore, that it
better effected the legislative goals behind the deferral provisions
of Title VII than did the Company's. 52 Consequently, the Court
held that the EEOC's interpretation of the ambiguous word "ter-
minate" was reasonable."
Related sections of Title VII also led the COPC II Court to its
conclusion that the EEOC's construction of "terminated" was rea-
sonable. 54 First the Court explained that section 706(d) permits state
and local agencies to waive the 60-day deferral period required
when the EEOC, rather than an individual complainant, files a
discrimination charge with a state agency." The Court reasoned
that the legislature cannot have meant to make the deferral period
waivable by states under section 706(d), when the EEOC files a
claim, but mandatory under section 706(c) when an individual files
one. 56
The Court also noted that sections 705(g)(I) and 709(b) of Title
VII, which give the EEOC the power to enter into worksharing
4® Id.
$" Id. at 1674, 46 FEP Cases at 1269-70.
51 Id.
52 Id.
" Id. at 1671, 46 FEP Cases at 1268.
54 Id, at 1674, 46 FEP Cases at 1270.
" Id.
56 Id.
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agreements with authorized state agencies, encourage formal co-
operation between the EEOC and those agencies." The Court as-
serted that these sections support worksharing agreements without
precluding the use of waiver provisions that are designed to avoid
inefficiency in claim processing. 58 The Court concluded that because
the Act envisions cooperation through worksharing agreements,
and the temporary waivers supported by the EEOC give effect to
those agreements, the EEOC's support of temporary waivers is
consistent with the cooperative focus of the Act."
Thus, the COPC II Court held that the cooperative spirit of
related sections of Tide VII and the goals of deference to states
and efficiency of processing, revealed in the legislative history, in-
dicated that the EEOC's construction of section 706(c) is reasonable.
Consequently, the Court held that the CCRD's waiver "terminated"
its proceedings within the 300-day federal limit and that Leersen's
claim was timely filed with the EEOC under Title VII. 60 The Court
thus reversed the Tenth Circuit's holding that the EEOC lacked
jurisdiction because of untimely filing, and remanded the case for
further proceedings on the EEOC's administrative subpoena. 8 '
Justice O'Connor concurred that, considering the statute's lan-
guage, structure, and legislative history, enough ambiguity existed
to grant deference to the EEOC's interpretation of "termination"
in section 706(c). 62 She also agreed with the majority's view that the
EEOC's construction was reasonable. 65 She noted, however, that in
its discussion of the agency's reasonableness, the majority was wrong
37 Id. at 1674-75, 46 FEP Cases at 1270.
s' Id. at 1675, 46 FE? Cases at 1270.
59 Id.	 .
" Id. at 1676, 46 FEP Cases at 1271. The Court also addressed the issue of whether a
complainant who files a discrimination charge that is untimely under state law is nonetheless
entitled to the 300-day extended federal filing period under section 706(e) of Title VII. Id.
at 1668, 46 FEY Cases at 1265. The Court joined all of the circuits that have considered the
question in holding that state time limits for filing discrimination claims do not determine
the federal time limit. Id. at 1675, 46 FE? Cases at 1271. The Court noted that Title VII
contains no express requirement of, or reference to, timeliness under state law, Id. at 1675,
46 FEP Cases at 1271. In addition, the COPC 11 Court reasoned that the importation of state
limitations periods into section 706(c) would not only tangle the EEOC in complicated issues
of state law with which it is ill-equipped to deal, but also make the remedial, scheme unne-
cessarily confusing for the laypersons who are expected to initiate the process. Id. at 1675-
76, 46 FEY Cases at 1271. Accordingly, the Court held that public policy and the statute
require that the extended 300-day period be available regardless of the timeliness of the state
filing. Id. at 1676, 46 FEP Cases at 1271.
61 Id.
52 Id. at 1676, 46 FEY Cases at 1272 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 ' Id.
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to imply that the EEOC's position was the only acceptable one.
Justice O'Connor objected to the Court's implication that it would
not uphold an agency's decision to adopt any other approach. Such
an implication, O'Connor asserted, would be contrary to the Court's
holdings that agency's interpretations must merely be rational, con-
sistent with the statute, and not arbitrary or capricious. Thus, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the majority was correct in deferring to
the EEOC's interpretation of this statute but not correct in implying
that this construction of section 706(c) was the only possible one. 64
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, dissented from the majority. 65 Justice Stevens asserted that
the inajority's decision was not faithful to the plain language of the
statute, the legislative compromise behind the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, or to the Court's prior interpretation of Title
VII's deferral provisions. 66 First, Justice Stevens reasoned that the
plain meaning of "termination" and the context in which it is used
in section 706(c) convey nothing other than absolute finality, and
negate the possibility that Congress contemplated future proceed-
ings by a state agency. 67 Second, he asserted that the effect of
interpreting section 706(c) to require states to waive all jurisdiction
in order to terminate their proceedings was merely to prevent con-
current jurisdiction over claims filed more than 240 days after the
illegality." This result, he concluded, would not frustrate the leg-
islative intent to protect state enforcement efforts because it would
limit federal — not state — intervention.° Justice Stevens added
that the above construction of section 706(c) was not supported by
the legislative history because nothing in that history suggested that
this class of complainants should receive special treatment.. 7° Finally,
he stated that the majority's interpretation of "terminate" was not
consistent with the Court's prior determination that "terminated"
meant "completed." 7 ' Thus, Justices Stevens and Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Company's construction of
section 706(c) was preferable to that of the EEOC. 72
'" Id. at 1677, 46 FEY Cases at 1272 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id,




70 Id. at 1677 n.2, 46 FEP Cases at 1272 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 ' hl. at 1677 n.3, 46 FEP Cases at 1272 11.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7Y at 1677, 46 FEY Cases at 1272 (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
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Despite the dissent's assertion otherwise, the majority's holding
is rooted in strong reasoning. The COPC II Court is correct in
finding that the statute is ambiguous. Dissenting in COPC 1, Judge
McKay stated that the Isaac court, the majority itself in COPC 1, and
other courts attest to the inherent ambiguity in the statute by their
inability to agree upon the meaning of "terminate."'" Further, as
Justice O'Connor asserted in her concurrence, the determination
of ambiguity is by itself enough to support the Court's decision
because the Court has commonly recognized that it must defer to
an agency's interpretation of ambiguous language in its own stat-
ute.'`
Similarly, no court seriously opposes the Court's conclusion that
the EEOC's interpretation of section 706(c) is reasonable, and there-
fore entitled to deference. First, the statute's goals, based on its
legislative history, are widely accepted. In COPC I, the majority
determined that one goal of the deferral provisions was to encour-
age local agencies to resolve civil rights disputes and to check federal
intervention.'" This was the same goal that the Supreme Court in
COPC II found in the legislative history. 7" Neither the concurrence
nor the dissent found fault with that determination."
Second, the dissent in COPC II and the majority in COPC I
never asserted that the EEOC's interpretation of section 706(c) did
not support this goal and therefore was not reasonable. Instead,
they simply relied on the argument that the Company's contrary
interpretation of section 706(c) is consistent with this goal of state
deterrence. Nowhere did they claim that the EEOC's interpretation
is not also reasonable. Thus, even if their arguments are valid, they
do not overcome the majority's position in COPC II that the EEOC's
construction is reasonable — because it promotes efficency, de-
creased federal intervention in local civil rights claims, and local
resolution of those claims — and is therefore entitled to deference.
Therefore, the Court's holding is sound.
The majority's well-reasoned decision to defer to the EEOC's
construction of section 706(c) has several important practical con-
75 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Products Co., 803
F.2d 581, 591, 42 FEP Cases 40, 56 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting).
74 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v, Commercial Office Products Co., 108 S.
Ct. 1666, 1(176, 46 FEP Cases 1265, 1272 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7 ' Commercial Office Product, 803 F.2d at 588, 42 FEP Cases at 54.
7" Commercial Office Products, 108 S. Ct. at 1672, 46 FEP Cases at 1268.
77 See id. at 1676-77, 46 FEP Cases at 1272 (O'Connor, J., concurring; Stevens,J.,
dissenting).
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sequences. First, the holding will allow more complainants a more
complete review of their charges. As the Court itself recognized,
the ruling may affect an entire class of charges because worksharing
agreements, such as that between the CCRD and the EEOC, per-
vade state and local employment discrimination enforcement.78 In
fact, three quarters of state and local agencies authorized to enforce
employment discrimination laws enter into worksharing agreements
with the EEOC, 79 The complainants in these jurisdictions who file
an employment discrimination charge with a state or local agency
between 240 and 300 days after the occurrence of an alleged ille-
gality still have an opportunity to file with the EEOC without sac-
rificing their right to have the state agency review the charge or the
EEOC's resolution of it. Thus, a potentially large group of com-
plainants now have a better opportunity for thorough, fair treat-
ment of their employment discrimination charges.
The ruling is also significant in that the EEOC, when operating
under a worksharing agreement, may proceed immediately on
charges that state and local agencies refer to them. Under the
Company's interpretation of section 706(c), the EEOC would have
to wait for up to sixty days to process claims upon which even the
state or local agency agreed not to take initial action. After the
Court's ruling in COPC II, these cases will not be frozen for sixty
days.
Thus, in COPC II the Supreme Court recognized that state and
local agencies and the EEOC may participate in worksharing agree-
ments with provisions that allow the state or local agency to waive
initial processing while retaining the right to address those charges
later. The Court resolved a conflict between the First and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeals over whether a state or local agency's
waiver under such agreements constitutes a termination of that
agency's proceedings under section 706(c) of Title VII, holding that
the agency's waiver is a "termination" of the agency's proceedings.
This ruling supports state power to enforce employment discrimi-
nation charges and allows the EEOC to act on referred charges
immediately. Most importantly, however, the ruling gives complain-
ants who file an employment discrimination charge with a state or
local agency between 240 and 300 days after the occurrence of the
alleged illegality the opportunity to file their charge with the EEOC
within the limitation period.
78 Id. at 1669, 96 FEP Cases at 1266.
79 Id.
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II. SCOPE OF TITLE VII
A. * Prisoners as Employees under Title VII: Baker v. McNeil Island
Corrections Center'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in the workplace, including apprenticeships and training pro-
grams, based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 2 In
order for Title VII protections to apply, however, a plaintiff must
show that he or she was involved in an employment relationship. 3
Courts generally determine whether an individual is an employee
within the scope of Title VII based on factors, borrowed from the
law of agency, used to distinguish between an employee and an
independent contractor.4 Courts agree that although all of the cir-
cumstances or "economic realities" of the work relationship must
be examined, the most important factor in determining whether an
individual is an employee, rather than an independent contractor,
is the extent of the employer's right to control the individual's
performance.'
* By Kathleen K. Ross, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
859 F.2d 124, 48 FEP Cases 143 (9th Cir. 1988).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, (Title VII) § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)—(d) (1982).
Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883, 24 FEP Cases 859, 861-62
(9th Cir. 1980). •
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 766-67, 47 FE?
Cases 954, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1988) (court held that terminated radiologist did not state a
cause of action under Title Vii against the hospital because he was an independent contractor,
not an employee); Lutcher, 633 F.2d 880, 883-84, 24 FEP Cases 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1980)
(musician whose contract was terminated did not state a cause of action against school district
and musicians' union because he was an independent contractorrnot an employee); Spirides
v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-33, 20 FEP Cases 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (trial court erred
when it dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claim; trial court should have reviewed the factors that
distinguish an employee from an independent contractor).
See infra note 23 and accompanying text for a list of the factors used to distinguish an
employee from an independent contractor.
5 Mitchell, 853 F.2d at 766, 47 FEP Cases at 957; Lutcher, 633 F.2d at 883, 24 FEP Cases
at 862; Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831, 20 FE? Cases at 145.
Under the right to control test, adopted by the courts from the law of agency,
[An employee] is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his
affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled
or is subject to the right to control by the master.
An independent contractor is a person who contracts to work with another
to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to
the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the perfor-
mance of the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957).
The "economic realities". test attempts to expose the ,real nature of the relationship
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A plaintiff may also state a cause of action under Title VII if
he or she can demonstrate that the defendant interfered with the
plaintiff's employment opportunities with another employer." Un-
der this interference theory, a plaintiff need not establish an em-
ployment relationship with the defendant.' Rather, it must only be
established that the defendant is an employer covered by Title VII
and that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff by inter-
fering with the plaintiff's work relationship with another employer. 8
This interpretation of Title VII gives a plaintiff a cause of action
against a Title VII employer who aids and abets discrimination. 9
Although courts have applied the employee versus indepen-
dent contractor test in numerous Title VII cases, before 1988 no
court had ever considered whether the test was appropriate for
determining when, if ever, a prison inmate may be considered an
employee for purposes of Title VII and, if so, how the traditional
factors that comprise the test should be applied in this context.
Similarly, before 1988 no court had ever considered the interfer-
ence theory in the prison context. In a 1986 decision by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission CEEOC" or "Commission"),
however, the Commission ruled that an inmate who had been re-
moved from his job assignment within the prison allegedly because
of his race, did not state a cause of action against the prison under
Title VII because an employment relationship had not existed be-
tween the prison and the inmate.'"
During the Survey year, in Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections
Center, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled, in a case of first impression, that a black prison inmate who
between the plaintiff and defendant by looking at factors that traditionally characterize one
as an employee or as an independent contractor. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 997 (1983).
6 See, e.g., Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 842 F.2d 291, 294-95, 46 FEP Cases
913, 915-16 (1 I th Cir. 1988) (a resident who was dismissed from his program at a partici-
pating hospital had a cause of action against the hospital under Title VII, even though the
hospital did not administer the residency program, because the hospital was in a position to
affect the resident's employment); Ellerby v. Illinois, 46 FEP Cases 524, 527 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(attorney who was denied a public defender position had a cause of action against the state
under Title VII even though the attorney's real "employer" was the criminal defendant
because the only way for the attorney to reach the employer was through the state); Sibley
Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342, 6 FEP Cases 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(although private duty nurse worked directly for patient, nurse had a cause of action against
hospital because it controlled initial access to patient).
7 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 998.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 998 Sc n.109.
1 ° No. 86-7, 40 FEP Cases 1892, 1893 (1986).
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had been denied a job at the prison library, allegedly because of his
race, stated a cause of action against the prison under Title VII."
In Baker, Leydell Baker, an inmate at the McNeil Island Corrections
Center in Washington State, applied for a job as a library aide in
the Corrections Center's Library. 12 The job paid thirty dollars a
month and involved assisting and being trained by the librarian."
Despite the fact that a prison employee in charge of inmate 'assign-
ments told Baker he was "next in line" for the position, Baker did
not get the job.' 4 Baker, who is black, claimed he was denied the
job because the state librarian did not want to work with a black
man. 15
Baker obtained an EEOC right-to-sue letter" and sued the
Corrections Center pro se under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964) 7 He alleged that he had been denied the position because
the female librarian was afraid of blacks; that he had been denied
benefits he would have received as an employee of the Washington
State Library; and that the position would have made him a direct
employee of the Washington State Library, so that unquestionably,
Title VII rights would apply." He stated that he had been denied
equal protection and due process rights as guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Moreover, he
stated that the mere lack of legal precedent to support his argument
did not imply that there is a right to discriminate against prison
inmates." He further alleged that the Department of Corrections
was trying to keep him in confinement by denying him the position
and that the Corrections Center had changed the referral proce-
dure when he applied for the position." He also asserted that the
right-to-sue letter demonstrated that his claim had merit. 2 '
" 859 F.2d 124, 126, 129, 48 FEP Cases 143, 145, 147 (9th Cir. 1988).




16 The first stage in bringing a Title VII action is to file a charge with the EEOC. If the
charge is not resolved within 180 days of filing, the plaintiff receives a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC which allows the plaintiff to file a civil action in district court. B. Scum &
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 946-47.
' 7 Baker, 859 F.2d at 125-26, 48 FEP Cases 144-45. Pro se refers to a situation in which
one does riot retain a lawyer but appears for oneself in court. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099
(5th ed. 1979).
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The magistrate to whom Baker's case was referred, applied the
factors used in Spirides v. Reinhardt to determine whether Baker
stated a claim.22
 In the 1979 case of Spirides, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia set forth a series of factors
or the "economic realities" to be examined, in order to distinguish
an employee from an independent contractor." The magistrate
observed that the employer's right to control the worker's perfor-
mance was the most important distinguishing factor and that in this
case, this factor suggested that the plaintiff was an employee under
Title VII because of the prison context, in which the prison inher-
ently controls every facet of its inmates' lives. 24
 The magistrate,
however, as required by Spirides, also looked to the "economic re-
alities" of the situation. 25
 Upon examination of the economic reali-
ties, the magistrate concluded that no employment relationship ex-
isted between the prison and Baker because prison job assignments
are more like rehabilitation and employment training than com-
mercial employment. 2
€ Therefore, the magistrate dismissed Baker's
22
 Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center, No. C85-1188T, slip op. at 2-3 (W,D.
Wash., June 4, 1986).
25
 613 F.2d 826, 831-32, 20 FEP Cases 141, 145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1979). These factors
include the extent of the "employer's" right to control the individual's work; the type of work
with reference to whether the work is normally done under supervision; the skill required;
whether the "employer" furnishes the equipment used by the individual; the length of time
the individual has worked; the method of payment with reference to whether payment is on
an hourly or per job basis; the manner in which the work relationship is terminated; and
whether the individual is given annual leave." Id. at 832, 20 FEP Cases at 145-46.
24 Baker, No. C85-1188T, slip op. at 4.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 8. The magistrate stated in his report and recommendation that:
[t]he typical employment relationship is created to facilitate profits. The
free enterprise system presupposes that hiring, promotion and business deci-
sions are made so as to maximize productivity. An individual should thus be
hired solely for the reason that he or she would do the best job. In this context,
Title VII regulation is not an undue burden on an employer's discretion,
because the only legitimate reason for hiring or promoting an individual is
because he or she is the best one available for the job, and if an employer hires
someone other than the individual best suited, an inference of illegitimate
purpose, e.g. racial discrimination, is reasonable.
These assumptions underlying Title VII do not hold true in the prison
context. As noted above, prison officials have a different set of goals in hiring
or promoting inmates. According to RCW 72.09.100, such work assignments as
are at issue here are made "to promote basic work training and experience so
that the inmate will be able to qualify for better work both within institutional
industries and the free community." RCW 72.09.100(3)(a). Thus, a hiring de-
cision can legitimately be made on the ground that Inmate X, while not nec-
essarily the best one for the job, has only six months left on his sentence and
no other saleable skill, while the other applicants have more time on their
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claim without explicitly stating whether dismissal was for failure to
state a claim or whether it was based on the prison's motion for
summary judgment.
Responding to the magistrate's decision, Baker filed a motion
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington for reconsideration of the magistrate's finding." The district
court affirmed the magistrate's finding and recommendation dis-
missing Baker's claim, 28 without issuing an opinion of its own. Baker
then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 29
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Baker court")
determined that Baker's action was dismissed for failure to state a
claim." Thus, the major issue on appeal was whether Baker's com-
plaint stated a claim under Title VIP' The Baker court noted that
"a complaint should not be dismissed . . . 'unless it appears beyond
a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."' 32
 The appeals court fur-
ther noted that in civil rights cases when the petitioner presents his
or her own case without the benefit of a lawyer, the court must give
the petitioner the "benefit of the doubt." ss
Although the Baker court agreed with the magistrate that the
test to be applied in determining whether Baker was involved in an
employer-employee relationship was the employee versus indepen-
dent contractor test, 34 the Baker court disagreed with the magis-
trate's holding that Baker had failed to state a cause of action under
Title VI 1." The appeals court stated that the magistrate could not
sentences and thus more time for training, or perhaps already have a skill that
is saleable in the free community .... Inmates may therefore be hired, promoted
or shifted in such a way as to maximize exposure to potential career choices
rather than solely because a particular inmate is the best for the job.
Id. at 6-8.
z' Baker, 859 F.2d at 126, 48 FEP Cases at 145.
29 Id.
29 Id.
99 Id. at 127, 48 FEP Cases at 146.
9L See 61. The appeals court also discussed whether Baker's claim was dismissed pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim or under Rule 56 for
summary judgment. This issue is irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion. Id. at 126-
27, 48 FEP Cases 145-46.
92 Id. at 127, 48 FEP Cases at 146 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
" Id.
34 See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of the employee versus
independent contractor test.
"Baker, 859 F.2d at 128, 48 FEP Cases at 146.
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have been convinced beyond doubt that Baker could not prove his
claim, because the magistrate acknowledged that the right to control
factor indicated that Baker was an employee. 36 The Baker court
further observed that the pleadings stated a fact that tended to
establish the existence of an employment relationship." According
to the Baker court, Baker's statement that the state librarian did not
want to work with a black man supports an inference that Baker
was an employee of the prison, because it indicated that the librarian
had input in the hiring decision. 38
The Baker court also disagreed with the magistrate's finding
that because prison work assignments, such as the library aide po-
sition, are in the nature of employment training, Baker was not
involved in an employment relationship and that therefore, Baker's
Title VII claim should be dismissed." The Baker court noted that
the language of Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race in
apprenticeships and "'other training or retraining, including on-
the-job training programs . . . .'" 4° The Baker court observed that
Baker might be a trainee because the magistrate found that the
library aide position was a type of job training.'" The Baker court
assumed that if Baker was a trainee, he must also be an employee. 42
Therefore, the Baker court, focusing on the statutory language, held
that Baker's claim should not have been dismissed."
The Baker court also noted the existence of a Notice of Policy
Statement, published by the Commission, that stated that Title VII
applied to prisoners eligible for work release.'" According to the
notice, once a prisoner is recommended for work release and the
prisoner seeks a job with an outside employer, the prison becomes
a third party. If the prison interferes with the inmate's employment
opportunities with this outside employer, it may be liable for dam-
ages under Title VII." The Baker court, noting that this type of
interference with another's employment opportunities is a recog-
nized and legitimate cause of action under Title VII, noted that
36 Id. The appeals court refers to the "district court" when in fact the district court issued
no opinion of its own, but rather, merely adopted the magistrate's report and recommen-
dation.
" Id.
" Id. at 128, 48 FEP Cases at 146-47.
" Id. at 128, 48 FEP Cases at 147.
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this theory might also provide a possible basis for Baker's Title VII
claim. 46
In fact, in 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson that a
private-duty male nurse stated a cause of action against a hospital
when he alleged that a nursing supervisor employed by the hospital
refused to refer him to female patients because he was male. 47 The
Sibley court stated that even though the plaintiff was employed
directly by patients rather than by the hospital, the hospital con-
trolled the work facilities, including the nurse's initial access to the
patient. 48
 The Baker court compared work assignments within the
prison, which involve training, to work release programs and sug-
gested that both prepare inmates for the job market." The Baker
court therefore implied that by controlling the type of training that
inmates receive, the prison administration can affect an inmate's
access to job opportunities.'" According to the Baker court, not
enough information was available about the library aide position to
determine whether an employment relationship existed.''
In sum, although the Baker court agreed with the magistrate's
application of the factors used to distinguish between employees
and employers, as set out by Spirides v. Reinhardt, the Baker court
disagreed with the results the magistrate reached. According to the
Baker court, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Baker
indicated that the magistrate could not have been convinced beyond
doubt that Baker could not have proved facts which would support
his claim. Therefore, the Baker court held that the magistrate erred
in dismissing Baker's claim and reversed and remanded the case to
the district court.
Contrary to the result reached by the Baker court, the EEOC
in 1986 ruled that an inmate did not state a claim under Title VII
because no employment relationship between the inmate and the
prison existed. 52
 The EEOC examined the prison-inmate relation-
ship in the terms of employee versus independent contractor fac-
tors. 53
 Although the Commission conceded that the most important
factor, the right to control, indicated that an employee-employer
45 Id.
47
 488 F.2d 1338, 1392, 6 FEP Cases 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45 Id.
49 See Baker, 859 F.2d at 128, 48 FEE' Cases at 147.
See id.
51 Id.
52 No. 86-7, 40 PEP Cases 1892, 1893 (1986).
59 Id, at 1894 & 11.3.
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relationship existed, the Commission focused on the "primary pur-
pose" of the relationship. Under this analysis, the Commission con-
cluded that the primary purpose of the prison-inmate relationship
involved was incarceration rather than employment and that there-
fore, the inmate was not an employee. The Commission reasoned
that because the prison administration not only controlled the in-
mate's work, but the inmate himself, the conditions under which
the inmate performed his work were "functions of his confinement
"54
 The Commission further reasoned that because of his
prisoner status, his "very job flowed from his incarceration and was
dependent on his status as a prison inmate." 55 Therefore, the Com-
mission concluded, the inmate is not an employee under Title VII.
Thus, the Commission utilized the same employee versus indepen-
dent contractor test set forth by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Spirides, but emphasized the primary
purpose of the work relationship in determining that the prisoner
was not an employee within the scope of Title VII. 56
Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center, the first judicial pro-
nouncement on the status of prisoners under Title VII, suggests
that a prisoner may be entitled to Title VII protections in future
cases based on three different theories. 57 The first theory, which
requires a plaintiff to show that he or she was an employee of the
defendant based on the employee versus independent contractor
test, was purportedly used by both the Baker court" and the Com-
mission in its 1986 EEOC decision. 59 Each test, however, had a
different emphasis which resulted in opposite conclusions. An anal-
ysis of the test as used by the Baker court and by the Commission
shows that each variation of the test has strengths and weaknesses,
but that courts should follow Baker. Courts should also follow Baker
and allow an inmate-plaintiff to state a cause of action based on the
interference theory69 or based on the language of Title VII. 6 t
"Id.
"
58 Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for an explanation of the employee versus
independent contractor test.
57 See supra notes 4, 6, 40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the respective
theories.
58 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Baker court's
application of the employee versus independent contractor test.
58 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the EEOC's appli-
cation of the employee versus independent contractor test.
6° See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interference theory.
8 ' See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the language of Title
vl l.
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The test used by the appeals court in Baker emphasized the
traditional factors of the employee versus independent contractor
test. 62 These factors include the extent to which the "employer"
controls the individual's work; whether the work is normally done
under supervision; the method of payment; and whether the indi-
vidual is given annual leave. 63 The Baker court placed greatest em-
phasis on the control factor and concluded that Baker was an em-
ployee and that he therefore stated a claim. 64
Under this variation of the test, which stresses the right to
control, all inmates would be employees for Title VII purposes
because by virtue of their incarceration, they are necessarily con-
trolled by the prison. This result has merit because no inmate will
be denied the opportunity to be heard on the merits of his or her
case. The extremeness of this result is balanced by the fact that
inmate-plaintiffs must still prove the existence of an employment
relationship and a violation of Title VII ultimately to succeed.
On the other hand, the Baker court's use of the employee versus
independent contractor test is problematic because it does not focus
on a central issue. In the prison context, the issue is not necessarily
whether the inmate is an employee or an independent contractor,
but rather, whether the inmate is an employee or merely one whose
work assignment is a "function" of his incarceration. 65 A test that
focuses on this distinction might produce a more accurate result.
The test used by the Commission, although purported to be
the traditional employee versus independent contractor test, was
apparently a variation of the traditional test that emphasized the
primary purpose of the work relationship. 66 The Commission con-
ceded that the right to control factor indicated that the inmate was
an employee; however, it also intimated that this factor could not
overcome the circumstances involved in the prison-inmate context.°
These circumstances involve the fact that the inmate's lob" is de-
pendent upon his or her incarceration and that the primary purpose
of the work relationship is incarceration. 68
Under this reasoning, inmates will almost never be employees
for purposes of Title VII and may never, therefore, state a cause
of action under Title VII. The result of this emphasis on the pri-
52 See Baker, 859 F,2d at 128, 48 FEP Cases at 146-47.
63 See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832, 20 FEP Cases at 145-46.
" See Baker, 859 F.2d at 128, 48 FEP Cases at 146.
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mary purpose of the work relationship is favorable in the sense that
it truly focuses on the issue at hand — whether the inmate is an
employee or merely one whose work assignment is a "function" of
his incarceration. On the other hand, though, this result is unrea-
sonable because it puts the inmate in a situation in which he or she
cannot possibly win. Because an inmate will always be involved in a
prison work assignment which necessarily stems from the fact that
he or she is in prison, an inmate will never be allowed the oppor-
tunity to be heard on the merits of his or her Title VII claim.
Although the analysis used by the Baker court and the one used
by the Commission in its 1986 decision both have merit, courts
probably will and should follow Baker. The primary purpose em-
phasis used by the Commission effectively denies all inmates a Title
VII claim, an undeniably unfair result. The traditional employee
versus independent contractor test, however, will allow almost all
inmates to state a claim under Title VII. This apparently excessive
result is tempered by the fact that the inmate must still present
sufficient evidence to win on the merits. In addition, because Baker
is a judicial opinion, courts will probably weigh it more heavily than
the EEOC decision. Thus, courts are likely to follow Baker.
Another possible Title VII claim for an inmate, according to
the Baker court, might be the prison's interference with the inmate's
employment opportunities.° This theory has been used and ac-
cepted in other Title VII cases,'" as well as by the EEOC, which, in
a Notice of Policy stated that an inmate involved in a work release
program may state a cause of action under Title VII against the
prison if the prison interferes with the inmate's employment op-
portunities with an outside employer."' Thus, in order for an inmate
to state a claim under Title VII on an interference theory, courts
would have to extend this principle to in-prison training. The ap-
peals court in Baker seemed willing to do this. It noted that both
work release and in-prison training prepare an inmate for the job
market and that the prison controls which inmates receive train-
ing." The Baker court intimated, therefore, that the prison can and
does interfere with the inmates' employment opportunities in both
69 See supra notes 6-9,44-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interference
theory.
7" See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
71
 See supra notes 49-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of this Notice of Policy
Sta lenient.
72 See supra notes 94-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limitations placed
on a prison's control of its prisoners.
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the work release and in-prison training situations. This reasoning
is sound because it allows a defendant who has interfered with the
rights of an inmate to be sued in a Title VII action, despite the fact
that the inmate is not on work release. It seems likely that other
courts will apply this reasoning and allow inmates to recover under
Title VII under the interference theory.
The language of Title VII is the third possible basis for an
inmate's claim against the prison, according to the Baker court."
Title VI I prohibits discrimination based on race in apprenticeships
and "other training or retraining, including on-the-job training pro-
grams . . . "74 According to the Baker court, because training pro-
grams are specifically covered under Title VII, Baker's claim might
have merit." Other courts should follow Baker and allow inmates
to state a claim based on this statutory language.
After Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center, inmates will most
likely be able to bring suit under Title VII, because other courts
will probably apply the reasoning used by the Baker court to con-
clude that inmates are employees. Is also seems likely that inmates
may also base their Title VII claims on the theory that the prison
interfered with the inmate's employment opportunities with an out-
side employer. Although this theory officially applies only to inmates
on work release, the appeals court in Baker seemed willing to extend
it to in-prison training, and other courts will probably follow suit.
The language of the statute is another possible Title VII claim for
an inmate because the statute specifically mentions training pro-
grams.
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. * Rehabilitation as the Essence of a BFOQ Defense: Torres
v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire or
73 See supra note 40 and accompanying text for a discussion of this language.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, (Title VII) § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)—(d) (1982).
75 See id.
* Bonnie Belson Edwards, Staff Member, BOS'I ON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 859 F.2d 1523, 48 FEP Cases 270 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133, 48 FEP
Cases 1896 (1989) and 109 S. Ct. 1537, 49 FEP Cases 464 (1989).
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discharge an individual based solely on the individual's sex. 2 Section
2000e-2(e)(1) of Title VII, however, provides a defense to prose-
cutions To prevail under this section, a defendant employer must
prove that gender "is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise . . . ."4
Because the purpose of Title VII is to provide a legal foun-
dation for non-discrimination, 5 the courts narrowly interpret the
BFOQ defense and require the defendant to bear the burden of
proof. 6
 Courts have developed various formulations of the BFOQ
defense.' First, as a threshold requirement, defendant employers
must prove that the normal operation of their business would suffer
if gender were not a qualification for a particular. position. 8 To
prove injury to the business, the defendant must establish the es-
sence of the business. 9
 As the second element of the BFOQ defense,
the defendant must show that the basis of the gender qualification
is not merely a stereotypical characterization of a particular gender's
traits.'° Some federal courts have also considered whether the de-
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; . .
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
Section 2000e-2(e)(1) provides:
flit shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ... on the basis of [their] religion, sex or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise . .
Id.
4 Id.
5 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386, 3 FEP Cases 337, 338
(5th Cir. 1971).
6 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34, 15 FEP Cases 10, 14-15 (1977);
Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387, 2 FEP Cases at 338; Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
. 228, 232, 1 FEP Cases 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1969).
See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333-34, 15 FEP Cases at 15-16.
8 Cf. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236, 12 FEP Cases 1233, 1242
(5th Cir. 1976) (assessing a BFOQ defense in the context of age discrimination).
9 See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388, 3 FEP Cases at 339.
'" E.g., Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235-36, I FE? Cases at 660-61. The defendant "has the
burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing,
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fendant employer can make reasonable accommodations to mini-
mize the conflict between the employer's essential interests and the
non-discrimination requirement of Title VII."
Title VII's non-discrimination principle is tested in the prison
context when administrators seek to establish gender as a BFOQ
for prison guards. 12 The administrators generally allege that the
maintenance of security is the essence of the business of the penal
institution. 13 The administrators attempt to prove the impossibility
of accommodating inmates' privacy rights without compromising
prison security if guards of the opposite gender are employed."
The courts, thus, characterize the clash of rights as a clash between
the administrator's statutory duty to maintain security and the em-
ployee's statutory right to a particular job.'`' Absent compelling
evidence that the employer cannot accommodate the clash of rights,
the courts have generally held that the employee's rights dominate,
and the BFOQ defense is not valid."'
During the Survey year, in Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health
& Social. Services, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the administrators of a female prison did not have
to introduce empirical evidence to prove that employing only female
correctional officers would enhance the rehabilitation of the female
inmates. 17 Instead, the court held that a court should consider the
totality of circumstances when evaluating the officials' efforts. 18 The
that all or substantially all (men) would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties
of the job involved." Id. at 235, i FE? Cases at 661. Alternatively, the defendant must show
that it would be virtually impossible to deal with applicants on an individualized basis. Cf.
Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236, 12 FEP Cases at 1242 (adjudicating an age discrimination claim).
In Tamiatai, the court stated that Weeks required proof beyond administrative convenience
or statistical correlation. 531 F.2c1 at 236-37, 12 FEP Cases at 1242,
" See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1118, 46 FE? Cases 1743, 1746 (4th
Cir. 1987); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086, 21 FEY Cases
1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 1980).
12 See, e.g., Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 771, 27
FEY Cases 1575, 1576-77 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd without opinion, 779 F.2d 50, 45 FEP Cases
1895 (6th Cir. 1985); Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 654 F. Supp. 690, 701, 30
FEP Cases 638, 646-47 (F.D. Mich. 1982).
1 • See Griffin, 654 F. Stipp. at 701, 30 FEP Cases at 646-47.
" See, e.g., Gunther, 612 F.2d at 1086, 21 FE? Cases at 1036; Harden, 520 F. Supp. at
778, 27 FEP Cases at 1583; Griffin, (154 F. Supp. at 701, 30 FEI' Cases at 646-47.
15 See, e.g., Gregory, 818 F.2d at 1118, 46 FEE' Cases at 1746; Edwards v. Department of
Corrections, 615 F. Supp. 804, 808-09, 45 FEY Cases 1540, 1544-45 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
'" See, e.g., Gregory, 818 F.2d at 1115, 46 FEP Cases at 1744; Edwards, 615 F. Supp. at
810, 45 FEP Cases at 1545.
0 859 F.2d 1523, 1532-33, 48 FEP Cases 270, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1988).
18 Id. at 1532, 48 FEI' Cases at 277.
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court held, however, that on remand the administrators must estab-
lish that a female-only gender qualification is "reasonably necessary"
to achieve the rehabilitative goal.' 9
 By formulating the standard in
this fashion, the court lowered the threshold requirement for the
BFOQ defense, implying that the essence of a business is not nec-
essarily monolithic; rather, the essence may be multi-faceted. 2°
Moreover, the court reduced the burden of proof required to es-
tablish that the gender qualification is not merely a stereotypical
classification from a factual evidence standard" to a "totality of the
circumstances" determination. 22
In Torres, the designated defendant, Nora J. Switala, was the
superintendent of Wisconsin's Taycheedah Correctional Institution
(TCI), the only maximum security prison for women in the state."
The Department appointed Ms. Switala to this position in 1978. 24
Her qualifications included eleven years of experience in the Wis-
consin penal system. 25 Upon assuming the superintendency, Ms.
Switala reviewed TCI's staffing needs. 26 She ultimately decided, on
the basis of her concerns for inmate rehabilitation and security, that
only female correctional officers should staff nineteen of the twenty-
seven positions in the prison's living units. 27 The TCI administra-
tion, therefore, announced in 1980 that it would implement a
BFOQ program over a two-year period.28
 The plan was to replace
male officers who held any of the nineteen designated positions in
the living units with female officers through a gradual process of
attrition.29
 Males who still held any of the designated "female only"
positions on September 1, 1982, however, would have to vacate
those positions.3° In 1982, when the program was to be fully imple-
I , Id. at 1532-33, 48 FEP Cases at 277-78.
20 See id. at 1529-30, 48 FEP Cases at 274-75.
2 ' See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228, 235, 1 FEP Cases 656, 661 (5th
Cir. 1969).
" See Torres v. Wisconsin Dept of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532, 48 FEP
Cases 270, 277 (7th Cir. 1988).
29 Id. at 1524, 48 FEP Cases at 270.
2, Id. at 1525, 48 FEP Cases at 271.
29 See id. Ms. Switala served for three years as treatment director at TC1 and eight years
as a parole and probation agent with the Wisconsin Division of Corrections. Id.
29 Id.
2? Id. at 1525, 48 FEP Cases at 271-72.
29 Id. The BFOQ plan affected 19 of 27 positions in the living units, including all CO-3
(the highest ranking correctional officers' position at TCI) positions in the units. The result
of the plan was that only 3 CO-3 positions would be available to men. Id.
29 See Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 639 F. Supp. 271, 276, 40
FEP Cases 1748, 1752 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
99 Id.
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mented, the three plaintiffs, Raymond Torres, Franklin Utz, and
Gerald Schmidt still occupied "female only" positions." To accom-
modate the BFOQ program, they were demoted with no loss of pay
to "undesignated" positions." The plaintiffs thereupon filed suit
challenging the validity of the BFOQ program under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33
The district court, after an eleven-day trial and a tour of TCI, 34
held that the defendants failed to establish the validity of their
BFOQ program. 35 The court ordered the abolition of the program,
and the reinstatement of the plaintiffs." The prison administration
asserted security, privacy and rehabilitation concerns as justifications
for the female-only BFOQ. 37 Rejecting these justifications, the court
reasoned that the defendants had "failed to show that security,
privacy or rehabilitation" would diminish at TCI if the BFOQ pro-
gram was not implemented." Specifically, with regard to the re-
habilitation justification, the district court found that the defen-
dant "offered only a theory of rehabilitation" and "no objective
evidence either from empirical studies or otherwise." 39 The
See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1525, 48 FEY Cases at 272. In 1986, when the district court
rendered its opinion in the Torres case, Raymond Torres was 48 years old and had been a
CO-3 at TCI since 1978. Frank Utz was 56; he had transferred to 'FCI as a CO-3 in 1979.
Gerald Schmidt transferred to TCI as a CO-3 in 1975 and was 41 at the time of the suit.
Torres, 639 F. Supp. at 272, 40 FEP Cases at 1748-49.
32 Torres, 859 F.2d at 1525, 48 FEP Cases at 272.
33 See Torres, 639 F. Supp. at 272, 40 FEP Cases at i 748.
" Id.
" Id. at 281, 40 FEN Cases at 1756.
36
37 Id. at 278, 40 FEP Cases 1753.
38 Id. at 278-81, 40 FEP Cases at 1753-56.
39 Id. at 280, 4(1 FEP Cases at 1755. Superintendent Switala's unique theory is based on
the premise that before incarceration approximately 60% of all inmates were abused by
males, Id. at 279-80, 40 FEP Cases at 1755. Female inmates are, therefore, uncomfortable
with male guards. This discomfort or fear interferes with rehabilitation of the inmates. Id.
Thus, reasoned Superintendent Switala, being female is a necessary qualification for a CO-
3 position in the living units at To. See id. TCI introduced expert testimony in support of
the rehabilitation theory. Id. The plaintiffs, however, introduced expert testimony that male
guards "have a beneficial effect on inmate rehabilitation." Id. Superintendent Switala admitted
that no decrease in the recidivism rate occurred during the 3 years that the program was in
effect. Id.
Dissenting from the initial circuit court decision in Torres, Judge Ripple quoted Ms.
Switala's testimony about her theory:
A good many — about 60 percent or our population comes from abusive
backgrounds, either . . . at the hands of their parents or spouse or boyfriend
or whatever[.] [T]hey come into the institution and they have told me of their
fear of assault, their fear or physical- harm from inmates, and I believe that if'
a woman is afraid, that is going to take over predominantly her energy. The
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court found, therefore, that rehabilitation concerns did not justify
the program."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in an opinion written by judge Cudahy, affirmed the district
court's ruling.'" The court stated that the defendant must prove
that the essence of its business would be undermined absent the
gender-based qualification." Moreover, the court stated that the
defendant must prove that the gender qualification was based on
more than a stereotypical characterization.°
The Seventh Circuit rejected the prison administrators' three
justifications — security, privacy and rehabilitation — for its BFOQ
program.'" The court dismissed the defendant's security rationale,
reasoning that no real risk of physical assault existed and that
therefore the security rationale was merely an extension of the
privacy rationale.'" As to the privacy justification, the court, refer-
ring to analogous cases, stated that prisons can generally preserve
inmate's privacy rights without sacrificing the employment rights of
security guards." In particular, the court noted that TCI operated
energy she has to invest in herself is going to be diminished by those concerns
[and' by [not] being able to assure her that in her living space, men will not be
intruding on her private life.
[W]omen, as a rule, when they come in, they have a history of being very
influenced, if not dominated by men in their lives and one of our major goals
is to teach diem . . . self-respect and ... dignity[,] [and that they] have the
capability of making their own decisions and living their lives based on their
own perceptions of what they want and what their options are. And [if] we
establish atmospheres where men are playing the primary dominant force,
which is somewhat natural in a prison anyway, in terms of staffing, or power
or authority over inmates, we were to perpetuate that, that's just going to further
compound what she's lived with in the past and she will probably defer to the
male and that's not something we want her to do.
Torres v. Wisconsin Dept of Health & Social Servs., 838 F.2d 944, 955, 45 FEP Cases 1652,
1661-62 (7th Cir. 1988) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
40
 Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 639 F. Supp, 271, 280, 40 FEP
Cases 1748, 1755 (F.D. Wis. 1986).
4 ' Ton-es, 838 F.2d at 954-55, 45 FEP Cases at 1661.
42 Id. at 949, 45 FEP Cases at 1656, The Seventh Circuit cited the standards adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34, 15 FEP
Cases 10, 15-16 (1977). The Dothard Court enunciated the standards for reviewing a BFOQ
defense in the context of a male maximum security prison. Id.
43 Torres, 838 F.2d at 949, 45 FEP Cases at 1656 (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333, 10
FEP Cases at 15-16).
" Torres, 838 F.2d at 949-54, 45 FEP Cases at 1657-61.
43
 See id. at 950, 45 FEP Cases at 1657.
46 Id. at 952, 45 FEP Cases at 1659.
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sensitively with regard to inmate privacy. 47 The court, therefore,
concluded that the privacy justification did not support the BFOQ
delense. 48 The court also dismissed the defendant's rehabilitation
rationale,49 stating that although the defendant is not required to
"dispel all reasonable doubts"" about its rehabilitation theory, it
should have to make a preliminary showing of some likelihood of
success." The Seventh Circuit further noted that, given the length
of the trial in the district court and the fact that the district court
judge toured TCI, deferring to the district court's findings was
especially appropriate in this case. 52
Circuit Judge Ripple dissented from this holding." Although
Judge Ripple accepted the majority's straightforward dismissal of
the defendant's privacy justification,'" he objected to the majority's
characterization of the case as a clash between inmates' rights and
guards' employment rights. 55 Rather, he stated that the case pre-
sented a conflict between the duty of the prison administration to
innovate and the employment rights of the guards. 56 Judge Ripple
reasoned that the unique nature of female penitentiaries necessi-
tates an innovative approach to rehabilitation." He concluded,
therefore, that innovation is the essence of the business of TC1. 58
Judge Ripple stated that the majority had placed an unreasonable
burden on the defendants by requiring objective proof that their
rehabilitation theory was based on more than stereotypical charac-
terizations because the defendants could not gather empirical data
or objective proof without experimentation." He stated that because
female prisoners were perhaps the most isolated minority in the
" Id. at 951, 45 FEP Cases at 1658.
48
 Id. at 953, 45 FEP Cases at 1660.
49 See id. at 954, 45 FEP Cases at. 1661.
58 Id.
td Id. at 954-55 n.7, 45 FEP Cases at 1661 n.7. In footnote 7, the Seventh Circuit stated:
The dissent argues with some force that the state should be allowed to experi-
ment in its efforts to achieve greater rehabilitation. An experiment that infringes
on workers' Tide VII protections against discrimination based on gender, how-
ever, should not be permitted to go forward without some preliminary showing
that it is likely to achieve objectives beyond the testing of a theory.
Id.
52 Id. at 946, 45 FEP Cases at 1654.
51 Id. at 955, 45 HP Cases at 1661 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
55 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
r''' Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 956-57, 45 FEP Cases at 1662-63 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 957, 45 FEP Cases at 1663 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
59 See id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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United States, their rehabilitation and eventual reintegration into
society is a goal not unlike the goal of Title VII itself. 60 Judge Ripple
concluded that the majority's dismissal of the defendant's rehabili-
tation justification was incorrect.'''
Upon petition for rehearing, the Seventh Circuit vacated its
earlier opinion and granted a rehearing en banc. 62 On October 17,
1988, in an opinion written by Judge Ripple, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Torres court),
reversed the district court's ruling.° The Torres court held that the
district court should evaluate the administrator's rehabilitation the-
ory by considering the totality of the circumstances. 64 Because the
district court's resolution of the rehabilitation issue rested on the
lack of objective evidence, the Torres court stated that the district
court had no occasion to evaluate the record under the proper
standard.65 Therefore, the Torres court remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration in accordance with the newly enunciated "totality
of the circumstances" standard . 66
In its analysis on rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reiterated the
long established precedents of the BFOQ defense.67 The court
stated that it is "universally recognized" that the BFOQ defense is
an "extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of dis-
crimination . . . "68 The court noted that a BFOQ defense is only
valid when the essence of the business would be undermined absent
the gender-based qualification. 69 Moreover, the court stated that an
employer must show reasonable cause to believe "that all or sub-
stantially all [individuals of one gender] would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."'" Although
acknowledging that the BFOQ defense should not be based on
stereotypical characterizations or preconceptions, the Torres court,
foreshadowing their ultimate conclusion, noted that ,gender classi-
66 See id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
61 See id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
62 Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 838 F.2d at 957-58 (per curiam).
63 Torres v. Wisconsin Dept of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1533, 48 FEP
Cases 270, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1988).
" Id. at 1532, 48 FEP Cases at 277.
65 Id.
56 Id.
67 Id. at 1526-28, 48 FEP Cases at 273-74.
66 Id. at 1527, 48 FEP Cases at 273 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334,
15 FEP Cases 10, 16 (1977)).
66 Torres, 859 F.2d at 1527, 48 FEP Cases at 273.
7° Id.
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fications exist that realistically reflect differences between men and
women. 71
Analyzing the facts of the instant case, the Torres court held
that the district court had to hear the case again because the district
court had applied an incorrect legal standard." The Torres court
analyzed the first requirement for a valid BFOQ defense — whether
the defendant's rehabilitation justification went to the essence of
TCI's business." To assess this threshold issue, the court enunciated
the standard for determining the essence of a business. 74 The court
stated that generalities are not sufficient to analyze correctly the
essence element of a BFOQ defense." Rather, the court noted that
it must consider the particularities that distinguish one institution
from other institutions involved in the same general enterprise."
The Torres court reasoned that only by delving into the particular
mission of an institution could the court determine whether the
absence of gender-based qualifications would truly undermine the
institution's primary goals."
The Torres court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Do-
thard v. Rawlinson, in which the Court distinguished Alabama's pris-
ons from generic maximum security prisons, and mandated a re-
fined, case-by-case analysis of an institution's essence.'" Therefore,
the Toms court outlined several levels of analysis to explore before
determining the essence of TCI's business." The Torres court noted
71 See id. at 1527-28, 48 FEP Cases at 273-74.
72 Id. at 1532, 48 FEP Cases at 277. The Torres court affirmed the district court's decision
that the BFOQ defense could not he justified on privacy or security grounds. Id. at 1528, 48
PEP Cases at 274.
75 Id. at 1528-30, 48 PEP Cases at 274-75.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 1528, 48 FEP Cases at 274.
76 Id. at 1528-29, 48 FEP Cases at 274.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 1529, 48 FEP Cases at 275. In Dothard, the Supreme Court held that although
Congress intended the BFOQ defense to be an "extremely narrow exception," the particularly
inhospitable atmosphere of Alabama's prisons established a valid BFOQ defense to gender-
based discrimination. 433 U.S. 321, 334-37, 15 FEP Cases 10, 16-17 (1977).
72 See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529, 48 FEP Cases at 274-75. The Tones court further
supported its levels of analysis approach by citing to the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in
Tram World Airways, Ine.(TWA) v. Thurston. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1528, 48 FEP Cases at 274
(citing Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122, 36 PEI' Cases 977, 982 (1985)). The Torres court implied
that Thurston stands for the proposition that courts cannot deal in generalities when deter-
mining the essence of a business. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1528, 36 FEP Cases at 274. Thurston
was an age discrimination case. 469 U.S. at 114, 36 PEP Cases at 979. In Thurston, the Court
suggested that the essence requirement refers to the relationship between the essence of a
particular business and the essence of the particular job front which an individual is excluded.
See id. at 122, 36 PEP Cases at 982. The Thurston Court stated that age was not a valid BFOQ
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that, at the most general level, TCI is in the business of gover-
nance." The court implied, however, that the inquiry could not end
there." At a second level, the court noted that TCI's business is
penal administration. 82 The Torres court indicated that at this level,
justification may exist for deferring to the defendants' innovative
theory of rehabilitation, because prisons present intractable admin-
istrative problems.83 Yet, the court noted that this level of analysis
was still too general. 84 The Torres court stated that at the relevant
level of analysis the defendants administered "a distinct type of
penal institution — a women's maximum security facility." 85
In discerning the essence of TCI's administrative policy, the
Torres court distinguished the task of administering TCI from that
of administering a male maximum security prison." The Torres
court noted that little historical precedent for the administration of
female prisons is available. 87 The court observed that, at the most
basic operational level, the officials charged with the administration
of female prisons must innovate, whereas administrators of male
prisons may rely on historical precedent and empirical evidence in
determining the most effective operational procedures. 88 Noting
that the Wisconsin legislature mandates rehabilitation as one of the
for a flight engineer's job, as distinguished from a pilot's job. 469 U.S. at 122-23, 36 FEP
Cases at 983. Thus, the Thurston Court used particularity to limit the scope of the BFOQ
defense. See id.
The Torres court, however, used particularity to expand the scope of the BFOQ defense
by suggesting that the essence of a business may be multi-faceted. 859 F.2d at 1528-29, 48
FEP Cases at 274-75. Moreover, the Thurston Court's relational test would suggest that even
if rehabilitation and innovation are accepted as the essence of TCI's business, the defendants
in TCI would have to prove that the essence of a correctional officer's job is rehabilitation.
In the 1985 decision of Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio noted that although the essence of the
operation of the medium security center in question was the rehabilitation of criminals
convicted of misdemeanors, the essence of the job of a rehabilitation specialist was security.
See Harden, 520 F. Supp. 769, 778, 27 FEP Cases 1575, 1583 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd without
opinion, 779 F.2d 50, 45 FEP Cases 1985 (6th Cir. 1985). Harden highlights, therefore, in a
prison context, the distinction that can be drawn between the essence of a business and the
essence of a particular job. See id.
" Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d at 1523, 1529, 48 FEP




" See id. at 1529, 48 FEP Cases at 274-75.
" Id. at 1529, 48 FEP Cases at 275.
85 See id.
" See id. at 1529-30, 48 FEP Cases at 275.
" Id. at 1529, 48 FEN Cases at 275.
"See id. at 1529-30, 48 FEP. Cases at 275.
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goals of prison administration, the Torres court observed that re-
habilitation and, therefore, innovation must be part of the essence
of the business of the administration of TCI. 8° The court concluded
that the female-only BFOQ was directly related to the rehabilitative
essence of TCI's business. 90
The Torres court next assessed the second element of TC1's
BFOQ defense — whether TCI had reasonable cause to believe that
their rehabilitation theory was based on more than stereotypical
characterizations of gender differences. 9 ' The court held that this
element should be judged based on a totality of the circumstances
standard. 92 The Torres court distinguished the instant case from the
Second Circuit decision in Forts v. Ward." In Forts, the Second
Circuit held that the employment of male guards on overnight shifts
did not violate the privacy rights of the female inmates at the
Bedford Hills Correctional Facility. 94 The Torres court identified the
conflict in Forts as a conflict between the female inmates' privacy
rights and the guards' employment rights." The Torres court char-
acterized the Forts case as a "mere matter of 'consumer prefer-
ence." t The Torres court implied that at TCI, however, the clash
of interests was between the guards' employment rights and TCI's
responsibility to its inmates and to society in general for the reha-
bilitation of inmates. 97 Thus characterizing the TCI conflict, the
court reasoned that a more deferential standard of review was
appropriate on the second element of the BFOQ defense because
59 See id. at 1529-30, 48 FEP Cases at 275.
9° Id, at 1530, 48 FEP Cases at 275.
g' See id. at 1530-32, 48 FEP Cases at 276-77.
92 See id. at 1532, 48 FEP Cases at 277.
95 Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530, 48 FEP Cases at 275-76 (citing Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210,
27 FEP Cases 1587 (2d Cir. 1980)).
94 Forts, 621 F.2d at 1217, 27 FEI' Cases at 1592-93, In Forts, the female prisoners
asserted that the prison administrators violated their privacy rights by assigning male guards
to their living and sleeping quarters. 621 F.2d at 1212-13, 27 FEP Cases at 1588-89. The
court was loathe to prevent the administration from employing male guards on overnight
shifts, noting that, ultimately, female guards would suffer from such a decision. 621 F.2d at
1215-16, 27 HP Cases at 1591. Therefore, noting that the prison administrators could
accommodate inmates' privacy rights, the Forts court held that the prison administrators
could assign male guards to overnight duty. 621 F.2d at 1217, '27 FEI' Cases at 1592-93,
95 Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530, 48 FEP Cases at 275-76.
96 See id. at 1530, 48 FEY Cases at 276. At least one court has noted that consumer
preference — clients' desire to have one gender serve their needs — does not create a valid
13FOQ unless ignoring such a preference would undermine the business. Diaz v. Pan Amer-
ican World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389, 3 FEP Cases 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1971).
97 See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530, 48 FEP Cases at 276.
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the administrators had an obligation to the inmates and to society
in general to innovate."
The Torres court analyzed precedent in BFOQ jurisprudence
and found no general requirement that objective evidence support
a BFOQ." The court reasoned that empirical evidence may be
appropriate in certain circumstances, but noted that situations exist
where validation studies are either unnecessary or unavailable. 1 °0
Referring again to the Supreme Court's decision in Dothard, the
Torres court stated that the Supreme Court's appraisal of whether
male guards were necessary in Alabama's maximum security prisons
was based on a "common-sense understanding of penal condi-
tions."°' The Torres court implicitly reasoned, therefore, that Do-
thard requires judges to defer to some degree to prison administra-
tors. 102
The Torres court cited precedent where role model theories
sufficed to establish a BFOQ absent objective proof.'° 3 The court
suggested that role model theories are comparable to TCI's reha-
bilitation theory. 104
 A role model theory, by its very nature, is not
98 See id. at 1532, 48 FEP Cases at 277.
" Id. at 1531-32, 48 FEP Cases at 276-77.
l" Id.
1" Id. at 1531, 48 FEP Cases at 276.
I o 2 Id.
'" Id. at 1531, 48 FEP Cases at 276-77. In Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, cited by the
Torres court, the Eighth Circuit held that a role model theory could support a BFOQ defense.
834 F.2d 697, 705, 45 FEP Cases 698, 698 (8th Cir. 1987). The Chambers court upheld the •
district court's finding that there was a direct relationship between the Club's goal of pre-
venting teenage pregnancy and their refusal to continue to employ an unmarried female
staff member when she became pregnant. Id. at 701-02, 45 FEP Cases at 701-02, The
Chambers court observed that role models may not be suited to empirical validation, Id. at
702, 45 FEP Cases at 702. Therefore, the court held that the district court's decision was
plausible and not clearly erroneous. Id. at 702, 45 FEP Cases at 701-02.
In Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago, also cited by the Torres court, the court held that
the evidence supported the general proposition advanced by the university, that having a
Jesuit presence at the university was reasonably necessary to the operation of the school. 803
F.2d 351, 354, 42 FEP Cases 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, the court held that being a Jesuit
was a valid BFOQ for a teaching position in the philosophy department. Id. In a concurring
opinion in Pime, Judge Posner suggested that the majority's reading of the BFOQ defense
might be too broad. Id, at 356, 42 FEP Cases at 4-5 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner
implied that by allowing tradition to suffice to establish a BFOQ, the court could be condoning
the type of traditional discrimination that Title VII is meant to eliminate. Id. (Posner, J.,
concurring). Judge Posner concurred in the court's judgment, however, despite the defen-
dant's failure to establish a BFOQ, because, he argued, the plaintiff had not made out a
prima facie case for religious discrimination. Id. at 356, 42 FEP Cases at 4-5 (Posner, J.,
concurring).
104 See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1531-32, 48 FEP Cases at 276-77.
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suited to empirical validation. 10" Similarly, the court reasoned that
TCI's rehabilitation theory, was not suited to empirical validation
because it is an innovative theory and therefore, by definition, could
not be proven empirically.'"
The Torres court stated that the district court required the
defendants to meet an unfair burden and that a court should eval-
uate the totality of the circumstances in assessing TCI's efforts to
rehabilitate its inmates.' 07 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit held that
the district court, on remand, should give substantial weight to
TCI's judgments if the district court found that TCI's program is
the "product of a reasoned decision-making process."'" 8 Conclud-
ing, the Torres court emphasized the narrowness of its holding and
stressed that a claim of innovation alone will not suffice to elude
Title VII and establish a BFOQ delensei°9 The court held only
that given the special circumstances of the instant case, the district
court erred in requiring objective validation to prove the second
element of the BFOQ defense."°
The Torres court's decision after rehearing produced two dis-
senting opinions. Circuit Judge Cudahy wrote one dissent, joined
by Circuit Judges Cummings and Easterbrook."' Circuit judge Eas-
terbrook wrote a separate dissent as well." 2
Judge Cudahy asserted that TCI must bear the heavy burden
of explaining and justifying its rehabilitation theory." 3 Given the
absence of evidence of any adverse reactions from the past employ-
ment of male guards in TCI's living units, Judge Cudahy concluded
that TCI had not established a valid BFOQ defense." 4 Moreover,
he objected to the majority's interpretation of Dothard as creating a
standard of review that would require the plaintiffs to prove that
TCI's program was not a "product of reasoned decision-making.""''
Requiring the plaintiffs to prove an inadequate process, Judge Cu-
dahy reasoned, degraded Title VIPs basic assumption that gender
105 hi.
See id. at 1531-32,48 FEP Cases at 277.
107 Id. at 1532,48 FEP Cases at 277.
108 Id.
1100 ld. at 1532-33,48 FEY Cases at 277-78.
11" ld, at 1533,48 HP Cases at 277-78.
1 " Id. at 1533-35,48 FEP Cases at 278-80 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
112 Id, at 1535-38,98 FEP Cases at 280-82 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
113 See id, at 1533,48 FEP Cases at 278 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
" 4 See N. at 1533-35,48 FEP Cases at 278-80 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 1534,48 HP Cases at 279 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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is rarely a decisive qualification in employment." 6 Judge Cudahy
stated that intractable problems exist at all levels of governance and
that, therefore, to distinguish prisons from other governmental
activities on that ground is inapt.'" He argued that, given the
district judge's experience as a district attorney and as Attorney
General of Wisconsin, the court should be particularly deferential
to the district court judge's evaluation of the evidence.'"
Judge Easterbrook, in his dissent, argued that, with the enact-
ment of Title VII, Congress altered the standard of proof required
to establish a valid BFOQ defense." 9 Judge Easterbrook noted that
the statute requires that TCI's gender qualification be necessary,
not merely reasonably related, to the goals of the institution.'" He
reasoned that the majority's standard conflicted with the statutory
mandate by accepting TCI's "bare opinion" that the BFOQ was
necessary.' 2 ' He suggested that the majority misinterpreted the dis-
trict court's standard by focusing on the district court's use of the
words "objective evidence. "122 Judge Easterbrook reasoned that the
district judge did not require computer data; rather, he suggested
that the district judge merely indicated that the expert testimony
was not conclusive.'" As to the majority's use of Wisconsin's legis-
lation to establish the essence of the business of penal institutions
in the state, Judge Easterbrook concluded that the state may pursue
whatever goals it chooses, but not at the expense of employment
discrimination. 124
Although the Torres court cited with approval the generally
accepted elements of a BFOQ defense, the Torres court's decision is
inconsistent with BFOQ jurisprudence in the prison context. Gen-
erally, gender-based BFOQs for prison guards are held to be in-
valid.' 25 Although most prison cases involve male prisons, the cases
116 See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
" 7 See id. at 1534, 48 FEP Cases at 279 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
"" Id. at 1535, 48 FEP Cases at 280 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
119 See id. at 1535, 48 FE? Cases at 280 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
1211 Id, (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
121 See id. at 1536, 48 FEP Cases at 280-81 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
"2 See id. at 1537, 48 FEY Cases at 281 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
123 See id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Easterhrook, J., dissenting).
In See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1115, 46 FEP Cases 1743, 1744
(4th Cir. 1987); Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1372, 30 FE? Cases 624, 630 (11th
Cir. 1982); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1087, 21 FEP Cases
1031, 1037 (8th Cir. 1980); Griffin v. Mich. Dep't of Corrections, 654 F. Supp. 690, 704-05,
30 FE? Cases 638, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1982). .
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involving female prisons have not upheld the validity of female-
only BFOQs. 126.
Although a number of federal courts have decided Title VII
actions involving gender discrimination in the prison context, the
Torres court used the reasoning of only two.127 The Torres court
based its decision on the 1977 Supreme Court decision in Dothard
v. Rawlinson.'" Although the Supreme Court in Dothard held that
the administrators of Alabama's Department of Safety established
a valid male-only BFOQ for Alabama's male maximum security
prisons, the Supreme Court suggested that Dothard was the excep-
tion, not the general rule.'" In fact, other courts use the narrow
holding of Dothard to invalidate gender-based BFOQs for prisons.'"
The only other prison case that the Torres court cites is Forts v.
Ward.' 3 ' In Forts, however, the court held that a female-only BFOQ
was invalid.' 32 The Torres court distinguished Forts on the grounds
that Forts was a suit brought by the female inmates of the prison
asserting their privacy rights.'" Although this distinction is valid,
the vast majority of prison cases that remain uncited by the Torres
court are cases where employees have brought actions asserting
their employment rights and the courts have held gender-based
BFOQs invalid.' 34
Torres affirms that a gender-based qualification is only valid
when the absence of such a qualification would undermine the
essence of the business.'" The purpose of the essence threshold
requirement for a BFOQ defense is to ensure that without gender
126 Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217, 27 FEP Cases 1587, 1593 (2d Cir. 1980); Edwards
v. Dept of Corrections, 615 F. Supp. 804, 810, 45 FEP Cases 1540, 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1985);
Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 774, 27 FEP Cases 1575,
1579 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
127 The Torres court does cite a third prison case, Hardin v. Stynchcomb, for the proposition
that "Title VII prohibits employment discrimination, which is 'one of the most deplorable
forms of discrimination.'" Torres, 859 F.2d at 1526-27, 48 FEP Cases at 273 (citing Hardin,
691 F.2d at 1369, 30 FEP Cases at 627).
128 See supra notes 78, 101-02 arid accompanying text for a discussion of Dothard,
129 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-37, 15 FEP Cases 10, 15-17 (1977).
1" See, e.g., Gregory, 818 F.2d at 1117-18, 46 FEP Cases at 1746; Hardin, 691 F.2d at
1372, 30 FEP Cases at 628; Edwards, 615 F. Supp. at 808, 45 FEP Cases at 1544.
1 ' 3 See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530, 48 FEP Cases at 275-76 (citing Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d
1210, 27 FEP Cases 1587 (2d Cir. 1980)).
132
 Forts, 621 F.2d at 1217, 27 FEP Cases at 1593.
' 3 ' Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530, 48 FEP Cases at 275-76.
134 See, e.g., Gregory, 818 F.2d at 1118, 46 FEP Cases at 1746-47; Edwards, 615 F. Supp.	 I
at 805, 810, 45 FEP Cases at 1541, 1545; Griffin, 654 F. Supp. at 693, 705, 30 FEP Cases at
640, 649.
175 See supra note 69 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point. .
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discrimination, the normal operation of a business will be under-
mined. Courts use the essence threshold to ensure that the BFOQ
defense remains a narrow exception to the general Title VII non-
discrimination principle. Without the essence requirement, the
BFOQ defense could conceivably swallow the general rule.' 36
Therefore, the essence of a business is that characteristic of a busi-
ness without which the business would not be viable.
The Torres court uses Dothard's analysis of the specific charac-
teristics of Alabama's male maximum security prisons to suggest
that courts should consider the goals of a particular institution in
order to determine the essence of the institution.'" Dothard's anal-
ysis distinguished Alabama's prisons on factual grounds, however,
observing that Alabama's maximum security prisons are "character-
ized by `rampant violence' and a jungle atmosphere." 38
 The Torres
court did not distinguish TCI from male maximum security prisons
on the basis of a factual analysis of the environment. Rather, the
Torres court distinguished TCI on the basis of TCI's superinten-
dent's methodological needs. 13° Therefore, although the Torres
court appears to delve into particulars with its levels of analysis
standard to determine the essence of TCI, the Torres court's focus
is on methodology, not environment.
The Torres court's analysis of the standard of proof required to
ensure that a BFOQ is not based on stereotypical characterizations
falls short of the statutory mandate. As pointed out by Judge Cu-
dahy in his dissent, the majority's totality of circumstances standard
suggests that the majority simply did not agree with the district
judge's evaluation of the evidence.' 40 The Torres court cites to several
Supreme Court cases to establish that courts should be particularly
deferential to the determinations of prison administrators who must
cope with "intractable problems" of penal institutions."' These
' 6 E.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235, 1 FEP Cases 656,
660-61 (5th Cir. 1969).
"r See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529, 48 FEP Cases at 275 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334, 15
FEP Cases at 16).
L" See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334-36, 15 FEP Cases at 15-16 (citing Pugh v. Locke (also
cited as James v. Wallace), 406 F. Stipp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976)).
139 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the administration
of female prisons.
4" See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1534, 48 FEP Cases at 279 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
141 See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529, 48 FEP Cases at 274-75 (citing Turner v. Salley, 107 S.
Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119,
127-29 (1977); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974)).
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cases, however, balance the constitutional rights of inmates against
the duties of prison administrators.'" The cited cases deferred to
prison administrators when the challenged regulations did not im-
plicate the rights of third parties (non-inmates)."' In Torres, the
statutory rights of third parties are the focus and, therefore, the
court should follow the Title VII mandate and be less deferential.
When other courts have balanced prisoners' rights, intertwined with
administrators' concerns about security, against employees' Title
VII rights, the employees have prevailed.'"
One may view Torres as a victory for feminism because the
decision implicitly recognizes that female prisoners have suffered
from abuse at the hands of males in society."' Unless other courts
interpret Torres as the exception and not the rule, however, Torres
could impede women's employment opportunities. Although the
Torres grievance is asserted on behalf of men, prison cases are
generally about discrimination against women.' 46 The Torres court's
essence analysis, combined with its diminished burden of proof,
could ultimately exclude women from positions at male peniten-
tiaries on the basis of theories and stereotypes if empirical data on
a particular theory is unavailable. Courts should use a standard that
will ensure that gender classifications are not valid unless such
142 E.g., Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2257 (first amendment and right to marry); Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 339 (eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment); Bell, 441 U.S. at 523 (fourth
amendment and due process); Jones, 433 U.S. at 121 (first amendment right to associate);
Procunier, 416 U.S. at 398-400 (first amendment censorship).
' 4 ' Compare Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 and Jones, 433 U.S. at 132 with Procunier, 416 U.S. at
409 and Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2266 (citing Procunier, 416 U.S. at 409).
The Procunier Court upheld the district court's invalidation of snail censorship regulations
issued by the Director of the California Department of Corrections. 416 U.S. at 415-16. The
Court rejected the Department's argument, based on assumptions about the legal status of
prisoners, for an undemanding standard of review. Id. at 409. The Court stated, "[t]his line
of argument and the undemanding standard of review it is intended to support fail to
recognize that the First Amendment liberties of free citizens are implicated in censorship of
prisoner mail." Id.
The Turner Court held that the Missouri Department of Corrections marriage regulation
was facially invalid. 107 S. Ct. at 2267. The Court noted that the marriage regulation could
implicate the interests of non-prisoners. 107 S. Ct. at 2265-66. The Court implied that an
undemanding standard of review would therefore be inappropriate. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at
2266 (citing Procunier, 416 U.S. at 409).
144 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the invalidation of
gender-based BFOQs.
115 See Jacobs, The Sexual Integration of the Prison's Guard Force: A Few Comments on Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 10 ToLEDo L. REV. 389, 414-17 (1979) for a discussion of the effect of Dothard
on the privacy rights of female prisoners and employment opportunities for women. See
supra note 39 for a discussion of the background of Female prisoners.
195 Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1215, 27 FEP Cases 1587, 1591 (2d Cir. 1980).
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discrimination is necessary. Gender discrimination is only necessary
when, absent the gender-based qualification, the institution will not
be viable.
B.*Retroactive Application of Pension Plan Rulings: Florida v. Long'
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an unlawful
employment practice "to discriminate against any individual with
regard to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's .. ,. sex."2 If a court finds
that an unlawful employment practice exists, "the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment prac-
tice, and order . . . affirmative action . . . or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate." 3 Although the statute states
that courts "may" award retroactive relief, the United States Su-
preme Court has stated that courts should not apply the "presump-
tion in favor of retroactive liability" in Title VII pension plan cases,
unless plainly commanded by legislative action.'
In the 1978 case of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart, the Supreme Court held that the sex discrimination pro-
visions of Title VII prohibited an employer from requiring women
to make larger pension plan contributions than men, based on the
longer lifespan of women as reflected in sex-based actuarial tables. 5
The Court denied retroactive relief, concluding that the presump-
tion in favor of retroactive relief should not be applied in Title VII
pension plan cases because it would be financially devastating to the
pension fund and would harm innocent third parties. 5 In the 1983
case of Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, the Supreme Court
held that Title VII also prohibited an employer from offering its
employees the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of
several companies selected by the employer, all of which paid
* By Janet Eve Josselyn, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
Florida v. Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354, 47 FEP Cases 7 (1988).
2 42	 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
3
 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1982).
Los Angeles Dept of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 721, 17 FEP Cases
395, 404 (1978).
5 Id. at 717, 17 FEP Cases at 402.
Id. at 722-23, 17 FEP Cases at 404. The Court noted that if the pension fund reserve
was not large enough to fund the retroactive award, it would be necessary to raise additional
revenue. If the pension fund raised additional revenue by lowering the benefits of all retired
workers or by increasing the burden on current employees, the financial burden would fall
on innocent third parties. Id.
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women lower monthly benefits than men, based on sex-based actu-
arial tables.? The Norris Court stated that "the classification of em-
ployees on the basis of sex is no more permissible at the pay-out
stage of a retirement plan than at the pay-in stage." 8 The Norris
Court stated that post-Manhart contributions must yield equal ben-
efits for both men and women. 9
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in Florida v. Long,
ruled that employers are not liable for pension plans offering dis-
criminatory payment options during periods prior to the Norris
decision.'° The Court stated that Norris, not Manhart, put employers
on notice that optional pension plans offering sex-based benefits
violated Title VII." The Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Manhart
that courts should not apply the presumption in favor of retroactive
relief in Title VII pension plan cases, stressing that such retroactive
relief would impose costs that would threaten the financial security
of both the funds and the beneficiaries.' 2 As a result, the Court held
that under the plan at issue in Long, employers need not make
adjustments for past,or future benefit payments for employees who
retired before the effective date of the Norris decision. 18 The Court
implied that no adjustment need occur because the plan offered
defined benefits, and the employer complied with the law at the
time the pension funds received the contributions.'`' An employer
may be liable, however, for offering pension plan options after the
Norris decision if those plans entail unequal contributions or un-
equal benefits based on sex-based actuarial tables.' 5 Consequently,
after the Long case, pension plans are not subject to retroactive
adjustment provided that they offered defined benefits and com-
plied with existing law at the time the pension funds received the
contributions.' 6
In Florida v. Long, a class of male retirees brought a class action
suit under Title VII on behalf of male retirees who elected one of
the optional pension plans offered by the state of Florida to state
7 Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086, 32 FEP Cases 233, 239
(1983).
8 Id. at 1081, 32 FEP Cases at 237.
Id. at 1093, 32 HP Cases at 242.
" Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2350, 47 FEP Cases at 10.
ll Id. at 2361, 47 FEP Cases at 11.
L2 Id. at 2362-63, 47 FE1' Cases at 12-13.
33 Id. at 2365, 47 FEP Cases at 14.
14 Id. at 2364, 47 FEP Cases at 14.
15 Id. at 2361, 47 FEP Cases at 11.
16 Id. at 2364, 47 HP Cases at 14.
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employees.' 7 The class consisted of male employees who retired
after the effective date of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 18 and before August 1, 1983, when Florida, pursuant to
the Norris decision, adopted unisex actuarial tables for all employees
in the Florida Retirement Systerni 9 Although the Florida Retire-
ment System calculated an employee's normal retirement benefit
without regard to the retiree's sex, if a male retiree chose one of
the optional plans instead of the normal plan, the male retiree
would receive a lower monthly payment than the female would
receive under the same optional plan. 2°
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the male retirees,
holding that the optional pension plan discriminated against male
employees in violation of Title VII.2 ' The district court ordered
Florida to compensate the men who retired after Manhart for the
difference between the benefits that the male retirees had received
and the benefits they would have received had the pension plan
used unisex mortality tables during the period between Manhart
and the court's judgment. 22 The district court also awarded in-
creased future benefits, calculated in the same manner." The dis-
trict court reasoned that the awards were appropriate because Man-
hart placed employers on notice that pension benefits as well as
contributions must be calculated without reliance on sex-based ac-
_ tuarial tables. 24 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.25
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
Norris decision, not the earlier Manhart decision, placed employers
17 Id. at 2358, 47 FEP Cases at 9.
Ili
	 at 2358 n.1, 47 FEP Cases at 8 n.1, 9. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 defined public employers (such as the state of Florida and its local governments) as
"employers" within the meaning of Title VII. Id.
19 Id. at 2358, 47 FEP Cases at 9.
2° Id. The Florida system calculated the normal retirement for both men and women
without regard to the retiree's sex. The optional plans, however, utilized sex-based actuarial
tables in order to determine the present actuarial value of the total amount an employee
would receive under the normal plan during the period between retirement and death. This
amount represented the amount an employee would receive under one of the optional plans.
As a male's life expectancy was shorter than a female's life expectancy, the optional plans
paid lower monthly benefits to males than the same optional plans paid to females. Id.
21 Id. at 2358, 47 FEP Cases at 10.
22 Id. at 2358-59, 47 FEP Cases at 10.
25 Id. at 2359, 47 FEP Cases at 10.
24 Id.
25 805 F.2d 1542, reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 1552 (1986) (per curiam).
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on notice that employer-operated pension, plans could not offer
discriminatory benefits without violating Title VII. 26 The Long Court
refused to apply retroactive relief for violations pre-dating its ,de-
cision in Norris." Reiterating its reasoning in Manhart, the Long
Court stated that such retroactive relief was not warranted for
periods in which the employer reasonably assumed that the use of
sex-based tables was lawful. 28 The Long Court held that the award
of increased future benefits was retroactive "in nature" and there-
fore prohibited for the same reason. 29 The Long Court also stated
that awarding retroactive relief would threaten the financial stability
of the pension plan and the financial security of the beneficiaries."
The majority opinion concluded that the first award, requiring
prejudgment benefit increases, was retroactive "without doubt" and
was therefore impermissible. 31 The majority also concluded that the
second award, requiring post-judgment benefit adjustments, al-
though related 'to future payments, was "fundamentally retroactive"
because it increased future benefits based on past contributions and
past actuarial assumptions. 32 After concluding that both awards
were retroactive, the Long Court identified three criteria for deter-
mining whether a retroactive award was appropriate in a Title VII
case involving the use of sex-based actuarial tables."
The first criterion concerns whether the Court's decision in
Manhart put Florida on notice that unequal benefit payments vio-
lated Title VII." The Long Court, concluded that Norris, not Man-
hart, put Florida on notice because Manhart only established that
unequal contributions, not benefits, violated Title VII. 35 In addition,
the Long Court reasoned that the Manhart decision left open the
possibility that an employer could set aside equal contributions and
allow each employee to purchase the largest benefit available on the
open market." The Long Court also stated that Manhart did not
26 Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2359, 47 FEP Cases at 10.
27 Id .
28 Id. at 2356, 47 FEP Cases at 14.
29 Id. The Court stated that the adjustment of future benefits is retroactive in nature"
because future benefit payments are based on contributions made in the past. Id. at 2364,
47 FEP Cases at 14.
'" Id. at 2362, 47 FEY Cases at 12-13.
Id. at 2363, 47 PEP Cases at 13.
32 Id. at 2363-64, 47 PEP Cases at 13-14.
" Id. at 2359, 47 PEP Cases at 10.
" Id.
33 Id. at 2360-61, 47 FEP Cases at 11.
96 Id, at 2360, 47 FEP Cases at 11.
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explicitly prevent the offering of sex-based annuities as options."
For these reasons, the Long Court held that Manhart 'did not put
Florida on notice that unequal benefits violated Title VII."
The second criterion the Long Court addressed was whether a
retroactive award was necessary in this case in order to either deter
deliberate violations or to ensure compliance with the Norris deci-
sion.39
 The Court noted that in Long, a retroactive award was not
necessary because Florida had modified its optional pension plans
to comply with Norris immediately following the effective date of
that decision." In addition, the Long Court stated that there was no
evidence that employers in general had not complied with the Title
VII requirements announced in Manhart and Norris.4 '
The third criterion . that the Long Court discussed was whether
an award of retroactive relief would produce inequitable results
"for the States, employers, retirees, or pension funds."42 The Court
concluded that retroactive relief would be inequitable because it
would cause financial instability in pension and retirement pro-
grams, resulting in harm to other retirees and innocent third par-
ties. 4" In addition, the Court stated that a retroactive award that
caused a deficiency in the pension fund could cause the pension
fund to violate its contractual guarantee to provide defined benefits
to other retirees." The Long Court, therefore, reaffirmed its con-
clusion in Manhart and Norris that retroactive liability was inappro-
priate in Title VII pension plan cases."
The majority concluded that the district court's award for com-
pensatory payments to employees who retired after Manhart and
before Norris was retroactive in nature and therefore impermissi-
ble." In addition, the Long Court held that the portion of the district
court award requiring that future payments be adjusted for all pre-
Norris male retirees who were receiving lower benefits was "retro-
active in nature and therefore impermissible."47 The Long Court
reached this conclusion because the award would adjust benefits
37 Id. at 2361, 47 FEP Cases at 12.
" Id. at 2361, 47 FEP Cases at 11.
39 Id. at 2359, 47 FEP Cases at 10.
4° Id. at 2362, 47 FEP Cases at 12.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2359, 47 FEP Cases at 10.
45 Id. at 2362, 47 FEP Cases at 13.
44 Id. at 2364, 47 FEE' Cases at 14.
45 Id. at 2362, 47 FEP Cases at 13.
4° Id. at 2363, 47 FEP Cases at 13.
" Id. at 2363-64, 47 FEP Cases at 13-14,
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that the pension plan had calculated in a manner that was not
unlawful at the time the retirements-occurred."
Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, disagreed with the
majority that Norris put Florida on notice that failure to use unisex
tables in calcUlating retirement benefits violated Title V II. 49 Justice
Blackmun argued that Manhart, not Norris, supplied the date after
which Florida should be liable. 50 Justice Blackmun reasoned that
the Manhart decision "clearly foreshadowed" the unlawfulness of
Florida's pension plan.5 ! Justice Blackmun argued that Norris did
not articulate a new principle of law 52 because Manhart laid down a
general rule that Title VII prohibited the use of sex-based actuarial
tables. 53 In addition, Justice Blackmun.argued that Manhart's open
market exception was only applicable to third party insurers and
not applicable to the employer-operated plan in Long,"
Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that both awards
were retroactive, 55 but disagreed with the majority that retroactive
liability would be inequitable. 56 Although Justice Blackmun agreed
with the majority that respondents who retired before Manhart were
not entitled to equitable relief, he argued that retroactive relief was
appropriate for post-Manhart retirees because Manhart, not Norris,
placed Florida on notice." Justice Blackmun argued that the pre-
sumption in favor of retroactive liability should apply because the
law was sufficiently clear at the time of the violation 58 and "no special
factors were presented . . . that would make an award of relief
inequitable for post-Manhart retirees."59
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with the major-
ity that recovery was not warranted for violations that occured prior
48 Id. at 2364, 47 FEP Cases at 14.





53 Id. at 2366, 47 FEP Cases at 16.
54 Id.
" Id. at 2365 n.2, 47 FEP Cases at 15 n:2.
56 Id. at 2368, 47 FEP Cases at 17.
" Id. at 2366, 47 FEP Cases at 15, 16.
58 Id. at 2365, 47 FEP Cases at 15.
Id, at 2368, 47 FEP Cases at 17.
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, argued for adjusting the future benefits for all pre-
Manhart male retirees because he characterized the future payments as "prospective," not
"retroactive." Id. at 2368-69, 47 FEP Cases at 17-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to the Manhart decision.° Justice Stevens agreed with the court of
appeals that the pre-Norris and pre-Manhart retirees should have
their future benefits increased because such future relief would be
prospective, not retroactive, in nature. 6 ' In addition, Justice Stevens
concluded that there were "no special equities in this case militating
against an award of this type of prospective relief." 62
Prior to the Long decision, the Supreme Court stated that it
was not necessary to apply retroactive relief in Title VII pension
plan cases because retroactive relief was not necessary to further
the principles of Title VII, and because such relief would impose
an adverse financial effect on the pension funds and beneficiaries.°
The Long decision reaffirms this proposition. 64 The majority, how-
ever, stretched this proposition by classifying adjusted future pay-
ments as retroactive in nature in order to deny an award of adjusted
future payments. It appears from the additional arguments offered
by the majority that their primary motivation for refusing to grant
relief was their concern about the potential adverse consequences
to the pension fund's economic stability. 65
The majority, however, limited its holding in Long in two im-
portant respects. First, the Court noted that since Florida had mod-
ified its pension plan options to comply with the Norris decision,
retroactive relief was not necessary in order to deter deliberate
violations or to ensure compliance in the future. 66 The Court stated
that if Florida had not complied with the Norris decision prohibiting
the use of sex-based actuarial tables to calculate benefits for its
pension plan, "the case before us would have been an altogether
different one."67 Although the l majority did not explain how the
case would have been different, this statement implies that the
majority would have been less reluctant to award retroactive relief
in such a case in order to deter deliberate violations and ensure
future compliance with the Norris decision.
Second, the majority admits that a different assessment of re-
troactivity might result if a pension plan did not provide retirees
"° Id. at 2368, 47 FEP Cases at 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2369, 47 FEP Cases at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Id.
65 See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1092, 32 FEP Cases 233, 242
(1983); Los Angeles Dept of Water & Power v. Mani-tart, 435 U.S. 702, 722-23, 17 FEP
Cases 395, 404 (1978).
" Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354, 2362-63, 47 FEP Cases 7, 12-13 (1988).
" 5 See id. at 2362-65, 47 FEP Cases at 12-14.
6° Id. at 2362-63, 47 FEP Cases at 12-13.
Id. at 2363, 47 FEN Cases at 13.
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with a contractual right to receive a fixed level of benefits or a fixed
rate of return on contributions." If an award of increased future
benefits in such a case did not require additional funding by the
state or employer and did not violate the contractual rights of other
retirees, the award would not disrupt past pension funding as-
sumptions and therefore would not be retroactive in nature. 69 Any
award, however, that disrupts past pension funding assumptions by
requiring adjustments based on conduct that could not reasonably
have been in violation of Title VII at the time the retirements
occured, is considered "essentially retroactive."'" Long, therefore,
indicates that in the future, courts will not adjust benefits for retirees
whose benefits were defined by a pension plan that complied with
the laws applicable when the contributions were made.
In essence, these two limitations carve out only a narrow range
of exceptions to the decision in Long not to apply retroactive relief.
Although the Long decision implies that the Court will consider
awarding retroactive relief in order to deter deliberate violations or
in situations where such an award would not be economically det-
rimental, the Long decision does not indicate the extent of the
interrelationship between these two exceptions. In the future, it is
unclear whether the Court will award retroactive relief in order to
deter continuing violations if such an award would be economically
detrimental to the pension fund. Although the Long decision does
not address the issue, the Court implied that the potential economic
consequences of a retroactive award will be the controlling factor.
In the 1988 case of Florida v. Long, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that employers are not liable for operating pension
plans that offer discriminatory payment options during periods
prior to the Norris decision. The Court reaffirmed its conclusion in
Manhart that courts should not apply the presumption in favor of
retroactive relief to Title VII pension plan cases if such relief would
impose a financial burden on the pension fund or its beneficiaries.
Long indicates that in the future, courts will not apply a pension
plan ruling retroactively if the pension plan in question contained
defined benefits and if the plan complied with existing law at the
time the contributors made their contributions.
"Id. at 2364, 47 FEP Cases at 14.
BUJ
70 Id.
